In evaluating presidential power, substantive focus on the administrative aspects of the presidency emphasizes the crucial importance of a president’s degree of control, and dominance, over the executive branch. In this dissertation, I examine the relationship between the unitary executive, in practice, and the power of presidents to control administrative policymaking. I begin with a theoretical discussion and practical definition of presidential power. I define power as the degree to which a president has unilateral control and influence over the federal government’s agencies, the executive branch, and therefore administrative policies. I then assess the legitimacy and influence of the unitary executive on power, with other historical context variables. These include serving under a unified or divided government, and year in a presidency, to see the effects on presidential powers. My research finds that a strong unitary expression, when embodied by an officeholder, is an explanatory variable in determining a powerful administrative presidency, through increased presidential control over the executive branch and agency functions. However, whether this increase in power is most attributable to the personality and endeavors of the individual, is inherent in the office itself, or is dependent on actions of the other branches in the government, requires additional focus. I therefore examine case studies of presidencies, from the start of the Modern Presidency era to the handing down of cases that limited the powers of Congress and expanded executive power. Overall, I test whether the unitary executive has been legitimate and present, whether it has also contributed to increased executive power, and the extent to which it is connected to interbranch relations. My research finds not only a strong correlation between executive power and the unitary executive, but also that the unitary executive has been bolstered as much by Congressional and Court delegation and acquiescence, as it has by individual initiative.
","abstract_html":"<p>In evaluating presidential power, substantive focus on the administrative aspects of the presidency emphasizes the crucial importance of a president’s degree of control, and dominance, over the executive branch. In this dissertation, I examine the relationship between the unitary executive, in practice, and the power of presidents to control administrative policymaking. I begin with a theoretical discussion and practical definition of presidential power. I define power as the degree to which a president has unilateral control and influence over the federal government’s agencies, the executive branch, and therefore administrative policies. I then assess the legitimacy and influence of the unitary executive on power, with other historical context variables. These include serving under a unified or divided government, and year in a presidency, to see the effects on presidential powers. My research finds that a strong unitary expression, when embodied by an officeholder, is an explanatory variable in determining a powerful administrative presidency, through increased presidential control over the executive branch and agency functions. However, whether this increase in power is most attributable to the personality and endeavors of the individual, is inherent in the office itself, or is dependent on actions of the other branches in the government, requires additional focus. I therefore examine case studies of presidencies, from the start of the Modern Presidency era to the handing down of cases that limited the powers of Congress and expanded executive power. Overall, I test whether the unitary executive has been legitimate and present, whether it has also contributed to increased executive power, and the extent to which it is connected to interbranch relations. My research finds not only a strong correlation between executive power and the unitary executive, but also that the unitary executive has been bolstered as much by Congressional and Court delegation and acquiescence, as it has by individual initiative.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Fuerderer, Maxwell J"],"institution":"The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":"Political Science","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Charles Tien"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":["Sanford Schram","Thomas Halper"],"year":2024,"date_issued":"2024-06-01T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-06-01T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:59:21Z","subjects":["American Politics","American Presidency","Presidential Power","Unitary Executive Theory"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/5822","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Charles Tien"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Sanford Schram","Thomas Halper"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Fuerderer, Maxwell J"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2024-04-30T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Political Science"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["American Politics","American Presidency","Presidential Power","Unitary Executive Theory"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/5822"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["In evaluating presidential power, substantive focus on the administrative aspects of the presidency emphasizes the crucial importance of a president’s degree of control, and dominance, over the executive branch. In this dissertation, I examine the relationship between the unitary executive, in practice, and the power of presidents to control administrative policymaking. I begin with a theoretical discussion and practical definition of presidential power. I define power as the degree to which a president has unilateral control and influence over the federal government’s agencies, the executive branch, and therefore administrative policies. I then assess the legitimacy and influence of the unitary executive on power, with other historical context variables. These include serving under a unified or divided government, and year in a presidency, to see the effects on presidential powers. My research finds that a strong unitary expression, when embodied by an officeholder, is an explanatory variable in determining a powerful administrative presidency, through increased presidential control over the executive branch and agency functions. However, whether this increase in power is most attributable to the personality and endeavors of the individual, is inherent in the office itself, or is dependent on actions of the other branches in the government, requires additional focus. I therefore examine case studies of presidencies, from the start of the Modern Presidency era to the handing down of cases that limited the powers of Congress and expanded executive power. Overall, I test whether the unitary executive has been legitimate and present, whether it has also contributed to increased executive power, and the extent to which it is connected to interbranch relations. My research finds not only a strong correlation between executive power and the unitary executive, but also that the unitary executive has been bolstered as much by Congressional and Court delegation and acquiescence, as it has by individual initiative.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The Unitary Executive and Power in the Modern American Presidency"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Charles Tien"],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Sanford Schram","Thomas Halper"],"dc:creator":["Fuerderer, Maxwell J"],"dc:date.available":["2024-04-30T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["In evaluating presidential power, substantive focus on the administrative aspects of the presidency emphasizes the crucial importance of a president’s degree of control, and dominance, over the executive branch. In this dissertation, I examine the relationship between the unitary executive, in practice, and the power of presidents to control administrative policymaking. I begin with a theoretical discussion and practical definition of presidential power. I define power as the degree to which a president has unilateral control and influence over the federal government’s agencies, the executive branch, and therefore administrative policies. I then assess the legitimacy and influence of the unitary executive on power, with other historical context variables. These include serving under a unified or divided government, and year in a presidency, to see the effects on presidential powers. My research finds that a strong unitary expression, when embodied by an officeholder, is an explanatory variable in determining a powerful administrative presidency, through increased presidential control over the executive branch and agency functions. However, whether this increase in power is most attributable to the personality and endeavors of the individual, is inherent in the office itself, or is dependent on actions of the other branches in the government, requires additional focus. I therefore examine case studies of presidencies, from the start of the Modern Presidency era to the handing down of cases that limited the powers of Congress and expanded executive power. Overall, I test whether the unitary executive has been legitimate and present, whether it has also contributed to increased executive power, and the extent to which it is connected to interbranch relations. My research finds not only a strong correlation between executive power and the unitary executive, but also that the unitary executive has been bolstered as much by Congressional and Court delegation and acquiescence, as it has by individual initiative.
"],"dc:identifier":["https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/5822"],"dc:subject":["American Politics","American Presidency","Presidential Power","Unitary Executive Theory"],"dc:title":["The Unitary Executive and Power in the Modern American Presidency"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Political Science"],"thesis:degree_level":["Doctoral"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy"],"thesis:institution_name":["The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:59:21Z"}