{"id":{"repo_id":"glasgow","oai_identifier":"oai:theses.gla.ac.uk:722"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/glasgow/oai:theses.gla.ac.uk:722","repository":{"repo_id":"glasgow","name":"University of Glasgow","base_url":"https://theses.gla.ac.uk/cgi/oai2"},"display":{"title":"Aquinas and the realist dispute in science an Aristotelio-Thomistic contribution to current discussions in language, logic and science","abstract":"Part I is entirely devoted to current issues in the philosophy of language, logic and science. The burden of the Introduction is to familiarise ourselves with the strengths and weaknesses of scientific realism and scientific anti-realism, and to show that a synthesis of realist and anti-realist tendencies is desirable. Chapters Two and Three deal with a challenge stemming from semantic anti-realists concerning the proper understanding of the nature of truth. The remainder of Part I is devoted to the problem of demarcation. In Chapter 6, which deals with Quine's thesis concerning the indeterminacy of radical translation, I offer a method of distinguishing areas of discourse capable of bearing a realist interpretation from those demanding treatment along anti-realistic lines. Part II beings our study of Aquinas' philosophy of science. Aquinas is presented as offering an intellectual system consistent with conclusions drawn in Part I. Moreover, his attempt to make theology a science on the Aristotelian model is seen to be analogous to our attempt to reconcile realist and anti-realist tendencies in the realist dispute in science.","abstract_html":"Part I is entirely devoted to current issues in the philosophy of language, logic and science. The burden of the Introduction is to familiarise ourselves with the strengths and weaknesses of scientific realism and scientific anti-realism, and to show that a synthesis of realist and anti-realist tendencies is desirable. Chapters Two and Three deal with a challenge stemming from semantic anti-realists concerning the proper understanding of the nature of truth. The remainder of Part I is devoted to the problem of demarcation. In Chapter 6, which deals with Quine's thesis concerning the indeterminacy of radical translation, I offer a method of distinguishing areas of discourse capable of bearing a realist interpretation from those demanding treatment along anti-realistic lines. Part II beings our study of Aquinas' philosophy of science. Aquinas is presented as offering an intellectual system consistent with conclusions drawn in Part I. Moreover, his attempt to make theology a science on the Aristotelian model is seen to be analogous to our attempt to reconcile realist and anti-realist tendencies in the realist dispute in science.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Boulter, Stephen Jordan"],"institution":"University of Glasgow","degree_name":null,"degree_level":"PhD","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":1996,"date_issued":"1996","date_published":"1996","updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:23:30Z","subjects":["B Philosophy (General)"],"languages":["en"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":null,"outbound_label":null,"outbound_source":null},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Boulter, Stephen Jordan"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["1996"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["1996"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Glasgow"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby","values":["https://theses.gla.ac.uk/722/"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby.uri","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby URI","values":["https://gla.on.worldcat.org/oclc/53663793"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["PhD"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["B Philosophy (General)"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://theses.gla.ac.uk/722/1/1996boulterphd.pdf"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Part I is entirely devoted to current issues in the philosophy of language, logic and science. The burden of the Introduction is to familiarise ourselves with the strengths and weaknesses of scientific realism and scientific anti-realism, and to show that a synthesis of realist and anti-realist tendencies is desirable. Chapters Two and Three deal with a challenge stemming from semantic anti-realists concerning the proper understanding of the nature of truth. The remainder of Part I is devoted to the problem of demarcation. In Chapter 6, which deals with Quine's thesis concerning the indeterminacy of radical translation, I offer a method of distinguishing areas of discourse capable of bearing a realist interpretation from those demanding treatment along anti-realistic lines. Part II beings our study of Aquinas' philosophy of science. Aquinas is presented as offering an intellectual system consistent with conclusions drawn in Part I. 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Chapters Two and Three deal with a challenge stemming from semantic anti-realists concerning the proper understanding of the nature of truth. The remainder of Part I is devoted to the problem of demarcation. In Chapter 6, which deals with Quine's thesis concerning the indeterminacy of radical translation, I offer a method of distinguishing areas of discourse capable of bearing a realist interpretation from those demanding treatment along anti-realistic lines. Part II beings our study of Aquinas' philosophy of science. Aquinas is presented as offering an intellectual system consistent with conclusions drawn in Part I. 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