Personhood, Persistence, and Constitution

In the following essay I argue that psychological continuity provides the most suitable account of a person’s persistence. This is in accordance with Derek Parfit’s claim that what’s important in cases of survival is not personal identity, but psychological continuity. The essay focuses on a criticism raised by Marya Schechtman. She argues that Parfit’s account doesn’t sufficiently distinguish between the metaphysical and practical concerns of a person’s persistence, which she takes to create significant problems. I respond to her criticisms to show that these problems are not as significant as she claims, and that by attempting to address them, her own view suffers. The difficulty with her view results from too broad a concept of personhood. This is the result of confusing the causal with the constitutive features of personhood. Once these features are distinguished, we can see why psychological continuity provides a better account of a person’s persistence.

Name thesis:degree_name

Master of Arts (M.A.)

Level thesis:degree_level

Master's

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor dc:publisher

Carleton University

Year dc:date.issued

2017

Author dc:creator

• Casey, Daniel

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright © 2017 the author(s). Theses may be used for non-commercial research, educational, or related academic purposes only. Such uses include personal study, research, scholarship, and teaching. Theses may only be shared by linking to Carleton University Institutional Repository and no part may be used without proper attribution to the author. No part may be used for commercial purposes directly or indirectly via a for-profit platform; no adaptation or derivative works are permitted without consent from the copyright owner.

Language dc:language.iso

en

DOI

10.22215/etd/2017-12016

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:carleton.scholaris.ca:20.500.14718/40174