The growing trend of computer network attacks provokes the necessity for a comprehensive cyber deterrence strategy to deter aggressors from attacking U.S. critical infrastructure. The current U.S. cyber deterrence strategy based on punishment is ineffective in deterring aggressors as evidenced by the increasing number of computer network attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure. Therefore, the U.S. should look towards an alternative strategy based on robustness to deny enemy objectives and absorb attacks. To identify the superior cyber deterrence strategy, this study uses a qualitative assessment based on open-sourced information to evaluate the effectiveness of each strategy. The findings of this study show that a deterrence strategy centered on robustness can be more effective in deterring aggressors. As a result, the United States would be better served to reform its cyber deterrence strategy by establishing a capability to absorb computer network attacks and deny enemy objectives as a deterrent.
","abstract_html":"<p>The growing trend of computer network attacks provokes the necessity for a comprehensive cyber deterrence strategy to deter aggressors from attacking U.S. critical infrastructure. The current U.S. cyber deterrence strategy based on punishment is ineffective in deterring aggressors as evidenced by the increasing number of computer network attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure. Therefore, the U.S. should look towards an alternative strategy based on robustness to deny enemy objectives and absorb attacks. To identify the superior cyber deterrence strategy, this study uses a qualitative assessment based on open-sourced information to evaluate the effectiveness of each strategy. The findings of this study show that a deterrence strategy centered on robustness can be more effective in deterring aggressors. As a result, the United States would be better served to reform its cyber deterrence strategy by establishing a capability to absorb computer network attacks and deny enemy objectives as a deterrent.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["DeCampos, Eric M."],"institution":null,"degree_name":"M.A.","degree_level":"Masters Thesis","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Paul R. Viotti, Ph.D.","Lewis K. Griffith","Benjamin P. Gochman","Joseph S. Szyliowicz","Maria D. Cruz"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2013,"date_issued":"2013-08-01T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2013-08-01T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:02:11Z","subjects":["Critical infrastructure protection","Cyber deterrence","Cybersecurity","Deterrence","Homeland defense","Homeland security","International Relations","Political Science"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright is held by the author. User is responsible for all copyright compliance.
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