Bullshit is a topic that has enjoyed an explosion of attention in both cognitive and social psychological research domains. While the picture painted thus far suggests that receptivity to such statements (i.e., perceiving meaning where none exists) hinges upon an individual’s ability to engage in reflective (vs. reflexive) cognitive processing, little attention has been paid to how purveyors of bullshit influence one’s willingness to engage with the message. This is critical to explore, given the status of misinformation in today’s media climate. A critical step involved in determining characteristics of speakers that predict bullshit receptivity is to understand how people envision “bullshitters” in their minds. Here, I present three studies that explore this phenomenon. Experiment 1 used reverse correlation to obtain visual estimates of people’s mental representations of a “bullshitter” (one who makes bullshit statements) or a “bullshittee” (one who believes bullshit statements). Experiment 2 tested whether participants had lower bullshit receptivity to statements attributed to bullshitters vs. non-bullshitters, approximated through participants’ anti-CIs. Experiment 3 explored whether participants assumed a dyadic existence between bullshitters and bullshittees as a justification to explain the perceived widespread nature of bullshit in today’s society. Overall, the data were mixed. Participants instead provided strongly overlapping mental representations of both bullshitters and bullshittees, suggesting a phenomenon where those who chronically peddle bullshit also tend to believe it. Experiment 2 found evidence for specific traits that influence bullshit receptivity (i.e., warmth, dominance). Experiment 3 provided mixed data on the dyad between bullshitters and bullshittees, though some separation was identified in terms of the traits perceived to drive the latter’s receptivity to bullshit from the former (e.g., gullibility, trustworthiness, attractiveness, ambition). In summary, these experiments offer a seminal line of work on the contribution of face perception in bullshit receptivity as well as a first look at how bullshitters and bullshittees are perceived in the mind.
","abstract_html":"<p>Bullshit is a topic that has enjoyed an explosion of attention in both cognitive and social psychological research domains. While the picture painted thus far suggests that receptivity to such statements (i.e., perceiving meaning where none exists) hinges upon an individual’s ability to engage in reflective (vs. reflexive) cognitive processing, little attention has been paid to how purveyors of bullshit influence one’s willingness to engage with the message. This is critical to explore, given the status of misinformation in today’s media climate. A critical step involved in determining characteristics of speakers that predict bullshit receptivity is to understand how people envision “bullshitters” in their minds. Here, I present three studies that explore this phenomenon. Experiment 1 used reverse correlation to obtain visual estimates of people’s mental representations of a “bullshitter” (one who makes bullshit statements) or a “bullshittee” (one who believes bullshit statements). Experiment 2 tested whether participants had lower bullshit receptivity to statements attributed to bullshitters vs. non-bullshitters, approximated through participants’ anti-CIs. Experiment 3 explored whether participants assumed a dyadic existence between bullshitters and bullshittees as a justification to explain the perceived widespread nature of bullshit in today’s society. Overall, the data were mixed. Participants instead provided strongly overlapping mental representations of both bullshitters and bullshittees, suggesting a phenomenon where those who chronically peddle bullshit also tend to believe it. Experiment 2 found evidence for specific traits that influence bullshit receptivity (i.e., warmth, dominance). Experiment 3 provided mixed data on the dyad between bullshitters and bullshittees, though some separation was identified in terms of the traits perceived to drive the latter’s receptivity to bullshit from the former (e.g., gullibility, trustworthiness, attractiveness, ambition). In summary, these experiments offer a seminal line of work on the contribution of face perception in bullshit receptivity as well as a first look at how bullshitters and bullshittees are perceived in the mind.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Tracy, Ryan"],"institution":"The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":"Psychology","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Eric Mandelbaum"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":["Steven Young","Ana Gantman","Daryl Wout"],"year":2024,"date_issued":"2024-09-01T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-09-01T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:00:35Z","subjects":["Cognitive Psychology","Cognitive Science","Social Psychology","bullshit receptivity","messenger characteristics","first impressions","mental representations"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/6002","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Eric Mandelbaum"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Steven Young","Ana Gantman","Daryl Wout"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Tracy, Ryan"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2024-09-11T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Psychology"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Cognitive Psychology","Cognitive Science","Social Psychology","bullshit receptivity","messenger