Abstract
dc:description.abstractThis thesis consists of four essays related to optimal antitrust enforcement. The �rst essay provides a case study of EC ringleader cartels and discusses by means of a theoretical model the e¤ect of excluding ringleaders from leniency programmes on collusive prices. The second essay adds an experimental investigation of the former, and examines in particular the e¤ects on cartel formation, prices and stability. The third essay experimentally explores the substitutability of antitrust detection rates and �nes, and test whether di¤erent �ne and detection rate combinations with constant expected �nes achieve an equal level of deterrence. Lastly, the �nal essay discusses the role of antitrust enforcement on collusion when �rms can engage in avoidance activities.
Degree
thesis:*- Name dc:type.qualificationname
- phd
- Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
- doctoral
- Grantor dc:publisher.institution
- University of East Anglia
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2014
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Wandschneider, Frederick
Rights
- Language dc:language
- en