{"id":{"repo_id":"gatech","oai_identifier":"oai:repository.gatech.edu:1853/72631"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/gatech/oai:repository.gatech.edu:1853/72631","repository":{"repo_id":"gatech","name":"Georgia Tech","base_url":"https://repository.gatech.edu/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"The Effect of Accessibility of Status-Confirming Information on Investor Reactions to the Pay-Ratio Disclosure","abstract":"The SEC provides companies with considerable flexibility in the disclosure of the ratio between CEO and median employee compensation (pay-ratio). Prior research suggests that pay-ratio disclosures negatively affect investors’ support for executive compensation (SoP). Using two experiments, I find that accessibility of information that helps justify the gap between CEO and median employee compensation (status-confirming information) increases nonprofessional investors’ support for executive compensation (SoP support). Drawing on research in psychology, in experiment 1, I predict that accessibility of status-confirming information increases investors’ perceptions of meritocracy especially when the pay-ratio is higher than the peer companies which helps investors rationalize the compensation gap made salient by the pay-ratio. I find that investors’ perceptions of meritocracy positively influence their SoP support. However, accessibility of status-confirming information does not increase perceptions of meritocracy when pay-ratio is higher than peer companies. Additional analysis reveals that accessibility of status-confirming information does not significantly increase SoP support and perceptions of meritocracy in higher income participants’, suggesting that participants income levels could potentially affect their evaluation of the pay-ratio disclosure when status-confirming information is accessible. Since the analysis including income levels was conducted ex-post in Experiment 1, I conduct a second experiment to confirm my findings. In Experiment 2 I investigate whether participants’ perceptions of wealth impact their responses when the pay ratio is higher than peer companies. I find that investors’ perceptions of wealth and accessibility of status-confirming information affect both investors’ perceptions of meritocracy and SoP support when pay-ratio is higher than peer companies. Together, my findings provide evidence that the content of the pay-ratio disclosure apart from the disclosure itself could systematically affect investor decisions.","abstract_html":"The SEC provides companies with considerable flexibility in the disclosure of the ratio between CEO and median employee compensation (pay-ratio). Prior research suggests that pay-ratio disclosures negatively affect investors’ support for executive compensation (SoP). Using two experiments, I find that accessibility of information that helps justify the gap between CEO and median employee compensation (status-confirming information) increases nonprofessional investors’ support for executive compensation (SoP support). Drawing on research in psychology, in experiment 1, I predict that accessibility of status-confirming information increases investors’ perceptions of meritocracy especially when the pay-ratio is higher than the peer companies which helps investors rationalize the compensation gap made salient by the pay-ratio. I find that investors’ perceptions of meritocracy positively influence their SoP support. However, accessibility of status-confirming information does not increase perceptions of meritocracy when pay-ratio is higher than peer companies. Additional analysis reveals that accessibility of status-confirming information does not significantly increase SoP support and perceptions of meritocracy in higher income participants’, suggesting that participants income levels could potentially affect their evaluation of the pay-ratio disclosure when status-confirming information is accessible. Since the analysis including income levels was conducted ex-post in Experiment 1, I conduct a second experiment to confirm my findings. In Experiment 2 I investigate whether participants’ perceptions of wealth impact their responses when the pay ratio is higher than peer companies. I find that investors’ perceptions of wealth and accessibility of status-confirming information affect both investors’ perceptions of meritocracy and SoP support when pay-ratio is higher than peer companies. Together, my findings provide evidence that the content of the pay-ratio disclosure apart from the disclosure itself could systematically affect investor decisions.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Menon, Anish"],"institution":"Georgia Institute of Technology","degree_name":null,"degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Business","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Rupar, Kathy","Rupar-Wang, Kathy"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":["Thayer, Jane","Venkataraman, Shankar","Kuang, Jason (Xi)","Moon, Robbie"],"year":2022,"date_issued":"2022-07-29","date_published":"2022-07-29","updated_at":"2026-07-27T19:49:34Z","subjects":["Pay-ratio","Wealth","Meritocracy"],"languages":["en_US"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/1853/72631","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Rupar, Kathy","Rupar-Wang, Kathy"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Thayer, Jane","Venkataraman, Shankar","Kuang, Jason (Xi)","Moon, Robbie"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Business"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Menon, Anish"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2023-09-06T19:44:41Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2023-09-06T19:44:41Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2022-07-29"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Georgia