{"id":{"repo_id":"heid-diss","oai_identifier":"oai:archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de:6952"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/heid-diss/oai:archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de:6952","repository":{"repo_id":"heid-diss","name":"Universität Heidelberg","base_url":"http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/cgi/oai2"},"display":{"title":"Financial Markets, Financial Intermediation, and Bailout Policy","abstract":"The 1980s and 1990s have been marked with a series of financial and banking crises all over the world. This turned the attention of economists to such questions as how a financial system should be structured in order to reduce the vulnerability of an economy to the risk of a crisis, or what policy should regulators follow in order to prevent the crises, and what regulatory measures would help in reduction of harmful effects of the crises? This dissertation studies relative advantages of a bank-based financial system against a market-based one. Instead of considering the role of financial intermediaries and financial markets in promoting economic growth, the work focuses on their ability to handle a crisis situation and to provide the optimal allocation of resources. The design of the bailout policy plays an important role in this issue, therefore the analysis begins with a microeconomic discussion of insolvency resolutions and then proceeds to a macroeconomic discussion of an optimal crisis management. The analysis here addresses such issues as constructive ambiguity and forbearance in the bailout policy of banking regulators. In particular, it is shown that ambiguity may be harmful for the economy, since asymmetric beliefs of the public may lead to suboptimal allocation of resources. On the contrary, forbearance may have a positive effect, since it makes intermediaries internalizing the costs of insolvency. In a dynamic context, banking system is more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks, since it transfers and magnifies the impact of the shock into future periods through borrowing from future generations, which in financial markets is impossible. However, a properly regulated banking system exhibits the property of intertemporal shock smoothing, whereas financial markets concentrate the burden of the shock in one period. The dissertation concludes with a discussion of several banking crises, including the Russian crisis in 1998, the Japanese crisis of 1990-s, and the Swedish crisis of the beginning of 1990-s.","abstract_html":"The 1980s and 1990s have been marked with a series of financial and banking crises all over the world. This turned the attention of economists to such questions as how a financial system should be structured in order to reduce the vulnerability of an economy to the risk of a crisis, or what policy should regulators follow in order to prevent the crises, and what regulatory measures would help in reduction of harmful effects of the crises? This dissertation studies relative advantages of a bank-based financial system against a market-based one. Instead of considering the role of financial intermediaries and financial markets in promoting economic growth, the work focuses on their ability to handle a crisis situation and to provide the optimal allocation of resources. The design of the bailout policy plays an important role in this issue, therefore the analysis begins with a microeconomic discussion of insolvency resolutions and then proceeds to a macroeconomic discussion of an optimal crisis management. The analysis here addresses such issues as constructive ambiguity and forbearance in the bailout policy of banking regulators. In particular, it is shown that ambiguity may be harmful for the economy, since asymmetric beliefs of the public may lead to suboptimal allocation of resources. On the contrary, forbearance may have a positive effect, since it makes intermediaries internalizing the costs of insolvency. In a dynamic context, banking system is more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks, since it transfers and magnifies the impact of the shock into future periods through borrowing from future generations, which in financial markets is impossible. However, a properly regulated banking system exhibits the property of intertemporal shock smoothing, whereas financial markets concentrate the burden of the shock in one period. The dissertation concludes with a discussion of several banking crises, including the Russian crisis in 1998, the Japanese crisis of 1990-s, and the Swedish crisis of the beginning of 1990-s.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Vinogradov, Dmitri V."],"institution":"Universität Heidelberg","degree_name":null,"degree_level":"thesis.doctoral","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Eichberger, Jürgen"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2006,"date_issued":"2006-07-20","date_published":"2006-07-20","updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:30:34Z","subjects":[],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/6952","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"source_url"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Eichberger, Jürgen"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Vinogradov, Dmitri V."]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["doctoralThesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["thesis.doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Universität Heidelberg"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["The 1980s and 1990s have been marked with a series of financial and banking crises all over the world. This turned the attention of economists to such questions as how a financial system should be structured in order to reduce the vulnerability of an economy to the risk of a crisis, or what policy should regulators follow in order to prevent the crises, and what regulatory measures would help in reduction of harmful effects of the crises? This dissertation studies relative advantages of a bank-based financial system against a market-based one. Instead of considering the role of financial intermediaries and financial markets in promoting economic growth, the work focuses on their ability to handle a crisis situation and to provide the optimal allocation of resources. The design of the bailout policy plays an important role in this issue, therefore the analysis begins with a microeconomic discussion of insolvency resolutions and then proceeds to a macroeconomic discussion of an optimal crisis management. The analysis here addresses such issues as constructive ambiguity and forbearance in the bailout policy of banking regulators. In particular, it is shown that ambiguity may be harmful for the economy, since asymmetric beliefs of the public may lead to suboptimal allocation of resources. On the contrary, forbearance may have a positive effect, since it makes intermediaries internalizing the costs of insolvency. In a dynamic context, banking system is more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks, since it transfers and magnifies the impact of the shock into future periods through borrowing from future generations, which in financial markets is impossible. However, a properly regulated banking system exhibits the property of intertemporal shock smoothing, whereas financial markets concentrate the burden of the shock in one period. The dissertation concludes with a discussion of several banking crises, including the Russian crisis in 1998, the Japanese crisis of 1990-s, and the Swedish crisis of the beginning of 1990-s.","Ð’ 1980-Ñ… - 1990-Ñ… годах волна финанÑ�овых кризиÑ�ов привлекла внимание Ñ�кономиÑ�тов к проблематике финанÑ�овых рынков и финанÑ�овых поÑ�редников. О центре диÑ�куÑ�Ñ�ии оказалиÑ�ÑŒ вопроÑ�Ñ‹ Ñ�труктуры финанÑ�овой Ñ�иÑ�темы, котораÑ� бы позволила предотвратить развитие кризиÑ�ов, и политики гоÑ�ударÑ�тва, направленнной на Ñ�нижение негативного влиÑ�ниÑ� кризиÑ�ов на Ñ�кономику. Ð’ данной работе изучаютÑ�Ñ� Ñ�равнительные преимущеÑ�тва банковÑ�кой и рыночной финанÑ�овых Ñ�иÑ�тем. ВмеÑ�то изучениÑ� роли финанÑ�овых поÑ�редников и финанÑ�овых рынков в обеÑ�печении Ñ�кономичеÑ�кого роÑ�та, центральным вопроÑ�ом данной работы Ñ�влÑ�етÑ�Ñ� иÑ�Ñ�ледование Ñ�поÑ�обноÑ�ти рыночной и банковÑ�кой финанÑ�овых Ñ�иÑ�тем преодолевать финанÑ�овый кризиÑ� и гарантировать оптимальное раÑ�пределение финанÑ�овых реÑ�урÑ�ов в Ñ�кономике. ОÑ�обую роль играет при Ñ�том политика Ñ�анированиÑ� финанÑ�ового Ñ�ектора, поÑ�тому работа начинаетÑ�Ñ� Ñ� микроÑ�кономичеÑ�кого моделированиÑ� банкротÑ�тв и неÑ�оÑ�тоÑ�тельноÑ�ти финанÑ�овых поÑ�редников, и завершаетÑ�Ñ� макроÑ�кономичеÑ�ким моделированием оптимальной политики регулÑ�тора по преодолению финанÑ�овых кризиÑ�ов. Ð’ работе изучаютÑ�Ñ� такие вопроÑ�Ñ‹, как неопределенноÑ�Ñ‚ÑŒ (неоднозначноÑ�Ñ‚ÑŒ) и политики Ñ�анированиÑ� и неÑ�воевременноÑ�Ñ‚ÑŒ решений о ликвидации (банкротÑ�тве). Ð’ чаÑ�тноÑ�ти, показано, что неоднозначноÑ�Ñ‚ÑŒ может негативно Ñ�казыватьÑ�Ñ� на раÑ�пределении реÑ�урÑ�ов, Ñ‚.к. в уÑ�ловиÑ�Ñ… неопределенноÑ�ти ожиданиÑ� публики могут оказатьÑ�Ñ� аÑ�имметрично-неоднородными, что и приводит к Ñ�убоптимальному равновеÑ�ию. Ð�апротив, задержки в ликвидации неÑ�оÑ�тоÑ�тельных кредитных учреждений могут обладать положительным Ñ�ффектом, Ñ�вÑ�занным Ñ� (чаÑ�тичной) интернализацией издержек банкротÑ�тва Ñ�амим финанÑ�овым поÑ�редником. Ð’ динамичеÑ�ком контекÑ�те банковÑ�каÑ� Ñ�иÑ�тема в большей Ñ�тепени подвержена влиÑ�нию макроÑ�кономичеÑ�ких шоков, поÑ�кольку Ñ�поÑ�обна раÑ�проÑ�транÑ�Ñ‚ÑŒ шок на поÑ�ледующие периоды и уÑ�илÑ�Ñ‚ÑŒ его воздейÑ�твие за Ñ�чет заимÑ�твований у будущих поколений, что в Ñ�лучае финанÑ�овых рынков практичеÑ�ки иÑ�ключено. 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This turned the attention of economists to such questions as how a financial system should be structured in order to reduce the vulnerability of an economy to the risk of a crisis, or what policy should regulators follow in order to prevent the crises, and what regulatory measures would help in reduction of harmful effects of the crises? This dissertation studies relative advantages of a bank-based financial system against a market-based one. Instead of considering the role of financial intermediaries and financial markets in promoting economic growth, the work focuses on their ability to handle a crisis situation and to provide the optimal allocation of resources. The design of the bailout policy plays an important role in this issue, therefore the analysis begins with a microeconomic discussion of insolvency resolutions and then proceeds to a macroeconomic discussion of an optimal crisis management. The analysis here addresses such issues as constructive ambiguity and forbearance in the bailout policy of banking regulators. In particular, it is shown that ambiguity may be harmful for the economy, since asymmetric beliefs of the public may lead to suboptimal allocation of resources. On the contrary, forbearance may have a positive effect, since it makes intermediaries internalizing the costs of insolvency. In a dynamic context, banking system is more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks, since it transfers and magnifies the impact of the shock into future periods through borrowing from future generations, which in financial markets is impossible. However, a properly regulated banking system exhibits the property of intertemporal shock smoothing, whereas financial markets concentrate the burden of the shock in one period. The dissertation concludes with a discussion of several banking crises, including the Russian crisis in 1998, the Japanese crisis of 1990-s, and the Swedish crisis of the beginning of 1990-s.","Ð’ 1980-Ñ… - 1990-Ñ… годах волна финанÑ�овых кризиÑ�ов привлекла внимание Ñ�кономиÑ�тов к проблематике финанÑ�овых рынков и финанÑ�овых поÑ�редников. О центре диÑ�куÑ�Ñ�ии оказалиÑ�ÑŒ вопроÑ�Ñ‹ Ñ�труктуры финанÑ�овой Ñ�иÑ�темы, котораÑ� бы позволила предотвратить развитие кризиÑ�ов, и политики гоÑ�ударÑ�тва, направленнной на Ñ�нижение негативного влиÑ�ниÑ� кризиÑ�ов на Ñ�кономику. Ð’ данной работе изучаютÑ�Ñ� Ñ�равнительные преимущеÑ�тва банковÑ�кой и рыночной финанÑ�овых Ñ�иÑ�тем. 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Ð’ чаÑ�тноÑ�ти, показано, что неоднозначноÑ�Ñ‚ÑŒ может негативно Ñ�казыватьÑ�Ñ� на раÑ�пределении реÑ�урÑ�ов, Ñ‚.к. в уÑ�ловиÑ�Ñ… неопределенноÑ�ти ожиданиÑ� публики могут оказатьÑ�Ñ� аÑ�имметрично-неоднородными, что и приводит к Ñ�убоптимальному равновеÑ�ию. Ð�апротив, задержки в ликвидации неÑ�оÑ�тоÑ�тельных кредитных учреждений могут обладать положительным Ñ�ффектом, Ñ�вÑ�занным Ñ� (чаÑ�тичной) интернализацией издержек банкротÑ�тва Ñ�амим финанÑ�овым поÑ�редником. Ð’ динамичеÑ�ком контекÑ�те банковÑ�каÑ� Ñ�иÑ�тема в большей Ñ�тепени подвержена влиÑ�нию макроÑ�кономичеÑ�ких шоков, поÑ�кольку Ñ�поÑ�обна раÑ�проÑ�транÑ�Ñ‚ÑŒ шок на поÑ�ледующие периоды и уÑ�илÑ�Ñ‚ÑŒ его воздейÑ�твие за Ñ�чет заимÑ�твований у будущих поколений, что в Ñ�лучае финанÑ�овых рынков практичеÑ�ки иÑ�ключено. Однако при Ñ�оответÑ�твующей Ñ�иÑ�теме регулированиÑ�, банковÑ�каÑ� Ñ�иÑ�тема демонÑ�трирует Ñ�войÑ�тво межвременного Ñ�глаживаниÑ� шоков, которым не обладают финанÑ�овые Ñ�иÑ�темы рыночного типа, концентрирующие воздейÑ�твие шока в одном периоде. ДиÑ�Ñ�енртациÑ� завершаетÑ�Ñ� обÑ�уждением неÑ�кольких банковÑ�ких кризиÑ�ов, включаÑ� роÑ�Ñ�ийÑ�кий кризиÑ� 1998 года, Ñ�понÑ�ких кризиÑ� девÑ�ноÑ�Ñ‚Ñ‹Ñ… годов и шведÑ�кий кризиÑ� начала девÑ�ноÑ�Ñ‚Ñ‹Ñ…."],"dc:format.medium":["application/pdf"],"dc:publisher":["Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg"],"dc:title":["Financial Markets, Financial Intermediation, and Bailout Policy","Finanzmärkte, Finanzindermediäre, und die Sanierungspolitik"],"dc:type":["doctoralThesis"],"thesis:degree_level":["thesis.doctoral"],"thesis:institution_name":["Universität Heidelberg"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:30:34Z"}