Explaining the U.S Failure in Afghanistan
This thesis offers a comprehensive analysis of the trajectory of U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan spanning multiple administrations from Obama to Biden, contextualizing it within broader shifts in American interventionism since the Cold War. An examination of the Obama, Trump, and Biden eras, delineates the complexities of military interventions, nation-building endeavors, the limitations of incrementalism in addressing the multifaceted challenges of conflict resolution, and the challenges of maintaining stability in conflict regions while avoiding prolonged military engagements. Ultimately, it advocates for a comprehensive and more flexible approach to foreign policy, balancing idealistic aspirations with pragmatic considerations to safeguard national interests, promote international stability, and advance global cooperation in the twenty-first century.
US Afghan war, Incrementalism, Wilsonianism, Realism, US foreign policy, Afghanistan, Taliban, Interventionist, Non-interventionist, Nation-building Withdrawal, International and Comparative Education
City University of New York - City College
Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations