{"id":{"repo_id":"east-anglia","oai_identifier":"oai:ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk:47933"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/east-anglia/oai:ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk:47933","repository":{"repo_id":"east-anglia","name":"University of East Anglia","base_url":"https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/cgi/oai2"},"display":{"title":"On the Optimal Design of Leniency Programmes","abstract":"Abstract This thesis comprises of a collection of essays that aim at enhancing our under- standing of the underlying mechanics of leniency policies in antitrust. In Chapter 1, we provide a systematic overview of the most in�uential contribu- tions to the literature on collusion and leniency policies, with a focus on antitrust law. The survey elucidates the e¤ects of leniency programmes on cartel formation and cartel implementation. In Chapter 2, we provide a model to investigate the impact of a leniency pro- gramme on collusive �rms�incentives to keep or destroy hard incriminating evi- dence. We show that �rms may willfully keep the hard evidence to facilitate the implementation of the cartel. Firms are more inclined to keep the hard evidence when a leniency programme is available. Finally, �rms are more likely to destroy the hard evidence when the collusive pro�ts-�ne ratio increases. In Chapter 3, we study the strategic interaction between a cartel and an an- titrust authority whose evidence against the cartel is private information. Within the framework of a signalling game, we explore the antitrust authority�s incentives to reveal the strength of its evidence, before committing to its prosecutorial e¤ort. We show that, despite its potentially feeble evidence, the antitrust authority can exploit its informational lead and induce the cartel to self-report at an earlier stage of the prosecutorial process. The more generous the leniency programme, the easier it is to induce self-reporting by the cartel. In Chapter 4, we provide a model to characterize the optimal leniency pro- gramme when colluding �rms can invest resources to avoid detection. We show that the optimal �ne discount rate depends positively on the severity of the �ne and negatively on the probability of investigation and the cost of avoidance ac- tivities. A leniency programme that ignores �rms�e¤orts to avoid detection may result in under-deterrence.","abstract_html":"Abstract This thesis comprises of a collection of essays that aim at enhancing our under- standing of the underlying mechanics of leniency policies in antitrust. In Chapter 1, we provide a systematic overview of the most in�uential contribu- tions to the literature on collusion and leniency policies, with a focus on antitrust law. The survey elucidates the e¤ects of leniency programmes on cartel formation and cartel implementation. In Chapter 2, we provide a model to investigate the impact of a leniency pro- gramme on collusive �rms�incentives to keep or destroy hard incriminating evi- dence. We show that �rms may willfully keep the hard evidence to facilitate the implementation of the cartel. Firms are more inclined to keep the hard evidence when a leniency programme is available. Finally, �rms are more likely to destroy the hard evidence when the collusive pro�ts-�ne ratio increases. In Chapter 3, we study the strategic interaction between a cartel and an an- titrust authority whose evidence against the cartel is private information. Within the framework of a signalling game, we explore the antitrust authority�s incentives to reveal the strength of its evidence, before committing to its prosecutorial e¤ort. We show that, despite its potentially feeble evidence, the antitrust authority can exploit its informational lead and induce the cartel to self-report at an earlier stage of the prosecutorial process. The more generous the leniency programme, the easier it is to induce self-reporting by the cartel. In Chapter 4, we provide a model to characterize the optimal leniency pro- gramme when colluding �rms can invest resources to avoid detection. We show that the optimal �ne discount rate depends positively on the severity of the �ne and negatively on the probability of investigation and the cost of avoidance ac- tivities. A leniency programme that ignores �rms�e¤orts to avoid detection may result in under-deterrence.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Agisilaou, Panayiotis"],"institution":"University of East Anglia","degree_name":"phd","degree_level":"doctoral","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2013,"date_issued":"2013-02","date_published":"2013-02","updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:11:56Z","subjects":[],"languages":["en"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":null,"outbound_label":null,"outbound_source":null},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Agisilaou, Panayiotis"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2013-02"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2013-02"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.department","label":"Dc Publisher Department","values":["School of Economics"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of