We admire those who know themselves, are appropriately open and receptive to feedback, and appropriately ignore or reject inaccurate feedback. Thus self-knowledge is a virtue that helps us to act justly toward these sources as well as enables us to acquire other virtues through helping us come to know our strengths and weaknesses. To better conceptualize self-knowledge as a virtue, I look at the role of epistemic injustice when it comes to receiving and evaluating feedback. Epistemic injustice involves harming a person by diminishing their ability to share or gain knowledge. Acknowledging the existence of epistemic injustice is to recognize the duty to act justly toward possible sources of self-knowledge. To achieve virtuous self-knowledge, one must act appropriately towards one’s sources of feedback in terms of receptivity as well as resistance.
","abstract_html":"<p>We admire those who know themselves, are appropriately open and receptive to feedback, and appropriately ignore or reject inaccurate feedback. Thus self-knowledge is a virtue that helps us to act justly toward these sources as well as enables us to acquire other virtues through helping us come to know our strengths and weaknesses. To better conceptualize self-knowledge as a virtue, I look at the role of epistemic injustice when it comes to receiving and evaluating feedback. Epistemic injustice involves harming a person by diminishing their ability to share or gain knowledge. Acknowledging the existence of epistemic injustice is to recognize the duty to act justly toward possible sources of self-knowledge. To achieve virtuous self-knowledge, one must act appropriately towards one’s sources of feedback in terms of receptivity as well as resistance.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Bondurant, Hannah A"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Wong, David B."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2021,"date_issued":"2021","date_published":"2021","updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:07:15Z","subjects":["Philosophy"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/10161/23126","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Wong, David B."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Bondurant, Hannah A"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2021-05-19T18:09:09Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2023-05-17T08:17:08Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2021"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Dissertation"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/10161/23126"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["We admire those who know themselves, are appropriately open and receptive to feedback, and appropriately ignore or reject inaccurate feedback. Thus self-knowledge is a virtue that helps us to act justly toward these sources as well as enables us to acquire other virtues through helping us come to know our strengths and weaknesses. To better conceptualize self-knowledge as a virtue, I look at the role of epistemic injustice when it comes to receiving and evaluating feedback. Epistemic injustice involves harming a person by diminishing their ability to share or gain knowledge. Acknowledging the existence of epistemic injustice is to recognize the duty to act justly toward possible sources of self-knowledge. To achieve virtuous self-knowledge, one must act appropriately towards one’s sources of feedback in terms of receptivity as well as resistance.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["How Others Inform and Transform One's Sense of Self"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Wong, David B."],"dc:creator":["Bondurant, Hannah A"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2021-05-19T18:09:09Z"],"dc:date.available":["2023-05-17T08:17:08Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2021"],"dc:description.abstract":["We admire those who know themselves, are appropriately open and receptive to feedback, and appropriately ignore or reject inaccurate feedback. Thus self-knowledge is a virtue that helps us to act justly toward these sources as well as enables us to acquire other virtues through helping us come to know our strengths and weaknesses. To better conceptualize self-knowledge as a virtue, I look at the role of epistemic injustice when it comes to receiving and evaluating feedback. Epistemic injustice involves harming a person by diminishing their ability to share or gain knowledge. Acknowledging the existence of epistemic injustice is to recognize the duty to act justly toward possible sources of self-knowledge. To achieve virtuous self-knowledge, one must act appropriately towards one’s sources of feedback in terms of receptivity as well as resistance.
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