Effects of Variable Payoff Structures on Cooperative Behaviors in a Repeated Prisoners Dilemma Game

This study examined the effects of payoff manipulations on cooperative behaviors between individuals using a Repeated Prisoners Dilemma Game (PDG). Eight graduate students served as participants and played 12 occurrences of the PDG with varying amounts of payoffs for cooperation or defection (non-cooperation). A reversal design experiment was conducted completely remotely, with the participants prevented from seeing and communicating with their dyad partners in each trial. Data were analyzed both in terms of group data, as well as individual within-subject data presented per participant. The results showed that individual levels of cooperation varied with no major trends distinguishing the effects of the differing reward conditions. The differing payoff amounts did not seem to influence behavior generally. Future research should continue to examine payoff variations along with the social consequences that may occur when participants are not anonymous.Keywords: cooperation, prisoners dilemma game, payoff, social consequences

Grantor dc:publisher

University of Kansas

Year dc:date.issued

2023

Author dc:creator

• Bauer, William

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Zane, Thomas

• Behavioral sciences
• Cooperation
• Payoff
• Prisoners Dilemma game
• Social consequences

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright held by the author.

Language dc:language.iso

en

Dc Identifier Other

http://dissertations.umi.com/ku:19050

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:kuscholarworks.ku.edu:1808/38866