characteristics","first impressions","mental representations"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/6002"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Bullshit is a topic that has enjoyed an explosion of attention in both cognitive and social psychological research domains. While the picture painted thus far suggests that receptivity to such statements (i.e., perceiving meaning where none exists) hinges upon an individual’s ability to engage in reflective (vs. reflexive) cognitive processing, little attention has been paid to how purveyors of bullshit influence one’s willingness to engage with the message. This is critical to explore, given the status of misinformation in today’s media climate. A critical step involved in determining characteristics of speakers that predict bullshit receptivity is to understand how people envision “bullshitters” in their minds. Here, I present three studies that explore this phenomenon. Experiment 1 used reverse correlation to obtain visual estimates of people’s mental representations of a “bullshitter” (one who makes bullshit statements) or a “bullshittee” (one who believes bullshit statements). Experiment 2 tested whether participants had lower bullshit receptivity to statements attributed to bullshitters vs. non-bullshitters, approximated through participants’ anti-CIs. Experiment 3 explored whether participants assumed a dyadic existence between bullshitters and bullshittees as a justification to explain the perceived widespread nature of bullshit in today’s society. Overall, the data were mixed. Participants instead provided strongly overlapping mental representations of both bullshitters and bullshittees, suggesting a phenomenon where those who chronically peddle bullshit also tend to believe it. Experiment 2 found evidence for specific traits that influence bullshit receptivity (i.e., warmth, dominance). Experiment 3 provided mixed data on the dyad between bullshitters and bullshittees, though some separation was identified in terms of the traits perceived to drive the latter’s receptivity to bullshit from the former (e.g., gullibility, trustworthiness, attractiveness, ambition). In summary, these experiments offer a seminal line of work on the contribution of face perception in bullshit receptivity as well as a first look at how bullshitters and bullshittees are perceived in the mind.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The Beautiful and the Bullshit: Speaker and Listener Mental Representations Influence Bullshit Receptivity"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Eric Mandelbaum"],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Steven Young","Ana Gantman","Daryl Wout"],"dc:creator":["Tracy, Ryan"],"dc:date.available":["2024-09-11T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["Bullshit is a topic that has enjoyed an explosion of attention in both cognitive and social psychological research domains. While the picture painted thus far suggests that receptivity to such statements (i.e., perceiving meaning where none exists) hinges upon an individual’s ability to engage in reflective (vs. reflexive) cognitive processing, little attention has been paid to how purveyors of bullshit influence one’s willingness to engage with the message. This is critical to explore, given the status of misinformation in today’s media climate. A critical step involved in determining characteristics of speakers that predict bullshit receptivity is to understand how people envision “bullshitters” in their minds. Here, I present three studies that explore this phenomenon. Experiment 1 used reverse correlation to obtain visual estimates of people’s mental representations of a “bullshitter” (one who makes bullshit statements) or a “bullshittee” (one who believes bullshit statements). Experiment 2 tested whether participants had lower bullshit receptivity to statements attributed to bullshitters vs. non-bullshitters, approximated through participants’ anti-CIs. Experiment 3 explored whether participants assumed a dyadic existence between bullshitters and bullshittees as a justification to explain the perceived widespread nature of bullshit in today’s society. Overall, the data were mixed. Participants instead provided strongly overlapping mental representations of both bullshitters and bullshittees, suggesting a phenomenon where those who chronically peddle bullshit also tend to believe it. Experiment 2 found evidence for specific traits that influence bullshit receptivity (i.e., warmth, dominance). Experiment 3 provided mixed data on the dyad between bullshitters and bullshittees, though some separation was identified in terms of the traits perceived to drive the latter’s receptivity to bullshit from the former (e.g., gullibility, trustworthiness, attractiveness, ambition). In summary, these experiments offer a seminal line of work on the contribution of face perception in bullshit receptivity as well as a first look at how bullshitters and bullshittees are perceived in the mind.
"],"dc:identifier":["https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/6002"],"dc:subject":["Cognitive Psychology","Cognitive Science","Social Psychology","bullshit receptivity","messenger characteristics","first impressions","mental representations"],"dc:title":["The Beautiful and the Bullshit: Speaker and Listener Mental Representations Influence Bullshit Receptivity"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Psychology"],"thesis:degree_level":["Doctoral"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy"],"thesis:institution_name":["The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:00:35Z"}