{"id":{"repo_id":"columbia-diss","oai_identifier":"oai:academiccommons.columbia.edu:10.7916/D8XS62GQ"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/columbia-diss/oai:academiccommons.columbia.edu:10.7916/D8XS62GQ","repository":{"repo_id":"columbia-diss","name":"Columbia University","base_url":"https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/oai"},"display":{"title":"The Power of Agency","abstract":"My dissertation addresses a foundational problem in the philosophy of action, that of explaining the distinction between actions and mere events. Actions, I argue, have a uniquely active component that distinguishes them from mere events and which can be explained in terms of effort. Effort has several features: it is attributed directly to agents; it is a causal power that each agent alone possesses and employs; it enables agents causally to activate, sustain, and control their capacities during the performance of an action; and its presence comes in varying degrees of strength. After defending an effort-based account of action and criticizing what is known as the standard story of action, I apply my account to situations in which an agent displays strength of will, such as when one struggles to perform an action while overcoming a persistent urge to do otherwise. I conclude by offering an explanation of mental action that demonstrates the extent of our powers of agency within the domain of the mental.","abstract_html":"My dissertation addresses a foundational problem in the philosophy of action, that of explaining the distinction between actions and mere events. Actions, I argue, have a uniquely active component that distinguishes them from mere events and which can be explained in terms of effort. Effort has several features: it is attributed directly to agents; it is a causal power that each agent alone possesses and employs; it enables agents causally to activate, sustain, and control their capacities during the performance of an action; and its presence comes in varying degrees of strength. After defending an effort-based account of action and criticizing what is known as the standard story of action, I apply my account to situations in which an agent displays strength of will, such as when one struggles to perform an action while overcoming a persistent urge to do otherwise. I conclude by offering an explanation of mental action that demonstrates the extent of our powers of agency within the domain of the mental.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Brent, Michael"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2012,"date_issued":"2012","date_published":"2012","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:44:22Z","subjects":["Philosophy","Agent (Philosophy)","Act (Philosophy)"],"languages":["English"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/10.7916/D8XS62GQ","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Brent, Michael"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2012"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Theses"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy","Agent (Philosophy)","Act (Philosophy)"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://doi.org/10.7916/D8XS62GQ"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["My dissertation addresses a foundational problem in the philosophy of action, that of explaining the distinction between actions and mere events. Actions, I argue, have a uniquely active component that distinguishes them from mere events and which can be explained in terms of effort. Effort has several features: it is attributed directly to agents; it is a causal power that each agent alone possesses and employs; it enables agents causally to activate, sustain, and control their capacities during the performance of an action; and its presence comes in varying degrees of strength. After defending an effort-based account of action and criticizing what is known as the standard story of action, I apply my account to situations in which an agent displays strength of will, such as when one struggles to perform an action while overcoming a persistent urge to do otherwise. I conclude by offering an explanation of mental action that demonstrates the extent of our powers of agency within the domain of the mental."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The Power of Agency"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:creator":["Brent, Michael"],"dc:date":["2012"],"dc:description":["My dissertation addresses a foundational problem in the philosophy of action, that of explaining the distinction between actions and mere events. Actions, I argue, have a uniquely active component that distinguishes them from mere events and which can be explained in terms of effort. Effort has several features: it is attributed directly to agents; it is a causal power that each agent alone possesses and employs; it enables agents causally to activate, sustain, and control their capacities during the performance of an action; and its presence comes in varying degrees of strength. After defending an effort-based account of action and criticizing what is known as the standard story of action, I apply my account to situations in which an agent displays strength of will, such as when one struggles to perform an action while overcoming a persistent urge to do otherwise. I conclude by offering an explanation of mental action that demonstrates the extent of our powers of agency within the domain of the mental."],"dc:identifier":["https://doi.org/10.7916/D8XS62GQ"],"dc:language":["English"],"dc:subject":["Philosophy","Agent (Philosophy)","Act (Philosophy)"],"dc:title":["The Power of Agency"],"dc:type":["Theses"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:44:22Z"}