This dissertation addresses a simple question: Is an anencephalic child a person? These children are born with only a brain stem, and, as such, cannot experience any type of consciousness. If personhood is understood as an articulable moral category, particularly distinct from DNA membership, reasonable evidence would be required to attribute any such moral category in these cases. That is, to claim that children who may never think or feel are persons carries a philosophical burden that extends beyond mere Homo Sapiens membership. This dissertation accepts that burden and answers that anencephalic children are persons. To do this, I first show that natural sciences tendencies and protocols cannot be the basis for personhood because, although proficient in what they do well, they are not sufficiently perceptive where moral questions such as personhood are involved. Second, I then argue that various philosophical groups who agree with me on anencephalic personhood too often fall prey to simple speciesist tendencies, basically asserting that only humans, as humans, are persons. Third, I rely on the phenomenological ethics of Emmanuel Levinas to provide a plausible basis for a non-speciesist personhood attribution, where the child is understood as always already appearing to me as a person. Finally, to anchor these Levinasian claims in practice, I use first-person narratives of caregivers, philosophers, and family members in particular settings, as well as inventive scenarios, to illustrate the personal encounters that Levinas claims occur. These accounts then give credence to claims of primordial personal encounters that ground the relationships I document others as having with these children. If successful, the dissertation overall then provides a reasonable and philosophically articulable basis for personhood claims to such children and, by extension, other such severely damaged individuals.
","abstract_html":"<p>This dissertation addresses a simple question: Is an anencephalic child a person? These children are born with only a brain stem, and, as such, cannot experience any type of consciousness. If personhood is understood as an articulable moral category, particularly distinct from DNA membership, reasonable evidence would be required to attribute any such moral category in these cases. That is, to claim that children who may never think or feel are persons carries a philosophical burden that extends beyond mere Homo Sapiens membership. This dissertation accepts that burden and answers that anencephalic children are persons. To do this, I first show that natural sciences tendencies and protocols cannot be the basis for personhood because, although proficient in what they do well, they are not sufficiently perceptive where moral questions such as personhood are involved. Second, I then argue that various philosophical groups who agree with me on anencephalic personhood too often fall prey to simple speciesist tendencies, basically asserting that only humans, as humans, are persons. Third, I rely on the phenomenological ethics of Emmanuel Levinas to provide a plausible basis for a non-speciesist personhood attribution, where the child is understood as always already appearing to me as a person. Finally, to anchor these Levinasian claims in practice, I use first-person narratives of caregivers, philosophers, and family members in particular settings, as well as inventive scenarios, to illustrate the personal encounters that Levinas claims occur. These accounts then give credence to claims of primordial personal encounters that ground the relationships I document others as having with these children. If successful, the dissertation overall then provides a reasonable and philosophically articulable basis for personhood claims to such children and, by extension, other such severely damaged individuals.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Buckley, Brian Joseph"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2011,"date_issued":"2011-01-01T08:00:00Z","date_published":"2011-01-01T08:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:55:08Z","subjects":["Anencephalic","Levinas","Naturalism","Personhood","Phenomenology","Taylor","Ethics and Political Philosophy"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/216","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Buckley, Brian Joseph"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2016-03-31T17:09:07Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Anencephalic","Levinas","Naturalism","Personhood","Phenomenology","Taylor","Ethics and Political Philosophy"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/216"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This dissertation addresses a simple question: Is an anencephalic child a person? These children are born with only a brain stem, and, as such, cannot experience any type of consciousness. If personhood is understood as an articulable moral category, particularly distinct from DNA membership, reasonable evidence would be required to attribute any such moral category in these cases. That is, to claim that children who may never think or feel are persons carries a philosophical burden that extends beyond mere Homo Sapiens membership. This dissertation accepts that burden and answers that anencephalic children are persons. To do this, I first show that natural sciences tendencies and protocols cannot be the basis for personhood because, although proficient in what they do well, they are not sufficiently perceptive where moral questions such as personhood are involved. Second, I then argue that various philosophical groups who agree with me on anencephalic personhood too often fall prey to simple speciesist tendencies, basically asserting that only humans, as humans, are persons. Third, I rely on the phenomenological ethics of Emmanuel Levinas to provide a plausible basis for a non-speciesist personhood attribution, where the child is understood as always already appearing to me as a person. Finally, to anchor these Levinasian claims in practice, I use first-person narratives of caregivers, philosophers, and family members in particular settings, as well as inventive scenarios, to illustrate the personal encounters that Levinas claims occur. These accounts then give credence to claims of primordial personal encounters that ground the relationships I document others as having with these children. If successful, the dissertation overall then provides a reasonable and philosophically articulable basis for personhood claims to such children and, by extension, other such severely damaged individuals.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Restoring the Balance: Setting Aside Naturalism in Favor of Personhood in Extreme Cases"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:creator":["Buckley, Brian Joseph"],"dc:date.available":["2016-03-31T17:09:07Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["This dissertation addresses a simple question: Is an anencephalic child a person? These children are born with only a brain stem, and, as such, cannot experience any type of consciousness. If personhood is understood as an articulable moral category, particularly distinct from DNA membership, reasonable evidence would be required to attribute any such moral category in these cases. That is, to claim that children who may never think or feel are persons carries a philosophical burden that extends beyond mere Homo Sapiens membership. This dissertation accepts that burden and answers that anencephalic children are persons. To do this, I first show that natural sciences tendencies and protocols cannot be the basis for personhood because, although proficient in what they do well, they are not sufficiently perceptive where moral questions such as personhood are involved. Second, I then argue that various philosophical groups who agree with me on anencephalic personhood too often fall prey to simple speciesist tendencies, basically asserting that only humans, as humans, are persons. Third, I rely on the phenomenological ethics of Emmanuel Levinas to provide a plausible basis for a non-speciesist personhood attribution, where the child is understood as always already appearing to me as a person. Finally, to anchor these Levinasian claims in practice, I use first-person narratives of caregivers, philosophers, and family members in particular settings, as well as inventive scenarios, to illustrate the personal encounters that Levinas claims occur. These accounts then give credence to claims of primordial personal encounters that ground the relationships I document others as having with these children. If successful, the dissertation overall then provides a reasonable and philosophically articulable basis for personhood claims to such children and, by extension, other such severely damaged individuals.
"],"dc:identifier":["https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/216"],"dc:subject":["Anencephalic","Levinas","Naturalism","Personhood","Phenomenology","Taylor","Ethics and Political Philosophy"],"dc:title":["Restoring the Balance: Setting Aside Naturalism in Favor of Personhood in Extreme Cases"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:55:08Z"}