{"id":{"repo_id":"columbia-diss","oai_identifier":"oai:academiccommons.columbia.edu:10.7916/D8988F3B"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/columbia-diss/oai:academiccommons.columbia.edu:10.7916/D8988F3B","repository":{"repo_id":"columbia-diss","name":"Columbia University","base_url":"https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/oai"},"display":{"title":"Four essays on strategic communication","abstract":"This dissertation studies patterns of strategic communication in cases, in which the involved parties disagree in their preferences or opinions. In Chapter 1, I study a model of strategic communication in networks, in which the players diverge in their preferences and information can be communicated either through a costly verifiable information (hard) channel or through a low-cost cheap talk (soft) channel. I find that the availability of hard links allows each agent to get a weakly greater number of truthful messages compared to the pure cheap talk setting. If only one party bears the cost of a hard link, then introducing hard links increases the total expected welfare. In contrast, if the cost of a hard link is shared by both parties, then allowing for verifiable communication can decrease the total welfare. In Chapter 2, I consider a model of strategic cheap talk communication in networks, in which the players can disagree in their preferences or their opinions. I find that the information transmission pattern crucially depends on the nature of the disagreement. If the agents diverge in their preferences, then information transmission exhibits a negative externality effect: greater information obtained by some agent discourages further information accumulation by harming the credibility of other agents. In contrast, information transmission displays a positive externality effect when the agents have divergent opinions: greater information obtained by some agent encourages further information accumulation by improving the credibility of other agents. Chapter 3 studies a benevolent authority's decision to constrain or inform a population of individuals. It demonstrates that the authority's decision to regulate an activity depends on whether she deems it a matter of preference or opinion. In the former case, the benevolent authority is libertarian: she gives truthful advice and safeguards liberty. In the latter case, the benevolent authority is paternalistic: believing that she acts in the individuals' best interest, the authority forces another action than the individuals would choose for themselves. In Chapter 4, I consider communication between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. The Sender has a preference bias and is guilt averse to letting down the Receiver's payoff expectations. I show that no separating equilibrium exists; rather, in case of uniform state of the world and quadratic utilities, I demonstrate that there exist partition equilibria (as in Crawford and Sobel (1982)). An increase in the guilt aversion intensity is akin a decrease in the preference divergence: higher guilt aversion intensity allows for more intervals in the equilibrium partition; and holding the number of elements in the partition fixed, greater guilt aversion intensity results in more balanced intervals.","abstract_html":"This dissertation studies patterns of strategic communication in cases, in which the involved parties disagree in their preferences or opinions. In Chapter 1, I study a model of strategic communication in networks, in which the players diverge in their preferences and information can be communicated either through a costly verifiable information (hard) channel or through a low-cost cheap talk (soft) channel. I find that the availability of hard links allows each agent to get a weakly greater number of truthful messages compared to the pure cheap talk setting. If only one party bears the cost of a hard link, then introducing hard links increases the total expected welfare. In contrast, if the cost of a hard link is shared by both parties, then allowing for verifiable communication can decrease the total welfare. In Chapter 2, I consider a model of strategic cheap talk communication in networks, in which the players can disagree in their preferences or their opinions. I find that the information transmission pattern crucially depends on the nature of the disagreement. If the agents diverge in their preferences, then information transmission exhibits a negative externality effect: greater information obtained by some agent discourages further information accumulation by harming the credibility of other agents. In contrast, information transmission displays a positive externality effect when the agents have divergent opinions: greater information obtained by some agent encourages further information accumulation by improving the credibility of other agents. Chapter 3 studies a benevolent authority's decision to constrain or inform a population of individuals. It demonstrates that the authority's decision to regulate an activity depends on whether she deems it a matter of preference or opinion. In the former case, the benevolent authority is libertarian: she gives truthful advice and safeguards liberty. In the latter case, the benevolent authority is paternalistic: believing that she acts in the individuals' best interest, the authority forces another action than the individuals would choose for themselves. In Chapter 4, I consider communication between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. The Sender has a preference bias and is guilt averse to letting down the Receiver's payoff expectations. I show that no separating equilibrium exists; rather, in case of uniform state of the world and quadratic utilities, I demonstrate that there exist partition equilibria (as in Crawford and Sobel (1982)). An increase in the guilt aversion intensity is akin a decrease in the preference divergence: higher guilt aversion intensity allows for more intervals in the equilibrium partition; and holding the number of elements in the partition fixed, greater guilt aversion intensity results in more balanced intervals.