{"id":{"repo_id":"gsu","oai_identifier":"oai:digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu:etd-1616"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/gsu/oai:digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu:etd-1616","repository":{"repo_id":"gsu","name":"Georgia Southern University","base_url":"https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"Strategic Theory, Methodology, Air Power, and Coercion in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War","abstract":"This thesis analyzes the air power, coercion, strategic theory, and strategic methodology in the 2006 Israel/Hezbollah War. In state versus non-state actor conflicts, air power's utility is different from state versus state conflicts. The dynamics of coercion also differ greatly from state versus state conflict. Additionally the strategic theories, and the methodologies used to develop these theories differ as well, both in their goals and their utility. By examining the 2006 Israel/Hezbollah war, which is an excellent example of a high-intensity conflict between a very capable state military, and a well-equipped non-state actor, Hezbollah, I analyze the ways in which air power is most useful in state versus non-state actor conflicts, the efficacy of coercion in such conflicts, and the role of strategic theory and methodology in such conflicts. I conclude that air power is best used against material high value targets, and against outside state sponsors of non-state actors, as non-state actors often blend amongst non-combatants, disperse their men and material widely, and are difficult to target with accuracy. I also conclude that the basic logic of coercion used in state versus state conflict is sound, but that the logic is complicated by the non-state actor's reliance on outside powers for war material, meaning that attempts to coerce without applying pressure to the outside power will be unlikely to succeed. Finally I conclude that strategic theory and methodology are of the greatest importance to success, and that the most important factor in both is adaptability. He who adapts fastest often wins in asymmetric warfare.","abstract_html":"This thesis analyzes the air power, coercion, strategic theory, and strategic methodology in the 2006 Israel/Hezbollah War. In state versus non-state actor conflicts, air power's utility is different from state versus state conflicts. The dynamics of coercion also differ greatly from state versus state conflict. Additionally the strategic theories, and the methodologies used to develop these theories differ as well, both in their goals and their utility. By examining the 2006 Israel/Hezbollah war, which is an excellent example of a high-intensity conflict between a very capable state military, and a well-equipped non-state actor, Hezbollah, I analyze the ways in which air power is most useful in state versus non-state actor conflicts, the efficacy of coercion in such conflicts, and the role of strategic theory and methodology in such conflicts. I conclude that air power is best used against material high value targets, and against outside state sponsors of non-state actors, as non-state actors often blend amongst non-combatants, disperse their men and material widely, and are difficult to target with accuracy. I also conclude that the basic logic of coercion used in state versus state conflict is sound, but that the logic is complicated by the non-state actor's reliance on outside powers for war material, meaning that attempts to coerce without applying pressure to the outside power will be unlikely to succeed. Finally I conclude that strategic theory and methodology are of the greatest importance to success, and that the most important factor in both is adaptability. He who adapts fastest often wins in asymmetric warfare.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Jones, Zachary"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Master of Arts in Social Sciences (M.A.)","degree_level":"Thesis (open access)","degree_discipline":"Department of Sociology and Anthropology","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Glynn Ellis","Robert Pirro"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2010,"date_issued":"2010-07-01T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2010-07-01T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:27:19Z","subjects":["ETD","Israel","Hezbollah","Non-state actors","Asymmetric warfare","Lebanon War","2006","Hizballah (Lebanon)"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/etd/616","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Glynn Ellis","Robert Pirro"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Jones, Zachary"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2013-10-17T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Department of Sociology and Anthropology"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Thesis (open access)"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Arts in Social Sciences (M.A.)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["ETD","Israel","Hezbollah","Non-state actors","Asymmetric warfare","Lebanon War","2006","Hizballah (Lebanon)"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/etd/616"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This thesis analyzes the air power, coercion, strategic theory, and strategic methodology in the 2006 Israel/Hezbollah War. In state versus non-state actor conflicts, air power's utility is different from state versus state conflicts. The dynamics of coercion also differ greatly from state versus state conflict. Additionally the strategic theories, and the methodologies used to develop these theories differ as well, both in their goals and their utility. By examining the 2006 Israel/Hezbollah war, which is an excellent example of a high-intensity conflict between a very capable state military, and a well-equipped non-state actor, Hezbollah, I analyze the ways in which air power is most useful in state versus non-state actor conflicts, the efficacy of coercion in such conflicts, and the role of strategic theory and methodology in such conflicts. I conclude that air power is best used against material high value targets, and against outside state sponsors of non-state actors, as non-state actors often blend amongst non-combatants, disperse their men and material widely, and are difficult to target with accuracy. I also conclude that the basic logic of coercion used in state versus state conflict is sound, but that the logic is complicated by the non-state actor's reliance on outside powers for war material, meaning that attempts to coerce without applying pressure to the outside power will be unlikely to succeed. Finally I conclude that strategic theory and methodology are of the greatest importance to success, and that the most important factor in both is adaptability. He who adapts fastest often wins in asymmetric warfare."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Strategic Theory, Methodology, Air Power, and Coercion in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Glynn Ellis","Robert Pirro"],"dc:creator":["Jones, Zachary"],"dc:date.available":["2013-10-17T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["This thesis analyzes the air power, coercion, strategic theory, and strategic methodology in the 2006 Israel/Hezbollah War. In state versus non-state actor conflicts, air power's utility is different from state versus state conflicts. The dynamics of coercion also differ greatly from state versus state conflict. Additionally the strategic theories, and the methodologies used to develop these theories differ as well, both in their goals and their utility. By examining the 2006 Israel/Hezbollah war, which is an excellent example of a high-intensity conflict between a very capable state military, and a well-equipped non-state actor, Hezbollah, I analyze the ways in which air power is most useful in state versus non-state actor conflicts, the efficacy of coercion in such conflicts, and the role of strategic theory and methodology in such conflicts. I conclude that air power is best used against material high value targets, and against outside state sponsors of non-state actors, as non-state actors often blend amongst non-combatants, disperse their men and material widely, and are difficult to target with accuracy. I also conclude that the basic logic of coercion used in state versus state conflict is sound, but that the logic is complicated by the non-state actor's reliance on outside powers for war material, meaning that attempts to coerce without applying pressure to the outside power will be unlikely to succeed. Finally I conclude that strategic theory and methodology are of the greatest importance to success, and that the most important factor in both is adaptability. He who adapts fastest often wins in asymmetric warfare."],"dc:identifier":["https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/etd/616"],"dc:subject":["ETD","Israel","Hezbollah","Non-state actors","Asymmetric warfare","Lebanon War","2006","Hizballah (Lebanon)"],"dc:title":["Strategic Theory, Methodology, Air Power, and Coercion in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Department of Sociology and Anthropology"],"thesis:degree_level":["Thesis (open access)"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master of Arts in Social Sciences (M.A.)"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:27:19Z"}