{"id":{"repo_id":"ku","oai_identifier":"oai:kuscholarworks.ku.edu:1808/37212"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/ku/oai:kuscholarworks.ku.edu:1808/37212","repository":{"repo_id":"ku","name":"University of Kansas","base_url":"https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Informal Accountability: Individual Actions and Organizational Consequences","abstract":"Organizations increasingly work together in collaborative arrangements to achieve common objectives. Because these collaborations typically lack the normal controls and formal accountability structures inherent in traditional hierarchical settings, individuals must find ways to hold each other accountable informally. The extant public administration literature on informal accountability is limited and chiefly provides a theoretical model for how individuals within collaborative groups use facilitative behaviors, reinforced by exchanging informal rewards and sanctions, to hold members accountable for group goals. These actions are exchanged between individuals who come to the group with a wide range of knowledge and expertise and represent agencies with varying levels of resources, cultures, and goals. Despite the prevalence of these collaborative arrangements at all levels of government, we know very little about the potential consequences stemming from these individual-level informal accountability actions and, more importantly, how those consequences spill over to organizations. This dissertation advances the thesis that individual-level informal accountability actions have unintended consequences for organizations. After analyzing case study data for two collaborative groups engaged in federal-level national security policymaking, this research presents an enhanced informal accountability model reflecting potential breakdowns of informal feedback mechanisms and the resulting consequences borne by organizations party to the collaboration.","abstract_html":"Organizations increasingly work together in collaborative arrangements to achieve common objectives. Because these collaborations typically lack the normal controls and formal accountability structures inherent in traditional hierarchical settings, individuals must find ways to hold each other accountable informally. The extant public administration literature on informal accountability is limited and chiefly provides a theoretical model for how individuals within collaborative groups use facilitative behaviors, reinforced by exchanging informal rewards and sanctions, to hold members accountable for group goals. These actions are exchanged between individuals who come to the group with a wide range of knowledge and expertise and represent agencies with varying levels of resources, cultures, and goals. Despite the prevalence of these collaborative arrangements at all levels of government, we know very little about the potential consequences stemming from these individual-level informal accountability actions and, more importantly, how those consequences spill over to organizations. This dissertation advances the thesis that individual-level informal accountability actions have unintended consequences for organizations. After analyzing case study data for two collaborative groups engaged in federal-level national security policymaking, this research presents an enhanced informal accountability model reflecting potential breakdowns of informal feedback mechanisms and the resulting consequences borne by organizations party to the collaboration.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Hartunian, Eric"],"institution":"University of Kansas","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["O'Leary, Rosemary"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019-01-01","date_published":"2019-01-01","updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:44:56Z","subjects":["Public administration","Accountability","Collaboration","Interagency","National Security"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright held by the author."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["http://dissertations.umi.com/ku:16381"],"render_values":[{"text":"http://dissertations.umi.com/ku:16381","href":"http://dissertations.umi.com/ku:16381","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/1808/37212","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["O'Leary, Rosemary"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Hartunian, Eric"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2026-04-14T16:05:42Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2026-04-14T16:05:42Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2019-01-01"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["University of Kansas"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Dissertation"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Public administration","Accountability","Collaboration","Interagency","National Security"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright held by the author."]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["http://dissertations.umi.com/ku:16381"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/1808/37212"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Organizations increasingly work together in collaborative arrangements to achieve common objectives. Because these collaborations typically lack the normal controls and formal accountability structures inherent in traditional hierarchical settings, individuals must find ways to hold each other accountable informally. The extant public administration literature on informal accountability is limited and chiefly provides a theoretical model for how individuals within collaborative groups use facilitative behaviors, reinforced by exchanging informal rewards and sanctions, to hold members accountable for group goals. These actions are exchanged between individuals who come to the group with a wide range of knowledge and expertise and represent agencies with varying levels of resources, cultures, and goals. Despite the prevalence of these collaborative arrangements at all levels of government, we know very little about the potential consequences stemming from these individual-level informal accountability actions and, more importantly, how those consequences spill over to organizations. This dissertation advances the thesis that individual-level informal accountability actions have unintended consequences for organizations. After analyzing case study data for two collaborative groups engaged in federal-level national security policymaking, this research presents an enhanced informal accountability model reflecting potential breakdowns of informal feedback mechanisms and the resulting consequences borne by organizations party to the collaboration."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Informal Accountability: Individual Actions and Organizational Consequences"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["O'Leary, Rosemary"],"dc:creator":["Hartunian, Eric"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2026-04-14T16:05:42Z"],"dc:date.available":["2026-04-14T16:05:42Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2019-01-01"],"dc:description.abstract":["Organizations increasingly work together in collaborative arrangements to achieve common objectives. Because these collaborations typically lack the normal controls and formal accountability structures inherent in traditional hierarchical settings, individuals must find ways to hold each other accountable informally. The extant public administration literature on informal accountability is limited and chiefly provides a theoretical model for how individuals within collaborative groups use facilitative behaviors, reinforced by exchanging informal rewards and sanctions, to hold members accountable for group goals. These actions are exchanged between individuals who come to the group with a wide range of knowledge and expertise and represent agencies with varying levels of resources, cultures, and goals. Despite the prevalence of these collaborative arrangements at all levels of government, we know very little about the potential consequences stemming from these individual-level informal accountability actions and, more importantly, how those consequences spill over to organizations. This dissertation advances the thesis that individual-level informal accountability actions have unintended consequences for organizations. After analyzing case study data for two collaborative groups engaged in federal-level national security policymaking, this research presents an enhanced informal accountability model reflecting potential breakdowns of informal feedback mechanisms and the resulting consequences borne by organizations party to the collaboration."],"dc:identifier.other":["http://dissertations.umi.com/ku:16381"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/1808/37212"],"dc:language.iso":["en"],"dc:publisher":["University of Kansas"],"dc:rights":["Copyright held by the author."],"dc:subject":["Public administration","Accountability","Collaboration","Interagency","National Security"],"dc:title":["Informal Accountability: Individual Actions and Organizational Consequences"],"dc:type":["Dissertation"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:44:56Z"}