This dissertation is a defense of perceptual pluralism, the thesis that perceptual systems deliver multiple types of representations including those used in thought. In particular, it argues that perceptual systems output iconic (i.e., image-like, analog) representations as well as discursive (i.e., language-like, digital) states. A central thesis is that perceptual representations of objects are propositional and composed of concepts. It also develops a compositional syntax of iconic representation called the coordination model, according to which icons are sets of primitive parts, each of which determines values along multiple analog feature dimensions simultaneously. The dissertation supports the conclusion that perceptual processes are distinguished from cognition by encapsulation and stimulus control, not format.
","abstract_html":"<p>This dissertation is a defense of <em>perceptual pluralism</em>, the thesis that perceptual systems deliver multiple types of representations including those used in thought. In particular, it argues that perceptual systems output iconic (i.e., image-like, analog) representations as well as discursive (i.e., language-like, digital) states. A central thesis is that perceptual representations of objects are propositional and composed of concepts. It also develops a compositional syntax of iconic representation called the coordination model, according to which icons are sets of primitive parts, each of which determines values along multiple analog feature dimensions simultaneously. The dissertation supports the conclusion that perceptual processes are distinguished from cognition by encapsulation and stimulus control, not format.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Quilty-Dunn, James K"],"institution":"The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Jesse Prinz","Eric Mandelbaum"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":["David Papineau","Tatiana Eloi Emmanouil","Ned Block"],"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-09-30T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2017-09-30T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:58:49Z","subjects":["Cognition and Perception","Cognitive Psychology","Philosophy of Mind","Philosophy of Science","Theory and Philosophy","perception","cognition","representation","format","iconic","propositional"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2261","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Jesse Prinz","Eric Mandelbaum"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["David Papineau","Tatiana Eloi Emmanouil","Ned Block"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Quilty-Dunn, James K"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2017-08-13T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Cognition and Perception","Cognitive Psychology","Philosophy of Mind","Philosophy of Science","Theory and Philosophy","perception","cognition","representation","format","iconic","propositional"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2261"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This dissertation is a defense of perceptual pluralism, the thesis that perceptual systems deliver multiple types of representations including those used in thought. In particular, it argues that perceptual systems output iconic (i.e., image-like, analog) representations as well as discursive (i.e., language-like, digital) states. A central thesis is that perceptual representations of objects are propositional and composed of concepts. It also develops a compositional syntax of iconic representation called the coordination model, according to which icons are sets of primitive parts, each of which determines values along multiple analog feature dimensions simultaneously. The dissertation supports the conclusion that perceptual processes are distinguished from cognition by encapsulation and stimulus control, not format.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Syntax and Semantics of Perceptual Representation"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Jesse Prinz","Eric Mandelbaum"],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["David Papineau","Tatiana Eloi Emmanouil","Ned Block"],"dc:creator":["Quilty-Dunn, James K"],"dc:date.available":["2017-08-13T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["This dissertation is a defense of perceptual pluralism, the thesis that perceptual systems deliver multiple types of representations including those used in thought. In particular, it argues that perceptual systems output iconic (i.e., image-like, analog) representations as well as discursive (i.e., language-like, digital) states. A central thesis is that perceptual representations of objects are propositional and composed of concepts. It also develops a compositional syntax of iconic representation called the coordination model, according to which icons are sets of primitive parts, each of which determines values along multiple analog feature dimensions simultaneously. The dissertation supports the conclusion that perceptual processes are distinguished from cognition by encapsulation and stimulus control, not format.
"],"dc:identifier":["https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2261"],"dc:subject":["Cognition and Perception","Cognitive Psychology","Philosophy of Mind","Philosophy of Science","Theory and Philosophy","perception","cognition","representation","format","iconic","propositional"],"dc:title":["Syntax and Semantics of Perceptual Representation"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["Doctoral"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy"],"thesis:institution_name":["The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:58:49Z"}