In this thesis we conduct a laboratory experiment to examine the preferences of sellers and buyers for the reserve price mechanism and test their rationalizability. We use a stylized independent private value environment, a second price auction institution and a first price auction institution to investigate if the preference is monetizable. We find that the revealed preference of the sellers does not translate on the aggregate level and partially on the individual level. Further, sellers who choose public reserve prices set higher reserve prices and achieve higher sales prices. Lastly, we find that buyers are willing to pay to obtain the reserve price information.
","abstract_html":"<p>In this thesis we conduct a laboratory experiment to examine the preferences of sellers and buyers for the reserve price mechanism and test their rationalizability. We use a stylized independent private value environment, a second price auction institution and a first price auction institution to investigate if the preference is monetizable. We find that the revealed preference of the sellers does not translate on the aggregate level and partially on the individual level. Further, sellers who choose public reserve prices set higher reserve prices and achieve higher sales prices. Lastly, we find that buyers are willing to pay to obtain the reserve price information.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Limberg, Philipp"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Master of Science (MS)","degree_level":"Thesis","degree_discipline":"Behavioral and Computational Economics","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Dr. David Porter","Dr. Erik Kimbrough"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2020,"date_issued":"2020-05-01T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2020-05-01T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:38:09Z","subjects":[],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/behavioral_and_computational_economics_theses/1","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Dr. David Porter","Dr. Erik Kimbrough"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Limberg, Philipp"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Behavioral and Computational Economics"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Science (MS)"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/behavioral_and_computational_economics_theses/1"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["In this thesis we conduct a laboratory experiment to examine the preferences of sellers and buyers for the reserve price mechanism and test their rationalizability. We use a stylized independent private value environment, a second price auction institution and a first price auction institution to investigate if the preference is monetizable. We find that the revealed preference of the sellers does not translate on the aggregate level and partially on the individual level. Further, sellers who choose public reserve prices set higher reserve prices and achieve higher sales prices. Lastly, we find that buyers are willing to pay to obtain the reserve price information.
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