Abstract
dc:description.abstractThe phenomenological approaches to embodiment presented by Levinas and Merleau-Ponty cannot provide an adequate account of bodily identity because their methodological commitments forbid them from admitting the central role that sensation plays in the constitution of experience. This neglect is symptomatic of their tradition's suspicion toward sensation as an explanatory concept, a suspicion stemming from Kant's critique of empiricist metaphysics and Husserl's critique of psychologism and objectivism. By contrast, I suggest that only with a robust theory of sensation can the integrity of the body and its relations be fully captured. I therefore develop--contra Kant and Husserl's idealism--a realist conception of sensation that is at once materialist and phenomenological.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- PhD
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Immediate Access
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Philosophy
- Year dc:date.available
- 2010
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Sparrow, Tom
- Contributors dc:contributor
-
- Fred Evans
- George Yancy
- Silvia Benso
- Daniel Selcer
Subjects
dc:subject × 6Rights
- Language dc:language
- English
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Repository record dc:identifier
- https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1228
- OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:dsc.duq.edu:etd-2244