Internationalisering en interne regulering: Europese Unie milieu-, gezondheids- en consumentenbeschermingsregels 'in de schaduw van de WTO'

How and to what extent internationalization affects domestic politics is one of the most important and debated perennial questions in international political economy. This doctoral thesis takes a particular angle at this question by studying the influence of the World Trade Organization (WTO), its substantial rules and its dispute settlement mechanism, on European Union (EU) decision-making processes on health, environmental and consumer regulation. Starting with refuting the widely but mistakenly held assumption that WTO-rules and dispute rulings have direct effect, the main research question in this thesis is how, why and with what effect the WTO affects regulatory politics within the EU. Theoretically, the predominant rational functionalist perspective on the domestic influence of the WTO that argues that exporters as ‘victims of non-compliance’ through retaliation will play the role of WTO-advocates during decision-making processes on regulation is challenged. Also realism and state-centric constructivism are judged less than satisfactory theories to understand the actual influence of WTO-rules on regulatory politics. A more sophisticated perspective based on a critical reading of historical institutionalism is put forward as a more plausible alternative. This perspective conceptualizes WTO-rules as part of a strategically selective context and emphasizes strategic action within the compartmentalized EU policy system by (coalitions of) public and private actors. It draws attention to the importance of the interpenetrative and interactive relationship between EU internal regulatory politics and international trade (rules) to understand contemporary regulatory decision-making processes. The empirical analysis is carried out through the process-tracing of three decision-making processes on regulation with (potential) significant external trade effects. The first case, the EU’s trade ban in seal products, demonstrates the inadequacy of the rational functionalist logic by not fitting its expectations in a very-likely case. While this EU regulation did not serve any rent-seeking import-competing interests, and although predictably negatively affecting the EU trade relationship with Canada and eventually provoking a WTO-dispute, exporters have not lobbied against the regulation and the most trade-restrictive alternative has been adopted. In contrast to the first case, in the other two case studies – REACH and the carbon border tax in the context of the EU climate and energy package – the decision-making process has resulted in, respectively, a less- and non-trade-restrictive outcome. WTO-consistency has been an important consideration in these processes. Once more against rational functionalist expectations, it have not been exporters that have advocated WTO-consistent adjustment/adoption of the proposed regulations, but European associations from the regulated sectors, along with EU policy-makers responsible for trade and industry. It is argued in the dissertation that this has several sources. These European associations are dominated by transnational enterprises that fear loss of profits within the EU, but especially on third markets, from stringent regulation. They therefore use WTO-consistency strategically as an argument in advocating less stringent and trade-restrictive regulation. They thereby find allies in trade policy decision-making actors, with whom they have traditional ties and that have incentives to avoid trade disputes and are ideationally dedicated towards WTO-consistency. Finally, the avoidance of burdensome EU regulations is also increasingly commensurate with, or even necessitated by, the new growth strategy of the Union that is premised more and more on exports towards emerging economies. The main conclusion is that ‘the shadow of the WTO’ does not influence domestic regulatory processes within the EU primarily through its dispute settlement mechanism via the mobilization of exporters that fear retaliation. It has an influence on internal regulatory politics mainly by empowering stringent-regulation-averse firms and promoting the involvement of trade policy-makers in decision-making processes. Especially in conjunction with a competitiveness discourse and rhetoric may WTO-rules then lead to less stringent and trade-restrictive and thus more WTO-consistent regulation. If one main conclusion from this dissertation should be put forward it would be the inherently contingent statement that the domestic influence of the WTO is what domestic actors make of it. The thesis reveals some other interesting conclusions about the intersection of EU internal regulation and internationalization that will be discussed in the concluding chapter and are proposed as fruitful areas for further research.

Grantor dc:publisher

Universiteit Gent. Faculteit Politieke en Sociale Wetenschappen

Year dc:date

2011

Author dc:creator

• De Ville, Ferdi

Contributors dc:contributor

• Orbie, Jan
• Vos, Hendrik

• Social Sciences

Statement dc:rights

• info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/4097475
https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/4097475/file/4335588

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:archive.ugent.be:4097475