When civil wars are resolved via negotiated settlement, peace-agreement provisions like power-sharing agreements and third-party security guarantees often are advocated for their purported benefits of ensuring a long-lasting and durable peace. Although scholars have explored the effects of peace-agreement provisions on enhancing the security of states, their influence on shaping individual security outcomes is largely unknown. The strong potential exists that these same provisions that improve a government's ability to deter future violence also increase that government's violation of its citizens' physical integrity rights as a means of coercion and governance. Also rare in the power-sharing literature is exploration of the effects of individual, disaggregated provisions.
This dissertation, therefore, asks: Under what conditions do peace-agreement provisions significantly improve the state's protection of its citizens' physical integrity rights? Two models are proposed. Model 1 considers aggregated power-sharing provisions. Model 2 considers disaggregated peace-agreement provisions, and includes both power-sharing agreements and robust third-party security guarantees.
Both models are evaluated in light of the situational and historical contexts relevant to each state's civil war experience. The universe of cases includes thirty-six civil wars in twenty-seven states where conflict terminated between 1989-2007 via negotiated settlement. This project leverages a mixed-method research design, including contingency tables and fuzzy-set Quantitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to resolve the \"small number of cases, multiple variables\" challenge and to account for causal complexity.
Four central claims are advanced in this dissertation: First, the common technique of evaluating peace-agreement provisions by aggregating them according to common political, military, and territorial dimensions obscures and misleads scholars; the disaggregation of peace-agreement provisions reveals how measures often act in opposition. Second, a number of commonly present provisions--including integration of rebels into the main military ranks and the granting of territorial autonomy--are consistently inhibitory to individual security after civil war ends. Third, other provisions such as robust third-party security guarantees and the granting of territorial federalism consistently lead to a reduction in the level of political repression used by states after civil war has ended. Fourth, significant human-rights improvement results from favorable causal recipes (i.e., combinations of disaggregated conditions) that together reduce both the motivation and opportunity of a government to repress.
These findings will assist decision-makers involved in negotiated settlements, as they (1) identify the appropriate blends of peace-agreement provisions for resolving different civil wars, and (2) balance the need for a post-conflict government to both assure its population and to deter future violence.
","abstract_html":"<p>When civil wars are resolved via negotiated settlement, peace-agreement provisions like power-sharing agreements and third-party security guarantees often are advocated for their purported benefits of ensuring a long-lasting and durable peace. Although scholars have explored the effects of peace-agreement provisions on enhancing the security of states, their influence on shaping individual security outcomes is largely unknown. The strong potential exists that these same provisions that improve a government's ability to deter future violence also increase that government's violation of its citizens' physical integrity rights as a means of coercion and governance. Also rare in the power-sharing literature is exploration of the effects of individual, disaggregated provisions.</p> <p>This dissertation, therefore, asks: <em>Under what conditions do peace-agreement provisions significantly improve the state's protection of its citizens' physical integrity rights?</em> Two models are proposed. Model 1 considers aggregated power-sharing provisions. Model 2 considers disaggregated peace-agreement provisions, and includes both power-sharing agreements and robust third-party security guarantees.</p> <p>Both models are evaluated in light of the situational and historical contexts relevant to each state's civil war experience. The universe of cases includes thirty-six civil wars in twenty-seven states where conflict terminated between 1989-2007 via negotiated settlement. This project leverages a mixed-method research design, including contingency tables and fuzzy-set Quantitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to resolve the "small number of cases, multiple variables" challenge and to account for causal complexity.</p> <p>Four central claims are advanced in this dissertation: First, the common technique of evaluating peace-agreement provisions by aggregating them according to common political, military, and territorial dimensions obscures and misleads scholars; the disaggregation of peace-agreement provisions reveals how measures often act in opposition. Second, a number of commonly present provisions--including integration of rebels into the main military ranks and the granting of territorial autonomy--are consistently inhibitory to individual security after civil war ends. Third, other provisions such as robust third-party security guarantees and the granting of territorial federalism consistently lead to a reduction in the level of political repression used by states after civil war has ended. Fourth, significant human-rights improvement results from favorable causal recipes (i.e., combinations of disaggregated conditions) that together reduce both the motivation and opportunity of a government to repress.</p> <p>These findings will assist decision-makers involved in negotiated settlements, as they (1) identify the appropriate blends of peace-agreement provisions for resolving different civil wars, and (2) balance the need for a post-conflict government to both assure its population and to deter future violence.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Korsmo, Melvin R."],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Deborah Avant, Ph.D.","Erica Chenoweth","Timothy Sisk"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-01-01T08:00:00Z","date_published":"2017-01-01T08:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:02:03Z","subjects":["Civil war","Human security","Peace","Physical integrity rights","Political repression","International and Area Studies","Political Science"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright is held by the author. User is responsible for all copyright compliance.
