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Carleton University

The Insurgent's Dilemma: A Theory of Mobilization and Conflict Outcome

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Why do some rebel groups win while others lose? Current explanations for why the outcomes of insurgencies vary tend to either overlook the role that the population plays in supporting an insurgency or fail to specify how the requirements of a rebel group's mobilization of popular support might have their own effect on conflict outcome. In this dissertation, I develop a theory of conflict outcome that links a rebel group's mobilization of popular support to organizational and administrative reforms, which, in turn, affect an insurgency's chances of winning or losing. I argue that all rebel groups face a core "Insurgent's Dilemma." On the one hand, insurgent groups often need to become organizationally centralized and have a large-scale administrative presence in order to mobilize a large amount of popular support, because with higher levels of popular support comes a greater chance of defeating a regime. Yet the same organizational and administrative characteristics that allow for effective mobilization actually favour the state in its efforts to destroy an insurgency. On the other hand, an insurgency can abjure centralization and a large-scale presence and avoid adopting characteristics that favour the state's counterinsurgency efforts. Doing so, however, limits the amount of popular support that an insurgency can ultimately mobilize, which effectively means that the group is unlikely to succeed, even if it is hard to defeat. Throughout the development of the mobilization and conflict outcome theory, I substantiate each point with qualitative historical evidence from a number of insurgencies. I also explicitly test three hypotheses that are derived from the theory using descriptive statistics from 21 insurgencies. Finally, I test the proposed mechanisms against four cases (the Mau Mau in Kenya, the Shining Path in Peru, the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, and the EPLF in Eritrea).

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
International Affairs
Grantor dc:publisher
Carleton University
Year dc:date.issued
2014

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Jardine, Eric

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Copyright © 2014 the author(s). Theses may be used for non-commercial research, educational, or related academic purposes only. Such uses include personal study, research, scholarship, and teaching. Theses may only be shared by linking to Carleton University Institutional Repository and no part may be used without proper attribution to the author. No part may be used for commercial purposes directly or indirectly via a for-profit platform; no adaptation or derivative works are permitted without consent from the copyright owner.
Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:carleton.scholaris.ca:20.500.14718/39858

Chain of custody

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Carleton University
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Last updated
2026-07-24
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citation

Jardine, Eric. The Insurgent's Dilemma: A Theory of Mobilization and Conflict Outcome. Doctoral thesis, Carleton University, 2014. https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14718/39858