East Anglia"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby","values":["https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/47933/"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["doctoral"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationname","label":"Dc Type Qualificationname","values":["phd"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/47933/1/P.Agisilaou_PhD_in_Economics_2013.pdf"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Abstract This thesis comprises of a collection of essays that aim at enhancing our under- standing of the underlying mechanics of leniency policies in antitrust. In Chapter 1, we provide a systematic overview of the most in�uential contribu- tions to the literature on collusion and leniency policies, with a focus on antitrust law. The survey elucidates the e¤ects of leniency programmes on cartel formation and cartel implementation. In Chapter 2, we provide a model to investigate the impact of a leniency pro- gramme on collusive �rms�incentives to keep or destroy hard incriminating evi- dence. We show that �rms may willfully keep the hard evidence to facilitate the implementation of the cartel. Firms are more inclined to keep the hard evidence when a leniency programme is available. Finally, �rms are more likely to destroy the hard evidence when the collusive pro�ts-�ne ratio increases. In Chapter 3, we study the strategic interaction between a cartel and an an- titrust authority whose evidence against the cartel is private information. Within the framework of a signalling game, we explore the antitrust authority�s incentives to reveal the strength of its evidence, before committing to its prosecutorial e¤ort. We show that, despite its potentially feeble evidence, the antitrust authority can exploit its informational lead and induce the cartel to self-report at an earlier stage of the prosecutorial process. The more generous the leniency programme, the easier it is to induce self-reporting by the cartel. In Chapter 4, we provide a model to characterize the optimal leniency pro- gramme when colluding �rms can invest resources to avoid detection. We show that the optimal �ne discount rate depends positively on the severity of the �ne and negatively on the probability of investigation and the cost of avoidance ac- tivities. A leniency programme that ignores �rms�e¤orts to avoid detection may result in under-deterrence."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["On the Optimal Design of Leniency Programmes"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:creator":["Agisilaou, Panayiotis"],"dc:date":["2013-02"],"dc:date.issued":["2013-02"],"dc:description.abstract":["Abstract This thesis comprises of a collection of essays that aim at enhancing our under- standing of the underlying mechanics of leniency policies in antitrust. In Chapter 1, we provide a systematic overview of the most in�uential contribu- tions to the literature on collusion and leniency policies, with a focus on antitrust law. The survey elucidates the e¤ects of leniency programmes on cartel formation and cartel implementation. In Chapter 2, we provide a model to investigate the impact of a leniency pro- gramme on collusive �rms�incentives to keep or destroy hard incriminating evi- dence. We show that �rms may willfully keep the hard evidence to facilitate the implementation of the cartel. Firms are more inclined to keep the hard evidence when a leniency programme is available. Finally, �rms are more likely to destroy the hard evidence when the collusive pro�ts-�ne ratio increases. In Chapter 3, we study the strategic interaction between a cartel and an an- titrust authority whose evidence against the cartel is private information. Within the framework of a signalling game, we explore the antitrust authority�s incentives to reveal the strength of its evidence, before committing to its prosecutorial e¤ort. We show that, despite its potentially feeble evidence, the antitrust authority can exploit its informational lead and induce the cartel to self-report at an earlier stage of the prosecutorial process. The more generous the leniency programme, the easier it is to induce self-reporting by the cartel. In Chapter 4, we provide a model to characterize the optimal leniency pro- gramme when colluding �rms can invest resources to avoid detection. We show that the optimal �ne discount rate depends positively on the severity of the �ne and negatively on the probability of investigation and the cost of avoidance ac- tivities. A leniency programme that ignores �rms�e¤orts to avoid detection may result in under-deterrence."],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/47933/1/P.Agisilaou_PhD_in_Economics_2013.pdf"],"dc:language":["en"],"dc:publisher.department":["School of Economics"],"dc:publisher.institution":["University of East Anglia"],"dc:relation.isreferencedby":["https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/47933/"],"dc:title":["On the Optimal Design of Leniency Programmes"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"dc:type.qualificationlevel":["doctoral"],"dc:type.qualificationname":["phd"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:11:56Z"}