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George Mason University

The Political Economy of Epidemiology

Abstract

These essays develop an institutional framework to epidemiology that highlights the conditions under which private actors resolve collective action problems associated with the prevention of infectious diseases. This framework is applied to a number of historical and modern cases from the United States and across the world to show that despite the theoretical problems of externalities and free riding, private coordination is more likely than previously thought. This is the case when people can capture the benefits of prevention and lower the cost of coordination. The main conclusion is that private and alternative disease prevention can be important means of mitigating the burden of infectious diseases, especially when people do not have access to functional governmental health institutions.

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author
  • Carson, Byron Bernell

Subjects

dc:subject × 7

Identifiers

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Identifier
hdl:1920/11162
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:MARS:1920/11162

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
George Mason University
Base URL
mars.gmu.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-27
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Carson, Byron Bernell. The Political Economy of Epidemiology. 2017.