https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/massey/oai:mro.massey.ac.nz:10179/2803
type: CreativeWork
name: Intelligence preparation of the battlefield in the contemporary operating environment : a grounded theory of the New Zealand experience : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at Massey University, Manawatu, New Zealand
description: The past decade has seen the New Zealand Defence Force operate in a diverse range of land-environment missions. From the low-risk efforts bringing support to civil authorities in the Solomon Islands, through peacekeeping operations in Timor Leste, to the contribution to the counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan; New Zealand forces are experiencing the complexities of the irregular nature of the contemporary operating environment (COE). While accolades are forthcoming for New Zealand’s contribution, some operational difficulties, particularly in intelligence exist. A key problem that needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency is the utility and understanding of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process in the COE. The reason is clear - Countering Irregular Threats (CIT) will be the main form of activity for at least the next decade with complex missions predicted to be the regular, contemporary form of military operations for New Zealand out to 2020. This thesis discusses the perception of the IPB by 17 participants from the New Zealand Defence Force. The participants included personnel who deployed on operational missions as well as training staff. By analysing their experiences the grounded theory just getting by emerged as a research-based explanation of the New Zealand approach. Just getting by consists of six categories: ambivalence, short of expectations, recognising the need to adapt, risk, professional optimism and satisficing. The theory concluded that difficulties in applying the traditional IPB in the COE were the result of three key elements. First, most of the training was perceived as still grounded in the Cold War era conventional environment. Second, the small Intelligence Corps was considered overstretched and barely holding on as an effective military force. Third, the doctrine of intelligence-led operations appeared to be ignored, causing much angst and frustration. The overall feeling was the IPB was not operating as expected,…
abstract: The past decade has seen the New Zealand Defence Force operate in a diverse range of land-environment missions. From the low-risk efforts bringing support to civil authorities in the Solomon Islands, through peacekeeping operations in Timor Leste, to the contribution to the counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan; New Zealand forces are experiencing the complexities of the irregular nature of the contemporary operating environment (COE). While accolades are forthcoming for New Zealand’s contribution, some operational difficulties, particularly in intelligence exist. A key problem that needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency is the utility and understanding of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process in the COE. The reason is clear - Countering Irregular Threats (CIT) will be the main form of activity for at least the next decade with complex missions predicted to be the regular, contemporary form of military operations for New Zealand out to 2020. This thesis discusses the perception of the IPB by 17 participants from the New Zealand Defence Force. The participants included personnel who deployed on operational missions as well as training staff. By analysing their experiences the grounded theory just getting by emerged as a research-based explanation of the New Zealand approach. Just getting by consists of six categories: ambivalence, short of expectations, recognising the need to adapt, risk, professional optimism and satisficing. The theory concluded that difficulties in applying the traditional IPB in the COE were the result of three key elements. First, most of the training was perceived as still grounded in the Cold War era conventional environment. Second, the small Intelligence Corps was considered overstretched and barely holding on as an effective military force. Third, the doctrine of intelligence-led operations appeared to be ignored, causing much angst and frustration. The overall feeling was the IPB was not operating as expected,…
author: Wineera, Gerald (Josh)
keywords: New Zealand Army drill and tactics, Military intelligence, Insurgency, Intelligence preparation of the battlefield, Contemporary operating environment
date published: 2011
date modified: 2026-07-27T20:18:23Z
provider: Massey University
publisher: Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations
type: WebPage
source organization: Massey University