The SEC mandates disclosure of Article 11 pro forma financial statements (pro formas) for acquisitions that exceed one of three bright-line materiality thresholds. Motivated by two theories of mandated disclosure, I test whether pro formas improve analyst forecasts or mitigate incentive alignment problems. Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, I provide evidence that pro formas reduce post-acquisition forecast errors and improve target selection. The improvement in forecast accuracy (target selection) is concentrated in acquirers with low analyst following (acquisitions involving third-party advisors), suggesting that benefits to mandated pro forma disclosure depend on the pre-existing information environment.
","abstract_html":"<p>The SEC mandates disclosure of Article 11 pro forma financial statements (pro formas) for acquisitions that exceed one of three bright-line materiality thresholds. Motivated by two theories of mandated disclosure, I test whether pro formas improve analyst forecasts or mitigate incentive alignment problems. Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, I provide evidence that pro formas reduce post-acquisition forecast errors and improve target selection. The improvement in forecast accuracy (target selection) is concentrated in acquirers with low analyst following (acquisitions involving third-party advisors), suggesting that benefits to mandated pro forma disclosure depend on the pre-existing information environment.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Kubic, Matthew"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Schipper, Katherine","Mayew, William"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2020,"date_issued":"2020","date_published":"2020","updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:07:15Z","subjects":["Accounting","Article 11","Mandatory Disclosure","Pro Forma","SEC"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/10161/20928","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Schipper, Katherine","Mayew, William"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Kubic, Matthew"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2020-06-09T17:59:01Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2022-05-27T08:17:12Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2020"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Dissertation"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Accounting","Article 11","Mandatory Disclosure","Pro Forma","SEC"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/10161/20928"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["The SEC mandates disclosure of Article 11 pro forma financial statements (pro formas) for acquisitions that exceed one of three bright-line materiality thresholds. Motivated by two theories of mandated disclosure, I test whether pro formas improve analyst forecasts or mitigate incentive alignment problems. Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, I provide evidence that pro formas reduce post-acquisition forecast errors and improve target selection. The improvement in forecast accuracy (target selection) is concentrated in acquirers with low analyst following (acquisitions involving third-party advisors), suggesting that benefits to mandated pro forma disclosure depend on the pre-existing information environment.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The Benefits of Mandatory Disclosure: Evidence from Regulation S-X Article 11"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Schipper, Katherine","Mayew, William"],"dc:creator":["Kubic, Matthew"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2020-06-09T17:59:01Z"],"dc:date.available":["2022-05-27T08:17:12Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2020"],"dc:description.abstract":["The SEC mandates disclosure of Article 11 pro forma financial statements (pro formas) for acquisitions that exceed one of three bright-line materiality thresholds. Motivated by two theories of mandated disclosure, I test whether pro formas improve analyst forecasts or mitigate incentive alignment problems. Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, I provide evidence that pro formas reduce post-acquisition forecast errors and improve target selection. The improvement in forecast accuracy (target selection) is concentrated in acquirers with low analyst following (acquisitions involving third-party advisors), suggesting that benefits to mandated pro forma disclosure depend on the pre-existing information environment.
"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/10161/20928"],"dc:subject":["Accounting","Article 11","Mandatory Disclosure","Pro Forma","SEC"],"dc:title":["The Benefits of Mandatory Disclosure: Evidence from Regulation S-X Article 11"],"dc:type":["Dissertation"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:07:15Z"}