The existing nuclear deterrence literature has, as a whole, overlooked rogue states, and especially North Korea. In the first half of this paper, I present a game-theoretic model that demonstrates the differences between how a rogue state acts with and without nuclear weapons. The second half of this paper is a case study focusing on North Korea, examining how North Korea fits into the model. My analysis of the model results in these conclusions: One, North Korea will respond with nuclear weapons if attacked; Two, a nuclear first strike by the U.S. on North Korea is possible if the nuclear taboo is overcome, and; Third, North Korea will not negotiate away its nuclear weapons. With these conclusions in mind, U.S. policy toward North Korea must accept these conclusions adjust accordingly. If the U.S. does not change its policy toward North Korea, the conflict will not continue without resolution.
","abstract_html":"<p>The existing nuclear deterrence literature has, as a whole, overlooked rogue states, and especially North Korea. In the first half of this paper, I present a game-theoretic model that demonstrates the differences between how a rogue state acts with and without nuclear weapons. The second half of this paper is a case study focusing on North Korea, examining how North Korea fits into the model. My analysis of the model results in these conclusions: One, North Korea will respond with nuclear weapons if attacked; Two, a nuclear first strike by the U.S. on North Korea is possible if the nuclear taboo is overcome, and; Third, North Korea will not negotiate away its nuclear weapons. With these conclusions in mind, U.S. policy toward North Korea must accept these conclusions adjust accordingly. If the U.S. does not change its policy toward North Korea, the conflict will not continue without resolution.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Hoffman, Nathan"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Master of Arts","degree_level":"thesis","degree_discipline":"Political Science","degree_department":"Department of Political Science","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Mark Nieman"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019-01-01","date_published":"2019-01-01","updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:39:41Z","subjects":[],"languages":["en"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["archive/lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/17027/"],"render_values":[{"text":"archive/lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/17027/","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://dr.lib.iastate.edu/handle/20.500.12876/31210","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Mark Nieman"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Department of Political Science"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Hoffman, Nathan"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2019-08-21T12:06:15.000"]},{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2020-06-30T03:15:21Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2020-06-30T03:15:21Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2019-01-01"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Political Science"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Arts"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["archive/lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/17027/"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://dr.lib.iastate.edu/handle/20.500.12876/31210"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["The existing nuclear deterrence literature has, as a whole, overlooked rogue states, and especially North Korea. In the first half of this paper, I present a game-theoretic model that demonstrates the differences between how a rogue state acts with and without nuclear weapons. The second half of this paper is a case study focusing on North Korea, examining how North Korea fits into the model. My analysis of the model results in these conclusions: One, North Korea will respond with nuclear weapons if attacked; Two, a nuclear first strike by the U.S. on North Korea is possible if the nuclear taboo is overcome, and; Third, North Korea will not negotiate away its nuclear weapons. With these conclusions in mind, U.S. policy toward North Korea must accept these conclusions adjust accordingly. If the U.S. does not change its policy toward North Korea, the conflict will not continue without resolution.
"]},{"key":"dc:format.mimetype","label":"Dc Format Mimetype","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Strategic deferment: A study of the rogue state, status quo state relationship with a focus on the United States and North Korea"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Mark Nieman"],"dc:contributor.department":["Department of Political Science"],"dc:creator":["Hoffman, Nathan"],"dc:date":["2019-08-21T12:06:15.000"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2020-06-30T03:15:21Z"],"dc:date.available":["2020-06-30T03:15:21Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2019-01-01"],"dc:description.abstract":["The existing nuclear deterrence literature has, as a whole, overlooked rogue states, and especially North Korea. In the first half of this paper, I present a game-theoretic model that demonstrates the differences between how a rogue state acts with and without nuclear weapons. The second half of this paper is a case study focusing on North Korea, examining how North Korea fits into the model. My analysis of the model results in these conclusions: One, North Korea will respond with nuclear weapons if attacked; Two, a nuclear first strike by the U.S. on North Korea is possible if the nuclear taboo is overcome, and; Third, North Korea will not negotiate away its nuclear weapons. With these conclusions in mind, U.S. policy toward North Korea must accept these conclusions adjust accordingly. If the U.S. does not change its policy toward North Korea, the conflict will not continue without resolution.
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