This dissertation examines French philosopher Michel Foucault's theory of historical conditions. It argues that historical conditions take the form of what Foucault calls “historical a priori”: rules that are at once transcendental and historical, and that, as such, serve as historically modifiable yet necessary conditions of what is knowable, sayable, and thinkable in a given period and at a given place. These conditions, this dissertation show in a second step, extend to experience as such; experience is conditioned by historical a priori forms of knowledge, power, and subjectivity. Finally, the dissertation shows that these conditions form the limits of critique: critique of the present is only available for those historical-transcendental conditions that are already in the process of withering away. This dissertation intervenes in the secondary scholarship on Foucault’s work in three decisive ways. First, I show that the historical a priori—which is typically seen as a methodological failure—is not only a methodologically viable concept, but the operative form of historical conditions throughout the entire Foucauldian corpus. Second, I show that even though the concept of experience, due to Foucault’s repeated critiques of phenomenology, is a rather neglected concept in the scholarship on his work, Foucault develops a robust non-phenomenological account of experience. Third, pace charges of a normative lacuna in Foucault’s work, I show that Foucault is committed to autonomy as a historically immanent, yet necessarily underdetermined, norm. This account of historical conditions avoids the facile opposition between determinism and freedom, by showing that the historical a priori neither determines the individual’s action, nor is it rendered inoperative by the spontaneity of human freedom: rather, these conditions delineate a restrictive realm within which freedom can be exercised.
","abstract_html":"<p>This dissertation examines French philosopher Michel Foucault's theory of historical conditions. It argues that historical conditions take the form of what Foucault calls “historical a priori”: rules that are at once transcendental and historical, and that, as such, serve as historically modifiable yet necessary conditions of what is knowable, sayable, and thinkable in a given period and at a given place. These conditions, this dissertation show in a second step, extend to experience as such; experience is conditioned by historical a priori forms of knowledge, power, and subjectivity. Finally, the dissertation shows that these conditions form the limits of critique: critique of the present is only available for those historical-transcendental conditions that are already in the process of withering away. This dissertation intervenes in the secondary scholarship on Foucault’s work in three decisive ways. First, I show that the historical a priori—which is typically seen as a methodological failure—is not only a methodologically viable concept, but the operative form of historical conditions throughout the entire Foucauldian corpus. Second, I show that even though the concept of experience, due to Foucault’s repeated critiques of phenomenology, is a rather neglected concept in the scholarship on his work, Foucault develops a robust non-phenomenological account of experience. Third, pace charges of a normative lacuna in Foucault’s work, I show that Foucault is committed to autonomy as a historically immanent, yet necessarily underdetermined, norm. This account of historical conditions avoids the facile opposition between determinism and freedom, by showing that the historical a priori neither determines the individual’s action, nor is it rendered inoperative by the spontaneity of human freedom: rather, these conditions delineate a restrictive realm within which freedom can be exercised. </p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Aavitsland, Vilde Lid"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2022,"date_issued":"2022-06-01T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2022-06-01T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:04:05Z","subjects":["Michel Foucault","history","experience","critique","historical conditions"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://via.library.depaul.edu/etd/332","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Aavitsland, Vilde Lid"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2032-07-09T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Michel Foucault","history","experience","critique","historical conditions"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://via.library.depaul.edu/etd/332"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This dissertation examines French philosopher Michel Foucault's theory of historical conditions. It argues that historical conditions take the form of what Foucault calls “historical a priori”: rules that are at once transcendental and historical, and that, as such, serve as historically modifiable yet necessary conditions of what is knowable, sayable, and thinkable in a given period and at a given place. These conditions, this dissertation show in a second step, extend to experience as such; experience is conditioned by historical a priori forms of knowledge, power, and subjectivity. Finally, the dissertation shows that these conditions form the limits of critique: critique of the present is only available for those historical-transcendental conditions that are already in the process of withering away. This dissertation intervenes in the secondary scholarship on Foucault’s work in three decisive ways. First, I show that the historical a priori—which is typically seen as a methodological failure—is not only a methodologically viable concept, but the operative form of historical conditions throughout the entire Foucauldian corpus. Second, I show that even though the concept of experience, due to Foucault’s repeated critiques of phenomenology, is a rather neglected concept in the scholarship on his work, Foucault develops a robust non-phenomenological account of experience. Third, pace charges of a normative lacuna in Foucault’s work, I show that Foucault is committed to autonomy as a historically immanent, yet necessarily underdetermined, norm. This account of historical conditions avoids the facile opposition between determinism and freedom, by showing that the historical a priori neither determines the individual’s action, nor is it rendered inoperative by the spontaneity of human freedom: rather, these conditions delineate a restrictive realm within which freedom can be exercised.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Conditioned by History: Experience and Critique in Foucault's Thought"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:creator":["Aavitsland, Vilde Lid"],"dc:date.available":["2032-07-09T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["This dissertation examines French philosopher Michel Foucault's theory of historical conditions. It argues that historical conditions take the form of what Foucault calls “historical a priori”: rules that are at once transcendental and historical, and that, as such, serve as historically modifiable yet necessary conditions of what is knowable, sayable, and thinkable in a given period and at a given place. These conditions, this dissertation show in a second step, extend to experience as such; experience is conditioned by historical a priori forms of knowledge, power, and subjectivity. Finally, the dissertation shows that these conditions form the limits of critique: critique of the present is only available for those historical-transcendental conditions that are already in the process of withering away. This dissertation intervenes in the secondary scholarship on Foucault’s work in three decisive ways. First, I show that the historical a priori—which is typically seen as a methodological failure—is not only a methodologically viable concept, but the operative form of historical conditions throughout the entire Foucauldian corpus. Second, I show that even though the concept of experience, due to Foucault’s repeated critiques of phenomenology, is a rather neglected concept in the scholarship on his work, Foucault develops a robust non-phenomenological account of experience. Third, pace charges of a normative lacuna in Foucault’s work, I show that Foucault is committed to autonomy as a historically immanent, yet necessarily underdetermined, norm. This account of historical conditions avoids the facile opposition between determinism and freedom, by showing that the historical a priori neither determines the individual’s action, nor is it rendered inoperative by the spontaneity of human freedom: rather, these conditions delineate a restrictive realm within which freedom can be exercised.
"],"dc:identifier":["https://via.library.depaul.edu/etd/332"],"dc:subject":["Michel Foucault","history","experience","critique","historical conditions"],"dc:title":["Conditioned by History: Experience and Critique in Foucault's Thought"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:04:05Z"}