Against the Linguistic Strategy for the Ontic Conception of Scientific Explanation

Philosophers of science are interested in characterizing the nature of scientific explanation. Much of the debate has been about which format or structures best represent, and thus explain, scientific phenomena. Pushing back against these representational views, Craver has been developing an ontic account of scientific explanation. According to this view, explanations are not representations of things in the real world but are the things in the world themselves. In a recent paper, Craver (2013) argues in favor of the ontic view by appeal to our use of the word ‘explain.’ In this paper, I evaluate Craver’s linguistic strategy and argue that it fails to provide support for the ontic view. Craver introduces a distinction between four senses of ‘explain’ and argues that one sense - the ontic sense - is the literal and foundational sense. This is taken to justify the ontic view. In this paper, I argue that linguistic tests for primacy do not privilege the ontic sense of ‘explain,’ and in fact, indicate that the ontic sense is subordinate. I conclude by raising some general questions about the merits of the linguistic strategy as method of justification for the ontic view of scientific explanation.

Grantor dc:publisher

University of Kansas

Year dc:date.issued

2017

Author dc:creator

• Fensholt, Rebecca Janell

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Robins, Sarah

• Philosophy of science
• Linguistics
• ambiguity
• explanation
• ontic
• polysemy

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright held by the author.

Language dc:language.iso

en

Dc Identifier Other

http://dissertations.umi.com/ku:15350

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:kuscholarworks.ku.edu:1808/25806