{"id":{"repo_id":"denver","oai_identifier":"oai:digitalcommons.du.edu:etd-3260"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/denver/oai:digitalcommons.du.edu:etd-3260","repository":{"repo_id":"denver","name":"University of Denver","base_url":"https://digitalcommons.du.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"Why Democracies and Autocracies Go to War: Comparing the Cases of Iraq and Ukraine","abstract":"<p>History shows that both democratic and nondemocratic countries wage wars to advance their strategic interests. This study has comparatively analyzed two conflicts – the 2003-2011 U.S. invasion of Iraq and Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine – to identify the trends that motivate both democratic and autocratic leaders to behave similarly by launching an invasion. The interpretive research of various memoirs, books, interviews, academic articles, news reports, and speeches, has uncovered that personal biases, particularly confirmation biases, play a significant role in motivating leaders to start a war. Leaders’ confirmation biases are often shaped by three prominent factors – historical memory, their ambitions and political vision, and unwaveringly supportive staff. In the pre-war period, both democratic and autocratic leaders first turn to history to identify their enemies and determine the prospects of their success in war. They form their opinions based on historical memory without further confirming past observations with evidence. History also sets a leadership standard and inspires presidents to pursue ambitious political strategies, which sometimes turn into ‘obsessions’ and motivate leaders to ‘fish’ for data that confirm their strategic beliefs. Such confirming information often comes from the administration staff, who share presidents’ beliefs or unwaveringly support their decisions. The lack of reliance on tangible evidence in this process biases leaders in favor of perpetrating a war that does not necessarily produce anticipated results. The paper provides more details about how leaders form their biases in two different systems and reach the same outcome – war.</p>","abstract_html":"&lt;p&gt;History shows that both democratic and nondemocratic countries wage wars to advance their strategic interests. This study has comparatively analyzed two conflicts – the 2003-2011 U.S. invasion of Iraq and Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine – to identify the trends that motivate both democratic and autocratic leaders to behave similarly by launching an invasion. The interpretive research of various memoirs, books, interviews, academic articles, news reports, and speeches, has uncovered that personal biases, particularly confirmation biases, play a significant role in motivating leaders to start a war. Leaders’ confirmation biases are often shaped by three prominent factors – historical memory, their ambitions and political vision, and unwaveringly supportive staff. In the pre-war period, both democratic and autocratic leaders first turn to history to identify their enemies and determine the prospects of their success in war. They form their opinions based on historical memory without further confirming past observations with evidence. History also sets a leadership standard and inspires presidents to pursue ambitious political strategies, which sometimes turn into ‘obsessions’ and motivate leaders to ‘fish’ for data that confirm their strategic beliefs. Such confirming information often comes from the administration staff, who share presidents’ beliefs or unwaveringly support their decisions. The lack of reliance on tangible evidence in this process biases leaders in favor of perpetrating a war that does not necessarily produce anticipated results. The paper provides more details about how leaders form their biases in two different systems and reach the same outcome – war.&lt;/p&gt;","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Chincharadze, Ketevan"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"M.A.","degree_level":"Masters Thesis","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Rachel Epstein","Nadia Kaneva","Tom Farer"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2023,"date_issued":"2023-06-01T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2023-06-01T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:01:39Z","subjects":["Democracy","George W. Bush","Iraq","Ukraine","Vladimir Putin","War","Eastern European Studies","International and Area Studies","International Relations","Near and Middle Eastern Studies","Peace and Conflict Studies","Political Science","Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration","Social and Behavioral Sciences","Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies"],"languages":["English (eng)"],"rights":["<p>Copyright is held by the author. User is responsible for all copyright compliance.</p>"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/2269","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Rachel Epstein","Nadia Kaneva","Tom Farer"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Chincharadze, Ketevan"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Masters Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["M.A."]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Democracy","George W. Bush","Iraq","Ukraine","Vladimir Putin","War","Eastern European Studies","International and Area Studies","International Relations","Near and Middle Eastern Studies","Peace and Conflict Studies","Political Science","Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration","Social and Behavioral Sciences","Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English (eng)"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["<p>Copyright is held by the author. User is responsible for all copyright compliance.</p>"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/2269"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["<p>History shows that both democratic and nondemocratic countries wage wars to advance their strategic interests. This study has comparatively analyzed two conflicts – the 2003-2011 U.S. invasion of Iraq and Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine – to identify the trends that motivate both democratic and autocratic leaders to behave similarly by launching an invasion. The interpretive research of various memoirs, books, interviews, academic articles, news reports, and speeches, has uncovered that personal biases, particularly confirmation biases, play a significant role in motivating leaders to start a war. Leaders’ confirmation biases are often shaped by three prominent factors – historical memory, their ambitions and political vision, and unwaveringly supportive staff. In the pre-war period, both democratic and autocratic leaders first turn to history to identify their enemies and determine the prospects of their success in war. They form their opinions based on historical memory without further confirming past observations with evidence. History also sets a leadership standard and inspires presidents to pursue ambitious political strategies, which sometimes turn into ‘obsessions’ and motivate leaders to ‘fish’ for data that confirm their strategic beliefs. Such confirming information often comes from the administration staff, who share presidents’ beliefs or unwaveringly support their decisions. The lack of reliance on tangible evidence in this process biases leaders in favor of perpetrating a war that does not necessarily produce anticipated results. The paper provides more details about how leaders form their biases in two different systems and reach the same outcome – war.</p>"]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Why Democracies and Autocracies Go to War: Comparing the Cases of Iraq and Ukraine"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Rachel Epstein","Nadia Kaneva","Tom Farer"],"dc:creator":["Chincharadze, Ketevan"],"dc:description.abstract":["<p>History shows that both democratic and nondemocratic countries wage wars to advance their strategic interests. This study has comparatively analyzed two conflicts – the 2003-2011 U.S. invasion of Iraq and Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine – to identify the trends that motivate both democratic and autocratic leaders to behave similarly by launching an invasion. The interpretive research of various memoirs, books, interviews, academic articles, news reports, and speeches, has uncovered that personal biases, particularly confirmation biases, play a significant role in motivating leaders to start a war. Leaders’ confirmation biases are often shaped by three prominent factors – historical memory, their ambitions and political vision, and unwaveringly supportive staff. In the pre-war period, both democratic and autocratic leaders first turn to history to identify their enemies and determine the prospects of their success in war. They form their opinions based on historical memory without further confirming past observations with evidence. History also sets a leadership standard and inspires presidents to pursue ambitious political strategies, which sometimes turn into ‘obsessions’ and motivate leaders to ‘fish’ for data that confirm their strategic beliefs. Such confirming information often comes from the administration staff, who share presidents’ beliefs or unwaveringly support their decisions. The lack of reliance on tangible evidence in this process biases leaders in favor of perpetrating a war that does not necessarily produce anticipated results. The paper provides more details about how leaders form their biases in two different systems and reach the same outcome – war.</p>"],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/2269"],"dc:language":["English (eng)"],"dc:rights":["<p>Copyright is held by the author. User is responsible for all copyright compliance.</p>"],"dc:subject":["Democracy","George W. Bush","Iraq","Ukraine","Vladimir Putin","War","Eastern European Studies","International and Area Studies","International Relations","Near and Middle Eastern Studies","Peace and Conflict Studies","Political Science","Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration","Social and Behavioral Sciences","Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies"],"dc:title":["Why Democracies and Autocracies Go to War: Comparing the Cases of Iraq and Ukraine"],"thesis:degree_level":["Masters Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["M.A."]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:01:39Z"}