This thesis argues that Lon Fuller’s approach to jurisprudence offers more important support to the rule of law than has been generally recognized. It argues further that a consequentialist lens allows clearer views of Fuller’s strengths in this regard, despite Fuller’s own resistance to consequentialism and despite consequentialism’s blindness to some of Fuller’s depth and texture. This thesis supplies a formula, although one intended only as a guide to thinking, not for actual computation, to drive judicial decision-making. The inputs into this formula are six values widely shared in the United States, modified by case-by-case salience. Kantian deontology strongly influences at least one such value. The thesis defends this unusual pluralistic version of consequentialism. It hopes to encourage jurists to find common ground based on those values, values themselves deeply rooted in American culture, and in so doing, may strengthen the legitimacy of American law and legal institutions. It also gleans from Fuller’s work a sense of his likely metaethics, whose modesty offers an illuminating symmetry with his jurisprudence, especially in comparison with the metaethics and jurisprudence of his two principal rivals, H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin. Finally, it argues that American law would do well to adopt his approach to the interpretation of legal documents.
","abstract_html":"<p>This thesis argues that Lon Fuller’s approach to jurisprudence offers more important support to the rule of law than has been generally recognized. It argues further that a consequentialist lens allows clearer views of Fuller’s strengths in this regard, despite Fuller’s own resistance to consequentialism and despite consequentialism’s blindness to some of Fuller’s depth and texture. This thesis supplies a formula, although one intended only as a guide to thinking, not for actual computation, to drive judicial decision-making. The inputs into this formula are six values widely shared in the United States, modified by case-by-case salience. Kantian deontology strongly influences at least one such value. The thesis defends this unusual pluralistic version of consequentialism. It hopes to encourage jurists to find common ground based on those values, values themselves deeply rooted in American culture, and in so doing, may strengthen the legitimacy of American law and legal institutions. It also gleans from Fuller’s work a sense of his likely metaethics, whose modesty offers an illuminating symmetry with his jurisprudence, especially in comparison with the metaethics and jurisprudence of his two principal rivals, H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin. Finally, it argues that American law would do well to adopt his approach to the interpretation of legal documents.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Feldman, Daniel L"],"institution":"The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Carol Gould"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":["Jeremy Waldron","Steven Ross","Stephen Neale"],"year":2024,"date_issued":"2024-02-01T08:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-02-01T08:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:58:57Z","subjects":["Jurisprudence","Philosophy","pluralism","consequentialism","legitimacy","morality"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/5618","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Carol Gould"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Jeremy Waldron","Steven Ross","Stephen Neale"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Feldman, Daniel L"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2023-12-19T08:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Jurisprudence","Philosophy","pluralism","consequentialism","legitimacy","morality"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/5618"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This thesis argues that Lon Fuller’s approach to jurisprudence offers more important support to the rule of law than has been generally recognized. It argues further that a consequentialist lens allows clearer views of Fuller’s strengths in this regard, despite Fuller’s own resistance to consequentialism and despite consequentialism’s blindness to some of Fuller’s depth and texture. This thesis supplies a formula, although one intended only as a guide to thinking, not for actual computation, to drive judicial decision-making. The inputs into this formula are six values widely shared in the United States, modified by case-by-case salience. Kantian deontology strongly influences at least one such value. The thesis defends this unusual pluralistic version of consequentialism. It hopes to encourage jurists to find common ground based on those values, values themselves deeply rooted in American culture, and in so doing, may strengthen the legitimacy of American law and legal institutions. It also gleans from Fuller’s work a sense of his likely metaethics, whose modesty offers an illuminating symmetry with his jurisprudence, especially in comparison with the metaethics and jurisprudence of his two principal rivals, H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin. Finally, it argues that American law would do well to adopt his approach to the interpretation of legal documents.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Law's Legitimacy: Lon Fuller in a Consequentialist Frame"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Carol Gould"],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Jeremy Waldron","Steven Ross","Stephen Neale"],"dc:creator":["Feldman, Daniel L"],"dc:date.available":["2023-12-19T08:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["This thesis argues that Lon Fuller’s approach to jurisprudence offers more important support to the rule of law than has been generally recognized. It argues further that a consequentialist lens allows clearer views of Fuller’s strengths in this regard, despite Fuller’s own resistance to consequentialism and despite consequentialism’s blindness to some of Fuller’s depth and texture. This thesis supplies a formula, although one intended only as a guide to thinking, not for actual computation, to drive judicial decision-making. The inputs into this formula are six values widely shared in the United States, modified by case-by-case salience. Kantian deontology strongly influences at least one such value. The thesis defends this unusual pluralistic version of consequentialism. It hopes to encourage jurists to find common ground based on those values, values themselves deeply rooted in American culture, and in so doing, may strengthen the legitimacy of American law and legal institutions. It also gleans from Fuller’s work a sense of his likely metaethics, whose modesty offers an illuminating symmetry with his jurisprudence, especially in comparison with the metaethics and jurisprudence of his two principal rivals, H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin. Finally, it argues that American law would do well to adopt his approach to the interpretation of legal documents.
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