Characteristics of Fuzzy Social Choice Functions

This paper considers the strategic manipulation of fuzzy social choice functions where both individuals and groups can choose alternatives to various degrees. Past efforts to model fuzzy social choice and strategic manipulation have allowed individual preferences to be fuzzy but still required groups to select only one alternative. Under this new framework, the author finds, with very minimal assumptions on individual preferences, strategy-proof fuzzy social choice functions satisfy fuzzy versions of peak-only, weak Paretianism, and monotonicity. In addition, the only type of strategy-proof fuzzy choice function corresponds to the traditional augmented median rule. Further, the paper illustrates the implications of this framework in the spatial model. The paper suggests that social choice can be both strategy-proof and non-dictatorial if alternatives are chosen to various degrees.

Grantor dc:publisher

Creighton University

Year dc:date.issued

2011

Author dc:creator

• Gibilisco, Michael

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Clark, Terry D.

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright is retained by the Author. A non-exclusive distribution right is granted to Creighton University and to ProQuest following the publishing model selected above.

Language dc:language.iso

en_US

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/10504/16842

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:cdr.creighton.edu:10504/16842