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Loginova, Uliana"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2012,"date_issued":"2012","date_published":"2012","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:44:18Z","subjects":["Economics"],"languages":["English"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/10.7916/D8988F3B","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Loginova, Uliana"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2012"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Theses"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Economics"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://doi.org/10.7916/D8988F3B"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["This dissertation studies patterns of strategic communication in cases, in which the involved parties disagree in their preferences or opinions. In Chapter 1, I study a model of strategic communication in networks, in which the players diverge in their preferences and information can be communicated either through a costly verifiable information (hard) channel or through a low-cost cheap talk (soft) channel. I find that the availability of hard links allows each agent to get a weakly greater number of truthful messages compared to the pure cheap talk setting. If only one party bears the cost of a hard link, then introducing hard links increases the total expected welfare. In contrast, if the cost of a hard link is shared by both parties, then allowing for verifiable communication can decrease the total welfare. In Chapter 2, I consider a model of strategic cheap talk communication in networks, in which the players can disagree in their preferences or their opinions. I find that the information transmission pattern crucially depends on the nature of the disagreement. If the agents diverge in their preferences, then information transmission exhibits a negative externality effect: greater information obtained by some agent discourages further information accumulation by harming the credibility of other agents. In contrast, information transmission displays a positive externality effect when the agents have divergent opinions: greater information obtained by some agent encourages further information accumulation by improving the credibility of other agents. Chapter 3 studies a benevolent authority's decision to constrain or inform a population of individuals. It demonstrates that the authority's decision to regulate an activity depends on whether she deems it a matter of preference or opinion. In the former case, the benevolent authority is libertarian: she gives truthful advice and safeguards liberty. In the latter case, the benevolent authority is paternalistic: believing that she acts in the individuals' best interest, the authority forces another action than the individuals would choose for themselves. In Chapter 4, I consider communication between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. The Sender has a preference bias and is guilt averse to letting down the Receiver's payoff expectations. I show that no separating equilibrium exists; rather, in case of uniform state of the world and quadratic utilities, I demonstrate that there exist partition equilibria (as in Crawford and Sobel (1982)). An increase in the guilt aversion intensity is akin a decrease in the preference divergence: higher guilt aversion intensity allows for more intervals in the equilibrium partition; and holding the number of elements in the partition fixed, greater guilt aversion intensity results in more balanced intervals."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Four essays on strategic communication"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:creator":["Loginova, Uliana"],"dc:date":["2012"],"dc:description":["This dissertation studies patterns of strategic communication in cases, in which the involved parties disagree in their preferences or opinions. In Chapter 1, I study a model of strategic communication in networks, in which the players diverge in their preferences and information can be communicated either through a costly verifiable information (hard) channel or through a low-cost cheap talk (soft) channel. I find that the availability of hard links allows each agent to get a weakly greater number of truthful messages compared to the pure cheap talk setting. If only one party bears the cost of a hard link, then introducing hard links increases the total expected welfare. In contrast, if the cost of a hard link is shared by both parties, then allowing for verifiable communication can decrease the total welfare. In Chapter 2, I consider a model of strategic cheap talk communication in networks, in which the players can disagree in their preferences or their opinions. I find that the information transmission pattern crucially depends on the nature of the disagreement. If the agents diverge in their preferences, then information transmission exhibits a negative externality effect: greater information obtained by some agent discourages further information accumulation by harming the credibility of other agents. In contrast, information transmission displays a positive externality effect when the agents have divergent opinions: greater information obtained by some agent encourages further information accumulation by improving the credibility of other agents. Chapter 3 studies a benevolent authority's decision to constrain or inform a population of individuals. It demonstrates that the authority's decision to regulate an activity depends on whether she deems it a matter of preference or opinion. In the former case, the benevolent authority is libertarian: she gives truthful advice and safeguards liberty. In the latter case, the benevolent authority is paternalistic: believing that she acts in the individuals' best interest, the authority forces another action than the individuals would choose for themselves. In Chapter 4, I consider communication between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. The Sender has a preference bias and is guilt averse to letting down the Receiver's payoff expectations. I show that no separating equilibrium exists; rather, in case of uniform state of the world and quadratic utilities, I demonstrate that there exist partition equilibria (as in Crawford and Sobel (1982)). An increase in the guilt aversion intensity is akin a decrease in the preference divergence: higher guilt aversion intensity allows for more intervals in the equilibrium partition; and holding the number of elements in the partition fixed, greater guilt aversion intensity results in more balanced intervals."],"dc:identifier":["https://doi.org/10.7916/D8988F3B"],"dc:language":["English"],"dc:subject":["Economics"],"dc:title":["Four essays on strategic communication"],"dc:type":["Theses"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:44:18Z"}