Institute of Technology"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Doctoral"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Pay-ratio","Wealth","Meritocracy"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en_US"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/1853/72631"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["The SEC provides companies with considerable flexibility in the disclosure of the ratio between CEO and median employee compensation (pay-ratio). Prior research suggests that pay-ratio disclosures negatively affect investors’ support for executive compensation (SoP). Using two experiments, I find that accessibility of information that helps justify the gap between CEO and median employee compensation (status-confirming information) increases nonprofessional investors’ support for executive compensation (SoP support). Drawing on research in psychology, in experiment 1, I predict that accessibility of status-confirming information increases investors’ perceptions of meritocracy especially when the pay-ratio is higher than the peer companies which helps investors rationalize the compensation gap made salient by the pay-ratio. I find that investors’ perceptions of meritocracy positively influence their SoP support. However, accessibility of status-confirming information does not increase perceptions of meritocracy when pay-ratio is higher than peer companies. Additional analysis reveals that accessibility of status-confirming information does not significantly increase SoP support and perceptions of meritocracy in higher income participants’, suggesting that participants income levels could potentially affect their evaluation of the pay-ratio disclosure when status-confirming information is accessible. Since the analysis including income levels was conducted ex-post in Experiment 1, I conduct a second experiment to confirm my findings. In Experiment 2 I investigate whether participants’ perceptions of wealth impact their responses when the pay ratio is higher than peer companies. I find that investors’ perceptions of wealth and accessibility of status-confirming information affect both investors’ perceptions of meritocracy and SoP support when pay-ratio is higher than peer companies. Together, my findings provide evidence that the content of the pay-ratio disclosure apart from the disclosure itself could systematically affect investor decisions."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"dc:format.mimetype","label":"Dc Format Mimetype","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The Effect of Accessibility of Status-Confirming Information on Investor Reactions to the Pay-Ratio Disclosure"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Rupar, Kathy","Rupar-Wang, Kathy"],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Thayer, Jane","Venkataraman, Shankar","Kuang, Jason (Xi)","Moon, Robbie"],"dc:contributor.department":["Business"],"dc:creator":["Menon, Anish"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2023-09-06T19:44:41Z"],"dc:date.available":["2023-09-06T19:44:41Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2022-07-29"],"dc:description.abstract":["The SEC provides companies with considerable flexibility in the disclosure of the ratio between CEO and median employee compensation (pay-ratio). Prior research suggests that pay-ratio disclosures negatively affect investors’ support for executive compensation (SoP). Using two experiments, I find that accessibility of information that helps justify the gap between CEO and median employee compensation (status-confirming information) increases nonprofessional investors’ support for executive compensation (SoP support). Drawing on research in psychology, in experiment 1, I predict that accessibility of status-confirming information increases investors’ perceptions of meritocracy especially when the pay-ratio is higher than the peer companies which helps investors rationalize the compensation gap made salient by the pay-ratio. I find that investors’ perceptions of meritocracy positively influence their SoP support. However, accessibility of status-confirming information does not increase perceptions of meritocracy when pay-ratio is higher than peer companies. Additional analysis reveals that accessibility of status-confirming information does not significantly increase SoP support and perceptions of meritocracy in higher income participants’, suggesting that participants income levels could potentially affect their evaluation of the pay-ratio disclosure when status-confirming information is accessible. Since the analysis including income levels was conducted ex-post in Experiment 1, I conduct a second experiment to confirm my findings. In Experiment 2 I investigate whether participants’ perceptions of wealth impact their responses when the pay ratio is higher than peer companies. I find that investors’ perceptions of wealth and accessibility of status-confirming information affect both investors’ perceptions of meritocracy and SoP support when pay-ratio is higher than peer companies. Together, my findings provide evidence that the content of the pay-ratio disclosure apart from the disclosure itself could systematically affect investor decisions."],"dc:description.degree":["Ph.D."],"dc:format.mimetype":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/1853/72631"],"dc:language.iso":["en_US"],"dc:publisher":["Georgia Institute of Technology"],"dc:subject":["Pay-ratio","Wealth","Meritocracy"],"dc:title":["The Effect of Accessibility of Status-Confirming Information on Investor Reactions to the Pay-Ratio Disclosure"],"dc:type":["Text"],"thesis:degree_level":["Doctoral"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-27T19:49:34Z"}