{"id":{"repo_id":"cuny-grad","oai_identifier":"oai:academicworks.cuny.edu:gc_etds-4902"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/cuny-grad/oai:academicworks.cuny.edu:gc_etds-4902","repository":{"repo_id":"cuny-grad","name":"City University of New York - Graduate Center","base_url":"https://academicworks.cuny.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"Who Governs the Sea? An Analysis of the Regime Complex in International Shipping","abstract":"<p>In many respects, international shipping represents the physical embodiment of globalization. It ties states together via the exchange of raw materials and finished goods in ways that inspire important questions about power distributions, trade, growth, global governance, jurisdiction, policy coordination, sovereignty, and regimes. Although shipping is a space that can be used to illustrate many International Relations ideas, it has been understudied in International Relations. This thesis argues that the international shipping regime complex produces suboptimal outcomes because it has inefficient and peculiar design features. Specifically, it locates the responsibility to enforce rules in states that lack the ability to do so and gives authority to make rules to actors that have clear conflicts of interest. Regional efforts have corrected the location of authority to enforce rules but have ultimately not been able to overcome the inefficient outcomes the regime complex produces.</p>","abstract_html":"&lt;p&gt;In many respects, international shipping represents the physical embodiment of globalization. It ties states together via the exchange of raw materials and finished goods in ways that inspire important questions about power distributions, trade, growth, global governance, jurisdiction, policy coordination, sovereignty, and regimes. Although shipping is a space that can be used to illustrate many International Relations ideas, it has been understudied in International Relations. This thesis argues that the international shipping regime complex produces suboptimal outcomes because it has inefficient and peculiar design features. Specifically, it locates the responsibility to enforce rules in states that lack the ability to do so and gives authority to make rules to actors that have clear conflicts of interest. Regional efforts have corrected the location of authority to enforce rules but have ultimately not been able to overcome the inefficient outcomes the regime complex produces.&lt;/p&gt;","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Landon, Brent"],"institution":"The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York","degree_name":"Master of Arts","degree_level":"Master","degree_discipline":"Political Science","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Stephanie R. Golob"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2020,"date_issued":"2020-06-01T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2020-06-01T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:58:22Z","subjects":["International Relations","International Maritime Organization","International Labor Organization","International Shipping"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3816","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Stephanie R. 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It ties states together via the exchange of raw materials and finished goods in ways that inspire important questions about power distributions, trade, growth, global governance, jurisdiction, policy coordination, sovereignty, and regimes. Although shipping is a space that can be used to illustrate many International Relations ideas, it has been understudied in International Relations. This thesis argues that the international shipping regime complex produces suboptimal outcomes because it has inefficient and peculiar design features. Specifically, it locates the responsibility to enforce rules in states that lack the ability to do so and gives authority to make rules to actors that have clear conflicts of interest. Regional efforts have corrected the location of authority to enforce rules but have ultimately not been able to overcome the inefficient outcomes the regime complex produces.</p>"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Who Governs the Sea? 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Specifically, it locates the responsibility to enforce rules in states that lack the ability to do so and gives authority to make rules to actors that have clear conflicts of interest. Regional efforts have corrected the location of authority to enforce rules but have ultimately not been able to overcome the inefficient outcomes the regime complex produces.</p>"],"dc:identifier":["https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3816"],"dc:subject":["International Relations","International Maritime Organization","International Labor Organization","International Shipping"],"dc:title":["Who Governs the Sea? An Analysis of the Regime Complex in International Shipping"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Political Science"],"thesis:degree_level":["Master"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master of Arts"],"thesis:institution_name":["The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:58:22Z"}