The Challenge of Modifying Deviant Behavior: Restructuring Incentives in Renegade Regimes

This thesis considers whether international coercion used to confront deviant behavior in renegade or rogue regimes produces an offset of the benefits of continued defiant behavior, or produces a restructuring of incentives and a counterproductive result. Much has been written on the effectiveness of international coercion, but little focus has been given to the potential for a pressure to restructure the decision process in a non-desired way. This thesis contrasts the expectations of rational choice and expected-utility theory with prospect theory in the decision calculus of renegade regimes. Finally, this thesis creates a basic model for limited prediction by combining expectations of prospect theory with the incentive offsetting/incentive restructuring (IO/IR) models as proposed by Miroslav Nincic.

Grantor dc:publisher

Creighton University

Year dc:date.issued

2007

Author dc:creator

• Davis, Daniel J.

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Clark, Terry D.

Language dc:language.iso

en_US

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/10504/88

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:cdr.creighton.edu:10504/88