In July 1936, Spain descended into chaos and civil war. Fascists in the military, Catholic Church, and aristocracy rebelled against a government elected to reform centuries old power structures. The United States reacted in surprise and joined France and Britain, staunchly refusing to be involved. For six months, the Department of State impeded attempts to material assist the Spanish government, until Congress passed an updated neutrality law prohibiting trade with Spain or the rebels. Congress again renewed and updated the law a year later. Yet in spring of 1939, at the end of the war, Franklin D. Roosevelt told his ambassador to Spain he regretted not assisting the Spanish government.
The president, however, unfairly critiqued himself. The United States never debated involvement. “Foreign Relations of the United States” (FRUS), the State Department’s official edited record of diplomatic reporting, has no record of diplomatic reporting warning of imminent war, despite ample indications. Bowers provided timely reports during the first six months of the war on assisting Americans in Spain and the diplomatic community’s activities. He did not report his observations of German and Italian military activity, atrocities committed by the fascists, or the consequences of prohibiting supplies from reaching Spanish government forces.
It is impossible to know how broader reporting might have changed decisions in Washington. This thesis does not argue American intervention could or would have changed the outcome of the war. This thesis argues that Bowers had a responsibility for fuller diplomatic vi reporting to inform better policy decisions in Washington and that lessons American learned post World War II resulting in intervention, globalist international policies, and diplomats opining on policy and recommending changes rather than just reporting, could have been learned from the Spanish Civil War.
","abstract_html":"<p>In July 1936, Spain descended into chaos and civil war. Fascists in the military, Catholic Church, and aristocracy rebelled against a government elected to reform centuries old power structures. The United States reacted in surprise and joined France and Britain, staunchly refusing to be involved. For six months, the Department of State impeded attempts to material assist the Spanish government, until Congress passed an updated neutrality law prohibiting trade with Spain or the rebels. Congress again renewed and updated the law a year later. Yet in spring of 1939, at the end of the war, Franklin D. Roosevelt told his ambassador to Spain he regretted not assisting the Spanish government.</p> <p>The president, however, unfairly critiqued himself. The United States never debated involvement. “Foreign Relations of the United States” (FRUS), the State Department’s official edited record of diplomatic reporting, has no record of diplomatic reporting warning of imminent war, despite ample indications. Bowers provided timely reports during the first six months of the war on assisting Americans in Spain and the diplomatic community’s activities. He did not report his observations of German and Italian military activity, atrocities committed by the fascists, or the consequences of prohibiting supplies from reaching Spanish government forces.</p> <p>It is impossible to know how broader reporting might have changed decisions in Washington. This thesis does not argue American intervention could or would have changed the outcome of the war. This thesis argues that Bowers had a responsibility for fuller diplomatic vi reporting to inform better policy decisions in Washington and that lessons American learned post World War II resulting in intervention, globalist international policies, and diplomats opining on policy and recommending changes rather than just reporting, could have been learned from the Spanish Civil War.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Missbach, Kyle"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Master of Arts (MA)","degree_level":"Thesis","degree_discipline":"War and Society","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Kyle Longley","Jennifer Keene","Mateo Jarquin"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2024,"date_issued":"2024-01-01T08:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-01-01T08:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:38:37Z","subjects":["Spain","Diplomacy","Neutrality","Bowers","Political History","United States History"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/war_and_society_theses/37","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Kyle Longley","Jennifer Keene","Mateo Jarquin"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Missbach, Kyle"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2024-01-31T08:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["War and Society"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Arts (MA)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Spain","Diplomacy","Neutrality","Bowers","Political History","United States History"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/war_and_society_theses/37"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["In July 1936, Spain descended into chaos and civil war. Fascists in the military, Catholic Church, and aristocracy rebelled against a government elected to reform centuries old power structures. The United States reacted in surprise and joined France and Britain, staunchly refusing to be involved. For six months, the Department of State impeded attempts to material assist the Spanish government, until Congress passed an updated neutrality law prohibiting trade with Spain or the rebels. Congress again renewed and updated the law a year later. Yet in spring of 1939, at the end of the war, Franklin D. Roosevelt told his ambassador to Spain he regretted not assisting the Spanish government.
The president, however, unfairly critiqued himself. The United States never debated involvement. “Foreign Relations of the United States” (FRUS), the State Department’s official edited record of diplomatic reporting, has no record of diplomatic reporting warning of imminent war, despite ample indications. Bowers provided timely reports during the first six months of the war on assisting Americans in Spain and the diplomatic community’s activities. He did not report his observations of German and Italian military activity, atrocities committed by the fascists, or the consequences of prohibiting supplies from reaching Spanish government forces.
It is impossible to know how broader reporting might have changed decisions in Washington. This thesis does not argue American intervention could or would have changed the outcome of the war. This thesis argues that Bowers had a responsibility for fuller diplomatic vi reporting to inform better policy decisions in Washington and that lessons American learned post World War II resulting in intervention, globalist international policies, and diplomats opining on policy and recommending changes rather than just reporting, could have been learned from the Spanish Civil War.
"]},{"key":"dc:source","label":"Dc Source","values":["Missbach, Kyle J. \"Lessons Not Learned.\" Master's thesis, Chapman University, 2024. https://doi.org/10.36837/chapman.000527"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Lessons Not Learned"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Kyle Longley","Jennifer Keene","Mateo Jarquin"],"dc:creator":["Missbach, Kyle"],"dc:date.available":["2024-01-31T08:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["In July 1936, Spain descended into chaos and civil war. Fascists in the military, Catholic Church, and aristocracy rebelled against a government elected to reform centuries old power structures. The United States reacted in surprise and joined France and Britain, staunchly refusing to be involved. For six months, the Department of State impeded attempts to material assist the Spanish government, until Congress passed an updated neutrality law prohibiting trade with Spain or the rebels. Congress again renewed and updated the law a year later. Yet in spring of 1939, at the end of the war, Franklin D. Roosevelt told his ambassador to Spain he regretted not assisting the Spanish government.
The president, however, unfairly critiqued himself. The United States never debated involvement. “Foreign Relations of the United States” (FRUS), the State Department’s official edited record of diplomatic reporting, has no record of diplomatic reporting warning of imminent war, despite ample indications. Bowers provided timely reports during the first six months of the war on assisting Americans in Spain and the diplomatic community’s activities. He did not report his observations of German and Italian military activity, atrocities committed by the fascists, or the consequences of prohibiting supplies from reaching Spanish government forces.
It is impossible to know how broader reporting might have changed decisions in Washington. This thesis does not argue American intervention could or would have changed the outcome of the war. This thesis argues that Bowers had a responsibility for fuller diplomatic vi reporting to inform better policy decisions in Washington and that lessons American learned post World War II resulting in intervention, globalist international policies, and diplomats opining on policy and recommending changes rather than just reporting, could have been learned from the Spanish Civil War.
"],"dc:identifier":["https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/war_and_society_theses/37"],"dc:source":["Missbach, Kyle J. \"Lessons Not Learned.\" Master's thesis, Chapman University, 2024. https://doi.org/10.36837/chapman.000527"],"dc:subject":["Spain","Diplomacy","Neutrality","Bowers","Political History","United States History"],"dc:title":["Lessons Not Learned"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["War and Society"],"thesis:degree_level":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master of Arts (MA)"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:38:37Z"}