{"id":{"repo_id":"lsu-thes","oai_identifier":"oai:repository.lsu.edu:gradschool_dissertations-1148"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/lsu-thes/oai:repository.lsu.edu:gradschool_dissertations-1148","repository":{"repo_id":"lsu-thes","name":"Lousiana State University","base_url":"https://repository.lsu.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"CEO succession processes and agency costs","abstract":"In the 'passing the baton' succession process, the incumbent CEO/Chairman relinquishes the CEO title, but retains the Chairman title to facilitate monitoring the new CEO during a probationary period. The new CEO eventually wins the Chairman title if he is successful during the probationary period. We argue that this type of succession process can lead to managerial conformism and conservatism because reputation concerns give the retiring CEO incentives to pressure the new CEO to continue existing policies and to avoid making major changes that could substantially improve performance or increase firm value. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find no changes in operating performance, abnormal stock returns, or the number of policy decisions the new CEO makes during his probationary period, but significant increases in all of these measures after the probationary period ends. Managerial entrenchment exacerbates succession-securing behavior during the probationary period, while effective monitoring and control mitigate it.","abstract_html":"In the 'passing the baton' succession process, the incumbent CEO/Chairman relinquishes the CEO title, but retains the Chairman title to facilitate monitoring the new CEO during a probationary period. The new CEO eventually wins the Chairman title if he is successful during the probationary period. We argue that this type of succession process can lead to managerial conformism and conservatism because reputation concerns give the retiring CEO incentives to pressure the new CEO to continue existing policies and to avoid making major changes that could substantially improve performance or increase firm value. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find no changes in operating performance, abnormal stock returns, or the number of policy decisions the new CEO makes during his probationary period, but significant increases in all of these measures after the probationary period ends. Managerial entrenchment exacerbates succession-securing behavior during the probationary period, while effective monitoring and control mitigate it.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Altintig, Zeynep Ayca"],"institution":"Finance (Business Administration)","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Finance and Financial Management","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2005,"date_issued":"2005-01-01T08:00:00Z","date_published":"2005-01-01T08:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:57:12Z","subjects":["agency costs","corporate governance","ceo succession","passing the baton"],"languages":[],"rights":["unrestricted","Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["etd-08192005-152601","https://repository.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/149"],"render_values":[{"text":"etd-08192005-152601","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"https://repository.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/149","href":"https://repository.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/149","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/10.31390/gradschool_dissertations.149","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Altintig, Zeynep Ayca"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2005-07-15"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2022-05-12T23:07:51Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Finance and Financial Management"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Finance (Business Administration)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["agency costs","corporate governance","ceo succession","passing the baton"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["unrestricted","Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide."]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["etd-08192005-152601","10.31390/gradschool_dissertations.149","https://repository.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/149"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["In the 'passing the baton' succession process, the incumbent CEO/Chairman relinquishes the CEO title, but retains the Chairman title to facilitate monitoring the new CEO during a probationary period. The new CEO eventually wins the Chairman title if he is successful during the probationary period. We argue that this type of succession process can lead to managerial conformism and conservatism because reputation concerns give the retiring CEO incentives to pressure the new CEO to continue existing policies and to avoid making major changes that could substantially improve performance or increase firm value. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find no changes in operating performance, abnormal stock returns, or the number of policy decisions the new CEO makes during his probationary period, but significant increases in all of these measures after the probationary period ends. Managerial entrenchment exacerbates succession-securing behavior during the probationary period, while effective monitoring and control mitigate it."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["CEO succession processes and agency costs"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:creator":["Altintig, Zeynep Ayca"],"dc:date":["2005-07-15"],"dc:date.available":["2022-05-12T23:07:51Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["In the 'passing the baton' succession process, the incumbent CEO/Chairman relinquishes the CEO title, but retains the Chairman title to facilitate monitoring the new CEO during a probationary period. The new CEO eventually wins the Chairman title if he is successful during the probationary period. We argue that this type of succession process can lead to managerial conformism and conservatism because reputation concerns give the retiring CEO incentives to pressure the new CEO to continue existing policies and to avoid making major changes that could substantially improve performance or increase firm value. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find no changes in operating performance, abnormal stock returns, or the number of policy decisions the new CEO makes during his probationary period, but significant increases in all of these measures after the probationary period ends. Managerial entrenchment exacerbates succession-securing behavior during the probationary period, while effective monitoring and control mitigate it."],"dc:identifier":["etd-08192005-152601","10.31390/gradschool_dissertations.149","https://repository.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/149"],"dc:rights":["unrestricted","Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide."],"dc:subject":["agency costs","corporate governance","ceo succession","passing the baton"],"dc:title":["CEO succession processes and agency costs"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Finance and Financial Management"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"],"thesis:institution_name":["Finance (Business Administration)"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:57:12Z"}