In this dissertation I answer the following question: Does recent empirical work give us reason to think that naive realism is false or that indirect realism is correct? There is a small amount of literature arguing that recent empirical findings pose problems for naive realism and suggest that perception involves mental representation. I review this literature and the arguments therein, examine the relevant empirical work, and argue that recent empirical work on perception does give us reason to reject naive realism and to favour an indirect realist view that countenances mental representations.
","abstract_html":"<p>In this dissertation I answer the following question: Does recent empirical work give us reason to think that naive realism is false or that indirect realism is correct? There is a small amount of literature arguing that recent empirical findings pose problems for naive realism and suggest that perception involves mental representation. I review this literature and the arguments therein, examine the relevant empirical work, and argue that recent empirical work on perception does give us reason to reject naive realism and to favour an indirect realist view that countenances mental representations.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Zigman, Philip"],"institution":"The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["David Rosenthal"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":["David Papineau","Howard Robinson","Jesse Prinz"],"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-09-01T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2018-09-01T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:59:54Z","subjects":["Philosophy of Mind"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2772","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["David Rosenthal"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["David Papineau","Howard Robinson","Jesse Prinz"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Zigman, Philip"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2018-06-26T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy of Mind"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2772"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["In this dissertation I answer the following question: Does recent empirical work give us reason to think that naive realism is false or that indirect realism is correct? There is a small amount of literature arguing that recent empirical findings pose problems for naive realism and suggest that perception involves mental representation. I review this literature and the arguments therein, examine the relevant empirical work, and argue that recent empirical work on perception does give us reason to reject naive realism and to favour an indirect realist view that countenances mental representations.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Theories of Perception and Recent Empirical Work"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["David Rosenthal"],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["David Papineau","Howard Robinson","Jesse Prinz"],"dc:creator":["Zigman, Philip"],"dc:date.available":["2018-06-26T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["In this dissertation I answer the following question: Does recent empirical work give us reason to think that naive realism is false or that indirect realism is correct? There is a small amount of literature arguing that recent empirical findings pose problems for naive realism and suggest that perception involves mental representation. I review this literature and the arguments therein, examine the relevant empirical work, and argue that recent empirical work on perception does give us reason to reject naive realism and to favour an indirect realist view that countenances mental representations.
"],"dc:identifier":["https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2772"],"dc:subject":["Philosophy of Mind"],"dc:title":["Theories of Perception and Recent Empirical Work"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["Doctoral"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy"],"thesis:institution_name":["The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:59:54Z"}