KANT’S DOCTRINE OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM

My dissertation proposes a novel interpretation of Kant’s doctrine of transcendental idealism as presented in the Critique of Pure Reason. I aim to give a consensus interpretation by overcoming past errors in interpreting this doctrine. I support my interpretation through a textual exegesis of the Critique of Pure Reason with a special focus on the direct and indirect proofs of transcendental idealism. Transcendental idealism is the doctrine that objects of our experience, space, and time, when taken as they would be outside our possible experience, are nothing but mere representations. However, this does not make them into illusions. This is because Kant takes objects of our experience, space, and time to be empirically real. Empirical realism is the doctrine that objects of our experience, space, and time, when taken within our possible experience, exist independently of us. Yet, their empirical reality is not grounded in things in themselves, about whose existence Kant is agnostic. Instead, the reality of objects of our experience, space, and time depend on a standard of empirical reality that differs from the standard of transcendental reality. This separate standard of empirical reality allows Kant to hold transcendental idealism and empirical realism at the same time. Finally, while not strictly part of the doctrine of transcendental idealism, I answer the question of the relation of appearances and things in themselves. The distinction between appearances and things in themselves is a metaphysical distinction between two different ways of being, i.e., objectivity, properties, existence, reality. Yet, this is a metaphysical distinction within the same concept of an object. Thus, appearances and things in themselves are the same object conceptually that is determined metaphysically in two different ways.

Grantor dc:publisher

[Bloomington, Ind.] : Indiana University

Year dc:date.issued

2024

Author dc:creator

• Buchinski, Alexander

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Wood, Allen, Ph.D.

• Kant
• Transcendental Idealism
• Metaphysics
• Epistemology
• History of Philosophy

Language dc:language.iso

en

Handle dc:identifier.uri

https://hdl.handle.net/2022/29822

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:scholarworks.iu.edu:2022/29822