{"id":{"repo_id":"houston","oai_identifier":"oai:uh-ir.tdl.org:10657/5815"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/houston/oai:uh-ir.tdl.org:10657/5815","repository":{"repo_id":"houston","name":"University of Houston","base_url":"https://uh-ir.tdl.org/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Does Tightening Auditing Standards Improve or Impair Welfare?","abstract":"This study investigates the effects of tightening auditing standards in a setting of an oligopolistic audit market and a competitive capital market. I look at how tightening auditing standards affects audit quality, audit fee, audit market share, stock price, and investment decisions. Two audit firms engage in a two-stage competition: audit quality competition and audit fee competition. Audit quality has a dual role: (a) audit quality affects the credibility of the accounting reports (precision effect); (b) a company’s choice of a high-quality versus a low-quality audit firm signals its hidden information about its economic prospects (signaling effect). I find that tightening auditing standards will improve the credibility of accounting reports of those companies that stick to original auditors and impair the credibility of accounting reports of those companies that switch auditors.","abstract_html":"This study investigates the effects of tightening auditing standards in a setting of an oligopolistic audit market and a competitive capital market. I look at how tightening auditing standards affects audit quality, audit fee, audit market share, stock price, and investment decisions. Two audit firms engage in a two-stage competition: audit quality competition and audit fee competition. Audit quality has a dual role: (a) audit quality affects the credibility of the accounting reports (precision effect); (b) a company’s choice of a high-quality versus a low-quality audit firm signals its hidden information about its economic prospects (signaling effect). I find that tightening auditing standards will improve the credibility of accounting reports of those companies that stick to original auditors and impair the credibility of accounting reports of those companies that switch auditors.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Ruan, Lijun"],"institution":"University of Houston","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":"Business Administration","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Lu, Tong"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":["Lin, Haijin","Langberg, Nisan","Seo, Sang Byung"],"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019-05","date_published":"2019-05","updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:31:47Z","subjects":["Auditing standards","Audit fee","Audit quality","Capital markets"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["The author of this work is the copyright owner. UH Libraries and the Texas Digital Library have their permission to store and provide access to this work. Further transmission, reproduction, or presentation of this work is prohibited except with permission of the author(s)."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/10657/5815","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Lu, Tong"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Lin, Haijin","Langberg, Nisan","Seo, Sang Byung"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Ruan, Lijun"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2020-01-07T02:41:16Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2019-05"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Business Administration"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Houston"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Auditing standards","Audit fee","Audit quality","Capital markets"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["The author of this work is the copyright owner. UH Libraries and the Texas Digital Library have their permission to store and provide access to this work. Further transmission, reproduction, or presentation of this work is prohibited except with permission of the author(s)."]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/10657/5815"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This study investigates the effects of tightening auditing standards in a setting of an oligopolistic audit market and a competitive capital market. I look at how tightening auditing standards affects audit quality, audit fee, audit market share, stock price, and investment decisions. Two audit firms engage in a two-stage competition: audit quality competition and audit fee competition. Audit quality has a dual role: (a) audit quality affects the credibility of the accounting reports (precision effect); (b) a company’s choice of a high-quality versus a low-quality audit firm signals its hidden information about its economic prospects (signaling effect). I find that tightening auditing standards will improve the credibility of accounting reports of those companies that stick to original auditors and impair the credibility of accounting reports of those companies that switch auditors."]},{"key":"dc:format.mimetype","label":"Dc Format Mimetype","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Does Tightening Auditing Standards Improve or Impair Welfare?"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Lu, Tong"],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Lin, Haijin","Langberg, Nisan","Seo, Sang Byung"],"dc:creator":["Ruan, Lijun"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2020-01-07T02:41:16Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2019-05"],"dc:description.abstract":["This study investigates the effects of tightening auditing standards in a setting of an oligopolistic audit market and a competitive capital market. I look at how tightening auditing standards affects audit quality, audit fee, audit market share, stock price, and investment decisions. Two audit firms engage in a two-stage competition: audit quality competition and audit fee competition. Audit quality has a dual role: (a) audit quality affects the credibility of the accounting reports (precision effect); (b) a company’s choice of a high-quality versus a low-quality audit firm signals its hidden information about its economic prospects (signaling effect). I find that tightening auditing standards will improve the credibility of accounting reports of those companies that stick to original auditors and impair the credibility of accounting reports of those companies that switch auditors."],"dc:format.mimetype":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/10657/5815"],"dc:language.iso":["eng"],"dc:rights":["The author of this work is the copyright owner. UH Libraries and the Texas Digital Library have their permission to store and provide access to this work. Further transmission, reproduction, or presentation of this work is prohibited except with permission of the author(s)."],"dc:subject":["Auditing standards","Audit fee","Audit quality","Capital markets"],"dc:title":["Does Tightening Auditing Standards Improve or Impair Welfare?"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Business Administration"],"thesis:degree_level":["Doctoral"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy"],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Houston"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:31:47Z"}