A Quantitative and Spatial Model of Escalation

Escalation is a critical concept within the greater literature on crises, conflict, deterrence, and bargaining. It is characterized as either a phenomenon of conflict or as a strategic option available to actors within a conflict, but in all cases it represents a discrete, qualitative step. Thus the current literature lacks a formal, quantitative approach to escalation. Additionally, while the current body of knowledge on escalation focuses on why escalation may occur, the process by which it occurs is largely unexplored. Finally, the literature largely fails to explore the potential relationship between misperception in international politics and escalation. This paper remedies these omissions in the literature by developing a quantitative, spatial, process-based model of escalation which accounts for the possibility of misperception between actors. The model forms the basis for computer simulations of conflict between two adversaries which, in turn, facilitates the comparison of multiple escalation strategies in conflict. An analysis of this tournament of strategies searches for and identifies two Nash equilibria along with four primary classes of outcomes to simulated conflict. Final conclusions from this analysis indicate that actors are generally unable to generate a decisive advantage in war through strategic choice and reinforce the idea of war as a “costly lottery” already present within the literature.

Grantor dc:publisher

Creighton University

Year dc:date.issued

2015

Author dc:creator

• Proctor, Johnathan

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Clark, Terry D.

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright is retained by the Author. A non-exclusive distribution right is granted to Creighton University and to ProQuest following the publishing model selected above.

Language dc:language.iso

en_US

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/10504/74263

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:cdr.creighton.edu:10504/74263