If conflict onset leads to increases in human rights abuse, how can these abuses be curbed once conflicts have ended? To answer this question, researchers have traditionally focused on a country’s regime type and leaders’ incentive structures. This is insufficient, I argue, because many regimes with obvious incentives to curb repression (especially democracies) fail to do so. In addition to regime-type, therefore, the answer depends on whether a given regime can count on the cooperation of its military and law enforcement institutions, which I refer to collectively as the security apparatus. This is because security agents’ prior experiences usually create strong proclivities for violence, and these proclivities must be actively counteracted before agents adopt restraint instead. While some regime leaders have sufficient authority and power over the security apparatus to compel this restraint, many do not. Security apparatuses that emerge from conflict episodes with the autonomy to defy regime leaders’ preferences will tend to protect agents from oversight and accountability mechanisms, perpetuating extrajudicial executions and other forms of severe abuse. I support this argument using cross-national statistical analyses in addition to an in-depth case study entailing five weeks of field research in Kathmandu, Nepal.
","abstract_html":"<p>If conflict onset leads to increases in human rights abuse, how can these abuses be curbed once conflicts have ended? To answer this question, researchers have traditionally focused on a country’s regime type and leaders’ incentive structures. This is insufficient, I argue, because many regimes with obvious incentives to curb repression (especially democracies) fail to do so. In addition to regime-type, therefore, the answer depends on whether a given regime can count on the cooperation of its military and law enforcement institutions, which I refer to collectively as the security apparatus. This is because security agents’ prior experiences usually create strong proclivities for violence, and these proclivities must be actively counteracted before agents adopt restraint instead. While some regime leaders have sufficient authority and power over the security apparatus to compel this restraint, many do not. Security apparatuses that emerge from conflict episodes with the autonomy to defy regime leaders’ preferences will tend to protect agents from oversight and accountability mechanisms, perpetuating extrajudicial executions and other forms of severe abuse. I support this argument using cross-national statistical analyses in addition to an in-depth case study entailing five weeks of field research in Kathmandu, Nepal.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Shay, Christopher Wiley"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Erica Chenoweth","Cullen Hendrix","Marie E. Berry"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2021,"date_issued":"2021-01-01T08:00:00Z","date_published":"2021-01-01T08:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:02:03Z","subjects":["Civil-military relations","Democratization","Human rights","Nepal","Post-conflict","State repression","Asian Studies","Human Rights Law","International and Area Studies","International Relations","Political Science"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright is held by the author. User is responsible for all copyright compliance.
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