Second Nature and Ethical Life: Habit, Culture, and Critique in Hegel's Science of Right

This dissertation investigates the status of reflection in Hegel's account of modern ethical life. I ask, on the one hand, why Hegel places so much significance on unreflective attitudes, and on the other, which forms of reflection remain compatible with what he calls the habit of the ethical. This question exposes crucial commitments underlying Hegel's project in the Philosophy of Right and interrogates the flexibility of his account and its openness to normative change. Yet my inquiry also has broader implications for the nature of social criticism. I argue that even reflection of the overtly critical variety emerges from and remains indebted to our habitual comportment and that this is why it must retain a valued place in ethical life.

Author dc:creator

• Novakovic, Andreja

• Philosophy
• Ethics
• Criticism
• Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831
• Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich)

Language dc:language

English

DOI dc:identifier

https://doi.org/10.7916/D8MG7WMX

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:academiccommons.columbia.edu:10.7916/D8MG7WMX