Abstract
dc:description.abstractThe aim of this essay is to present a novel line of argument in support of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy of language. It consists in three parts. First, it explores a family of referential theories of meaning belonging to the tradition of Millian semantics – a family dubbed ‘Millian externalism.’ Second, it draws on the work of both Wittgenstein and Noam Chomsky to undermine the tenability of Millian externalism, all the while generating insights into the nature of an adequate semantic theory as it proceeds. And third, from the fact that Millian externalism fails insofar as it purports to be a scientific theory of meaning, the essay concludes that philosophy of language must give in to a theory of meaning which endorses Wittgensteinian quietism. If it refuses, then it must conform to the methodology of linguistics.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Master of Arts (M.A.)
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Master's
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Philosophy
- Grantor dc:publisher
- Carleton University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2015
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Tweedie, Andrew John
Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- Copyright © 2015 the author(s). Theses may be used for non-commercial research, educational, or related academic purposes only. Such uses include personal study, research, scholarship, and teaching. Theses may only be shared by linking to Carleton University Institutional Repository and no part may be used without proper attribution to the author. No part may be used for commercial purposes directly or indirectly via a for-profit platform; no adaptation or derivative works are permitted without consent from the copyright owner.
- Language dc:language.iso
- en
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:carleton.scholaris.ca:20.500.14718/32683