This dissertation provides an answer to what I call the central question of moral philosophy: what, if anything, is moral value? The answer, I argue, is that moral value is the relational property of eliciting a suitable response from a properly informed, rational, benevolent and otherwise minimal spectator. I call this theory the response-dependent benevolent ideal observer theory or BIORD.
Although the way in which I express and argue for BIORD is original and unique, the core of the theory is old. In chapter 1, I explore these historical roots. The notion that moral value depends, in some sense, upon the reactions of an idealised spectator stretches back at least to Adam Smith and, I argue, to his tutor Francis Hutcheson. I explore how a natural connection between ideal observers, benevolence and utilitarianism has often been assumed without being explicitly argued for.
In chapter 2, I lay out certain crucial meta-theoretical assumptions that help to motivate BIORD. I argue against the methodology of conceptual analysis and in favour of a revisionary approach sometimes called ‘conceptual ethics’. I explore the theoretical aims that ought to guide the conceptual ethicists’ project before arguing in favour of a response-dependent metaethics, in contrast to other sentimentalist theories such as fitting-attitude accounts. The response-dependent schema states that an object is morally valuable if and only if a particular agent would have a particular reaction to it (in certain circumstances).
In chapter 3, I argue that the agent that ought to fill the response-dependent schema is a properly informed, rational, benevolent and otherwise minimal spectator. I define benevolence as a final care directed towards the welfare of conscious creatures and thus argue in favour of welfarism: the view that welfare is the only essential moral value.
In chapter 4, I discuss which of the benevolent observer’s reactions are best thought of as relevant, and which objects are best thought of as the bearers of both essential and non-essential moral value. I suggest that any attitude which lacks the property of being ‘truth-oriented’ is relevant. Arguments concerning the objects of value leads to a discussion of Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion, which BIORD entails. I argue that we ought to embrace it. Lastly, I discuss the objects of non-essential value, showing how BIORD can capture some intuitions that value pluralists might otherwise use against it.
Finally, in chapter 5, I discuss how accepting BIORD would impact our moral discourse, arguing in favour of a radical eliminativist proposal in which deontic language is abandoned in favour of comparative value-talk. I then discuss how BIORD can provide us with a theory of reasons.
","abstract_html":"<p>This dissertation provides an answer to what I call the central question of moral philosophy: what, if anything, is moral value? The answer, I argue, is that moral value is the relational property of eliciting a suitable response from a properly informed, rational, benevolent and otherwise minimal spectator. I call this theory the response-dependent benevolent ideal observer theory or BIORD.</p><p>Although the way in which I express and argue for BIORD is original and unique, the core of the theory is old. In chapter 1, I explore these historical roots. The notion that moral value depends, in some sense, upon the reactions of an idealised spectator stretches back at least to Adam Smith and, I argue, to his tutor Francis Hutcheson. I explore how a natural connection between ideal observers, benevolence and utilitarianism has often been assumed without being explicitly argued for. </p><p>In chapter 2, I lay out certain crucial meta-theoretical assumptions that help to motivate BIORD. I argue against the methodology of conceptual analysis and in favour of a revisionary approach sometimes called ‘conceptual ethics’. I explore the theoretical aims that ought to guide the conceptual ethicists’ project before arguing in favour of a response-dependent metaethics, in contrast to other sentimentalist theories such as fitting-attitude accounts. The response-dependent schema states that an object is morally valuable if and only if a particular agent would have a particular reaction to it (in certain circumstances). </p><p>In chapter 3, I argue that the agent that ought to fill the response-dependent schema is a properly informed, rational, benevolent and otherwise minimal spectator. I define benevolence as a final care directed towards the welfare of conscious creatures and thus argue in favour of welfarism: the view that welfare is the only essential moral value. </p><p>In chapter 4, I discuss which of the benevolent observer’s reactions are best thought of as relevant, and which objects are best thought of as the bearers of both essential and non-essential moral value. I suggest that any attitude which lacks the property of being ‘truth-oriented’ is relevant. Arguments concerning the objects of value leads to a discussion of Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion, which BIORD entails. I argue that we ought to embrace it. Lastly, I discuss the objects of non-essential value, showing how BIORD can capture some intuitions that value pluralists might otherwise use against it. </p><p>Finally, in chapter 5, I discuss how accepting BIORD would impact our moral discourse, arguing in favour of a radical eliminativist proposal in which deontic language is abandoned in favour of comparative value-talk. I then discuss how BIORD can provide us with a theory of reasons.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Campbell, Michael"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018","date_published":"2018","updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:07:10Z","subjects":["Philosophy","benevolence","ethics","ideal observer theory","metaethics","utilitarianism"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/10161/18230","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Campbell, Michael"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2019-04-02T16:27:09Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2019-04-02T16:27:09Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2018"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Dissertation"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy","benevolence","ethics","ideal observer theory","metaethics","utilitarianism"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/10161/18230"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This dissertation provides an answer to what I call the central question of moral philosophy: what, if anything, is moral value? The answer, I argue, is that moral value is the relational property of eliciting a suitable response from a properly informed, rational, benevolent and otherwise minimal spectator. I call this theory the response-dependent benevolent ideal observer theory or BIORD.
