This dissertation seeks to bring together two philosophical literatures: the functions literature from the philosophy of biology, and the functionalist literature in naturalistic metaethics. Biological function suggests both objectivity and normativity: “the function of the heart is to pump blood” is an objective fact, and yet, hearts may malfunction—and malfunctioning is normative. Many ethicists wish to naturalize ethics—to help find a place for human normative lives in the objective natural world. In order to do so, they need tools to analyze humans as the products of evolutionary processes. Humans have a dual inheritance system involving both cultural and genetic inheritance that makes analysis of function for them particularly complex. In this dissertation, I develop a set of conceptual tools for those who wish to naturalize. I begin by developing an account of inheritance that can handle culture. Then, I elaborate the selected effects account of function so that it can handle all the evolutionary strangeness of culture. I then introduce the monolith fallacy—an error often committed by those studying human evolution—a tendency to oversimplify—to emphasize the high degree of complexity involved in any naturalizing project. Finally, I introduce the notion of value-guided functions—a kind of functioning not tied to our intentions, but to our values to round out the picture. I then apply the whole framework to the work of the functional metaethicists: Allan Gibbard, David Wong, Richard Joyce, and Philip Kitcher.
","abstract_html":"<p>This dissertation seeks to bring together two philosophical literatures: the functions literature from the philosophy of biology, and the functionalist literature in naturalistic metaethics. Biological function suggests both objectivity and normativity: “the function of the heart is to pump blood” is an objective fact, and yet, hearts may malfunction—and malfunctioning is normative. Many ethicists wish to naturalize ethics—to help find a place for human normative lives in the objective natural world. In order to do so, they need tools to analyze humans as the products of evolutionary processes. Humans have a dual inheritance system involving both cultural and genetic inheritance that makes analysis of function for them particularly complex. In this dissertation, I develop a set of conceptual tools for those who wish to naturalize. I begin by developing an account of inheritance that can handle culture. Then, I elaborate the selected effects account of function so that it can handle all the evolutionary strangeness of culture. I then introduce the monolith fallacy—an error often committed by those studying human evolution—a tendency to oversimplify—to emphasize the high degree of complexity involved in any naturalizing project. Finally, I introduce the notion of value-guided functions—a kind of functioning not tied to our intentions, but to our values to round out the picture. I then apply the whole framework to the work of the functional metaethicists: Allan Gibbard, David Wong, Richard Joyce, and Philip Kitcher.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Conrad, Aryn Ashley"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Neander, Karen L"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2015,"date_issued":"2015","date_published":"2015","updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:07:23Z","subjects":["Philosophy","Biology","Cultural Evolution","Function","Monolith Fallacy","Naturalistic Metaethics","Prefunctions","Value-Guided Function"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/10161/11384","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Neander, Karen L"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Conrad, Aryn Ashley"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2016-01-04T19:26:53Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2016-01-04T19:26:53Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2015"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Dissertation"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy","Biology","Cultural Evolution","Function","Monolith Fallacy","Naturalistic Metaethics","Prefunctions","Value-Guided Function"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/10161/11384"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This dissertation seeks to bring together two philosophical literatures: the functions literature from the philosophy of biology, and the functionalist literature in naturalistic metaethics. Biological function suggests both objectivity and normativity: “the function of the heart is to pump blood” is an objective fact, and yet, hearts may malfunction—and malfunctioning is normative. Many ethicists wish to naturalize ethics—to help find a place for human normative lives in the objective natural world. In order to do so, they need tools to analyze humans as the products of evolutionary processes. Humans have a dual inheritance system involving both cultural and genetic inheritance that makes analysis of function for them particularly complex. In this dissertation, I develop a set of conceptual tools for those who wish to naturalize. I begin by developing an account of inheritance that can handle culture. Then, I elaborate the selected effects account of function so that it can handle all the evolutionary strangeness of culture. I then introduce the monolith fallacy—an error often committed by those studying human evolution—a tendency to oversimplify—to emphasize the high degree of complexity involved in any naturalizing project. Finally, I introduce the notion of value-guided functions—a kind of functioning not tied to our intentions, but to our values to round out the picture. I then apply the whole framework to the work of the functional metaethicists: Allan Gibbard, David Wong, Richard Joyce, and Philip Kitcher.
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