DELEGATE OR ABDICATE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION INFLUENCES CONGRESSIONAL AND EXECUTIVE BEHAVIOR

When referring policy to the executive branch, how does the US Congress determine whether to delegate or abdicate policymaking authority? This research investigates the important role of public attitudes over policy in congressional decisions to abdicate or delegate to the executive branch in the modern legislative era, 1973 - 2020. I operationalize congressional delegation or abdication by measuring oversight activity and developing a ratio of proactive to passive activities across 21 policy areas. My theory posits that congressional interactions with the executive are dependent on public attitudes over the most important problems in the country. I expect congressional action to depend on levels of public attitudes over policy, and for Congress to empower the executive to take unitary action in policy areas where Congress abdicates. The research uses the Comparative Agendas Project, Government Accountability Office, and Federal Register data to determine congressional and executive activity by policy area. I establish a baseline of congressional and executive activity to discern fluctuations in attention across policy topics, and this baseline is utilized to identify instances of delegation or abdication. The research employs a panel data statistical approach to test expectations, evaluating the relationship between the public's valuation of a policy topic and congressional decisions to delegate or abdicate. The results support that there is a significant relationship between public attitudes and congressional decisions to delegate or abdicate. Furthermore, the results indicate that Congress has increasingly abdicated to the executive over the past two decades.

Author

• Smith, Jason Scott

• Abdication
• Congress
• Delegation
• Executive
• Government
• Oversight

Identifier

hdl:1920/13787

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:MARS:1920/13787