In this dissertation I consider the question, \"Is it possible to think the subject qua subject or must any theoretical attempt to understand the subject necessarily reify it?\" To answer this question, I appealed to Immanuel Kant's distinction between theoretical and practical reason, noting that practical reason could think the subject as a free soul rather than as a naturally-determined object. I then divided the sciences of the subject into four general types to determine which science could think the subject qua subject. Three sciences were shown to necessarily reify the subject: empirical psychology, rational psychology, and heteronomous ethics. I then paralleled Kant's insight with Michel Foucault's analyses of the human sciences, showing the concrete consequences of objectification. Using Foucault's work on ethical practice and askesis as a guide, I returned to Kant and explained how practical reason can think the subject qua subject only insofar as it considers the subject as something to be made rather than a theoretical object to know. I then posed the question, “What are the necessary conditions for someone to be a subject of possible experience?� which led into a Kantian-inspired theory of love and intersubjectivity. Finally, I concluded that contemporary psychology is mired in an impasse between happiness and freedom, insofar as therapeutic practice is no longer an ethic. I suggest the need for a practical psychology to solve this impasse.
","abstract_html":"<p>In this dissertation I consider the question, "Is it possible to think the subject qua subject or must any theoretical attempt to understand the subject necessarily reify it?" To answer this question, I appealed to Immanuel Kant's distinction between theoretical and practical reason, noting that practical reason could think the subject as a free soul rather than as a naturally-determined object. I then divided the sciences of the subject into four general types to determine which science could think the subject qua subject. Three sciences were shown to necessarily reify the subject: empirical psychology, rational psychology, and heteronomous ethics. I then paralleled Kant's insight with Michel Foucault's analyses of the human sciences, showing the concrete consequences of objectification. Using Foucault's work on ethical practice and askesis as a guide, I returned to Kant and explained how practical reason can think the subject qua subject only insofar as it considers the subject as something to be made rather than a theoretical object to know. I then posed the question, “What are the necessary conditions for someone to be a subject of possible experience?� which led into a Kantian-inspired theory of love and intersubjectivity. Finally, I concluded that contemporary psychology is mired in an impasse between happiness and freedom, insofar as therapeutic practice is no longer an ethic. I suggest the need for a practical psychology to solve this impasse.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Valentine, Matthew Gordon"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"PhD","degree_level":"Immediate Access","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["James Swindal","Fred Evans","Jay Lampert"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2016,"date_issued":"2016-05-06T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2016-05-06T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:10:50Z","subjects":["Ascetic Practices","Freedom","Happiness","Immanuel Kant","Michel Foucault","The Subject"],"languages":["English"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1527","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["James Swindal","Fred Evans","Jay Lampert"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Valentine, Matthew Gordon"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2019-08-11T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Immediate Access"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["PhD"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Ascetic Practices","Freedom","Happiness","Immanuel Kant","Michel Foucault","The Subject"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1527"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["In this dissertation I consider the question, \"Is it possible to think the subject qua subject or must any theoretical attempt to understand the subject necessarily reify it?\" To answer this question, I appealed to Immanuel Kant's distinction between theoretical and practical reason, noting that practical reason could think the subject as a free soul rather than as a naturally-determined object. I then divided the sciences of the subject into four general types to determine which science could think the subject qua subject. Three sciences were shown to necessarily reify the subject: empirical psychology, rational psychology, and heteronomous ethics. I then paralleled Kant's insight with Michel Foucault's analyses of the human sciences, showing the concrete consequences of objectification. Using Foucault's work on ethical practice and askesis as a guide, I returned to Kant and explained how practical reason can think the subject qua subject only insofar as it considers the subject as something to be made rather than a theoretical object to know. I then posed the question, “What are the necessary conditions for someone to be a subject of possible experience?� which led into a Kantian-inspired theory of love and intersubjectivity. Finally, I concluded that contemporary psychology is mired in an impasse between happiness and freedom, insofar as therapeutic practice is no longer an ethic. I suggest the need for a practical psychology to solve this impasse.
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