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This dissertation, therefore, asks: Under what conditions do peace-agreement provisions significantly improve the state's protection of its citizens' physical integrity rights? Two models are proposed. Model 1 considers aggregated power-sharing provisions. Model 2 considers disaggregated peace-agreement provisions, and includes both power-sharing agreements and robust third-party security guarantees.
Both models are evaluated in light of the situational and historical contexts relevant to each state's civil war experience. The universe of cases includes thirty-six civil wars in twenty-seven states where conflict terminated between 1989-2007 via negotiated settlement. This project leverages a mixed-method research design, including contingency tables and fuzzy-set Quantitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to resolve the \"small number of cases, multiple variables\" challenge and to account for causal complexity.
Four central claims are advanced in this dissertation: First, the common technique of evaluating peace-agreement provisions by aggregating them according to common political, military, and territorial dimensions obscures and misleads scholars; the disaggregation of peace-agreement provisions reveals how measures often act in opposition. Second, a number of commonly present provisions--including integration of rebels into the main military ranks and the granting of territorial autonomy--are consistently inhibitory to individual security after civil war ends. Third, other provisions such as robust third-party security guarantees and the granting of territorial federalism consistently lead to a reduction in the level of political repression used by states after civil war has ended. Fourth, significant human-rights improvement results from favorable causal recipes (i.e., combinations of disaggregated conditions) that together reduce both the motivation and opportunity of a government to repress.
These findings will assist decision-makers involved in negotiated settlements, as they (1) identify the appropriate blends of peace-agreement provisions for resolving different civil wars, and (2) balance the need for a post-conflict government to both assure its population and to deter future violence.
"]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Securing Whose Peace? The Effects of Peace-Agreement Provisions on Physical Integrity Rights After Civil War"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Deborah Avant, Ph.D.","Erica Chenoweth","Timothy Sisk"],"dc:creator":["Korsmo, Melvin R."],"dc:date.available":["2019-09-21T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["When civil wars are resolved via negotiated settlement, peace-agreement provisions like power-sharing agreements and third-party security guarantees often are advocated for their purported benefits of ensuring a long-lasting and durable peace. Although scholars have explored the effects of peace-agreement provisions on enhancing the security of states, their influence on shaping individual security outcomes is largely unknown. The strong potential exists that these same provisions that improve a government's ability to deter future violence also increase that government's violation of its citizens' physical integrity rights as a means of coercion and governance. Also rare in the power-sharing literature is exploration of the effects of individual, disaggregated provisions.
This dissertation, therefore, asks: Under what conditions do peace-agreement provisions significantly improve the state's protection of its citizens' physical integrity rights? Two models are proposed. Model 1 considers aggregated power-sharing provisions. Model 2 considers disaggregated peace-agreement provisions, and includes both power-sharing agreements and robust third-party security guarantees.
Both models are evaluated in light of the situational and historical contexts relevant to each state's civil war experience. The universe of cases includes thirty-six civil wars in twenty-seven states where conflict terminated between 1989-2007 via negotiated settlement. This project leverages a mixed-method research design, including contingency tables and fuzzy-set Quantitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to resolve the \"small number of cases, multiple variables\" challenge and to account for causal complexity.
Four central claims are advanced in this dissertation: First, the common technique of evaluating peace-agreement provisions by aggregating them according to common political, military, and territorial dimensions obscures and misleads scholars; the disaggregation of peace-agreement provisions reveals how measures often act in opposition. Second, a number of commonly present provisions--including integration of rebels into the main military ranks and the granting of territorial autonomy--are consistently inhibitory to individual security after civil war ends. Third, other provisions such as robust third-party security guarantees and the granting of territorial federalism consistently lead to a reduction in the level of political repression used by states after civil war has ended. Fourth, significant human-rights improvement results from favorable causal recipes (i.e., combinations of disaggregated conditions) that together reduce both the motivation and opportunity of a government to repress.
These findings will assist decision-makers involved in negotiated settlements, as they (1) identify the appropriate blends of peace-agreement provisions for resolving different civil wars, and (2) balance the need for a post-conflict government to both assure its population and to deter future violence.
"],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/1361"],"dc:language":["en"],"dc:rights":["Copyright is held by the author. User is responsible for all copyright compliance.
"],"dc:subject":["Civil war","Human security","Peace","Physical integrity rights","Political repression","International and Area Studies","Political Science"],"dc:title":["Securing Whose Peace? The Effects of Peace-Agreement Provisions on Physical Integrity Rights After Civil War"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:02:03Z"}