{"id":{"repo_id":"columbia-diss","oai_identifier":"oai:academiccommons.columbia.edu:10.7916/D82R3ZNG"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/columbia-diss/oai:academiccommons.columbia.edu:10.7916/D82R3ZNG","repository":{"repo_id":"columbia-diss","name":"Columbia University","base_url":"https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/oai"},"display":{"title":"Two Approaches to Non-Zero-Sum Stochastic Differential Games of Control and Stopping","abstract":"This dissertation takes two approaches - martingale and backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) - to solve non-zero-sum stochastic differential games in which all players can control and stop the reward streams of the games. Existence of equilibrium stopping rules is proved under some assumptions. The martingale part provides an equivalent martingale characterization of Nash equilibrium strategies of the games. When using equilibrium stopping rules, Isaacs' condition is necessary and sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium control set. The BSDE part shows that solutions to BSDEs provide value processes of the games. A multidimensional BSDE with reflecting barrier is studied in two cases for its solution: existence and uniqueness with Lipschitz growth, and existence in a Markovian system with linear growth rate.","abstract_html":"This dissertation takes two approaches - martingale and backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) - to solve non-zero-sum stochastic differential games in which all players can control and stop the reward streams of the games. Existence of equilibrium stopping rules is proved under some assumptions. The martingale part provides an equivalent martingale characterization of Nash equilibrium strategies of the games. When using equilibrium stopping rules, Isaacs' condition is necessary and sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium control set. The BSDE part shows that solutions to BSDEs provide value processes of the games. A multidimensional BSDE with reflecting barrier is studied in two cases for its solution: existence and uniqueness with Lipschitz growth, and existence in a Markovian system with linear growth rate.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Li, Qinghua"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2011,"date_issued":"2011","date_published":"2011","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:44:11Z","subjects":["Mathematical statistics","Stochastic processes","Game theory--Mathematical models"],"languages":["English"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/10.7916/D82R3ZNG","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Li, Qinghua"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2011"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Theses"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Mathematical statistics","Stochastic processes","Game theory--Mathematical models"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://doi.org/10.7916/D82R3ZNG"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["This dissertation takes two approaches - martingale and backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) - to solve non-zero-sum stochastic differential games in which all players can control and stop the reward streams of the games. Existence of equilibrium stopping rules is proved under some assumptions. The martingale part provides an equivalent martingale characterization of Nash equilibrium strategies of the games. When using equilibrium stopping rules, Isaacs' condition is necessary and sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium control set. The BSDE part shows that solutions to BSDEs provide value processes of the games. A multidimensional BSDE with reflecting barrier is studied in two cases for its solution: existence and uniqueness with Lipschitz growth, and existence in a Markovian system with linear growth rate."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Two Approaches to Non-Zero-Sum Stochastic Differential Games of Control and Stopping"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:creator":["Li, Qinghua"],"dc:date":["2011"],"dc:description":["This dissertation takes two approaches - martingale and backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) - to solve non-zero-sum stochastic differential games in which all players can control and stop the reward streams of the games. Existence of equilibrium stopping rules is proved under some assumptions. The martingale part provides an equivalent martingale characterization of Nash equilibrium strategies of the games. When using equilibrium stopping rules, Isaacs' condition is necessary and sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium control set. The BSDE part shows that solutions to BSDEs provide value processes of the games. A multidimensional BSDE with reflecting barrier is studied in two cases for its solution: existence and uniqueness with Lipschitz growth, and existence in a Markovian system with linear growth rate."],"dc:identifier":["https://doi.org/10.7916/D82R3ZNG"],"dc:language":["English"],"dc:subject":["Mathematical statistics","Stochastic processes","Game theory--Mathematical models"],"dc:title":["Two Approaches to Non-Zero-Sum Stochastic Differential Games of Control and Stopping"],"dc:type":["Theses"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:44:11Z"}