OPERATION DESERT STORM: AN EXAMINATION OE THE STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGN

This study examines the conceptual foundation and political validity of the strategic air campaign part of Operation Desert Storm. Prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, American military attention focused on winning wars on the battlefield with air power in a supportive role, but this war reintroduced the idea of achieving victory by means of a distinct air campaign. Key architects of this intent argued that the Iraqi army could be forced from Kuwait without a major ground offensive by applying conventional air power against telecommunication and leadership facilities in Baghdad. They sought to kill, overthrow or isolate Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath regime or use the threat of these to compel the Iraqi forces to withdraw from Kuwait. The study explores why the «dccapitation strategy» did not succeed in instituting a change in the Iraqi regime. Findings derive from military and official documentation, interviews with United States Air Force officers who were closely involved with the planning and Iraqis with detailed knowledge and experience of Saddam Hussein’s political power structure. By systematically examining the origins, evolution and execution of the strategic air campaign against the inner workings of the Iraqi regime and the targeted state’s perception of the bombing, the thesis goes beyond existing literature in disclosing the controversial planning process and assessing the political impact of targeting the regime’s «central nervous systcm». The research suggest.s that though the «dccapitation strategy» was the only aspect of Operation Desert Storm that attempted to deal with the root of the problem (the Iraqi regime) rather than the symptom (the occupation of Kuwait), the air campaign failed in its ultimate objective because there was no comprehensive understanding of how the regime worked, inadequate intelligence and because of political constraints that were imposed on the strategy. While the campaign failed to decapitate the regime, it was never afforded the political patronage essential to success and the Iraqi regime proved more resilient than anticipated. Thus the strategic air effort represented an imperfect application of a new air power concept, caught as it was between an ill-defined political endstate and means that were incapable of implementation. These two factors did in the end preclude success, and in order for the strategy to have prospects for the future one needs to improve the relationship between what is on the one hand politically desirable, and on the other militarily achievable.

Name dc:type.qualificationname

PhD

Level dc:type.qualificationlevel

Doctoral

Grantor dc:publisher.institution

De Montfort University

Year dc:date.issued

2000

Author dc:creator

• OLSEN, JOHN ANDREAS

Licence

• https://dora.dmu.ac.uk/bitstreams/ba98328f-34af-427c-a972-b13dbf5413e9/download