Although the way in which I express and argue for BIORD is original and unique, the core of the theory is old. In chapter 1, I explore these historical roots. The notion that moral value depends, in some sense, upon the reactions of an idealised spectator stretches back at least to Adam Smith and, I argue, to his tutor Francis Hutcheson. I explore how a natural connection between ideal observers, benevolence and utilitarianism has often been assumed without being explicitly argued for.
In chapter 2, I lay out certain crucial meta-theoretical assumptions that help to motivate BIORD. I argue against the methodology of conceptual analysis and in favour of a revisionary approach sometimes called ‘conceptual ethics’. I explore the theoretical aims that ought to guide the conceptual ethicists’ project before arguing in favour of a response-dependent metaethics, in contrast to other sentimentalist theories such as fitting-attitude accounts. The response-dependent schema states that an object is morally valuable if and only if a particular agent would have a particular reaction to it (in certain circumstances).
In chapter 3, I argue that the agent that ought to fill the response-dependent schema is a properly informed, rational, benevolent and otherwise minimal spectator. I define benevolence as a final care directed towards the welfare of conscious creatures and thus argue in favour of welfarism: the view that welfare is the only essential moral value.
In chapter 4, I discuss which of the benevolent observer’s reactions are best thought of as relevant, and which objects are best thought of as the bearers of both essential and non-essential moral value. I suggest that any attitude which lacks the property of being ‘truth-oriented’ is relevant. Arguments concerning the objects of value leads to a discussion of Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion, which BIORD entails. I argue that we ought to embrace it. Lastly, I discuss the objects of non-essential value, showing how BIORD can capture some intuitions that value pluralists might otherwise use against it.
Finally, in chapter 5, I discuss how accepting BIORD would impact our moral discourse, arguing in favour of a radical eliminativist proposal in which deontic language is abandoned in favour of comparative value-talk. I then discuss how BIORD can provide us with a theory of reasons.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The Benevolent Ideal Observer Theory"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter"],"dc:creator":["Campbell, Michael"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2019-04-02T16:27:09Z"],"dc:date.available":["2019-04-02T16:27:09Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2018"],"dc:description.abstract":["This dissertation provides an answer to what I call the central question of moral philosophy: what, if anything, is moral value? The answer, I argue, is that moral value is the relational property of eliciting a suitable response from a properly informed, rational, benevolent and otherwise minimal spectator. I call this theory the response-dependent benevolent ideal observer theory or BIORD.
Although the way in which I express and argue for BIORD is original and unique, the core of the theory is old. In chapter 1, I explore these historical roots. The notion that moral value depends, in some sense, upon the reactions of an idealised spectator stretches back at least to Adam Smith and, I argue, to his tutor Francis Hutcheson. I explore how a natural connection between ideal observers, benevolence and utilitarianism has often been assumed without being explicitly argued for.
In chapter 2, I lay out certain crucial meta-theoretical assumptions that help to motivate BIORD. I argue against the methodology of conceptual analysis and in favour of a revisionary approach sometimes called ‘conceptual ethics’. I explore the theoretical aims that ought to guide the conceptual ethicists’ project before arguing in favour of a response-dependent metaethics, in contrast to other sentimentalist theories such as fitting-attitude accounts. The response-dependent schema states that an object is morally valuable if and only if a particular agent would have a particular reaction to it (in certain circumstances).
In chapter 3, I argue that the agent that ought to fill the response-dependent schema is a properly informed, rational, benevolent and otherwise minimal spectator. I define benevolence as a final care directed towards the welfare of conscious creatures and thus argue in favour of welfarism: the view that welfare is the only essential moral value.
In chapter 4, I discuss which of the benevolent observer’s reactions are best thought of as relevant, and which objects are best thought of as the bearers of both essential and non-essential moral value. I suggest that any attitude which lacks the property of being ‘truth-oriented’ is relevant. Arguments concerning the objects of value leads to a discussion of Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion, which BIORD entails. I argue that we ought to embrace it. Lastly, I discuss the objects of non-essential value, showing how BIORD can capture some intuitions that value pluralists might otherwise use against it.
Finally, in chapter 5, I discuss how accepting BIORD would impact our moral discourse, arguing in favour of a radical eliminativist proposal in which deontic language is abandoned in favour of comparative value-talk. I then discuss how BIORD can provide us with a theory of reasons.
"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/10161/18230"],"dc:subject":["Philosophy","benevolence","ethics","ideal observer theory","metaethics","utilitarianism"],"dc:title":["The Benevolent Ideal Observer Theory"],"dc:type":["Dissertation"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:07:10Z"}