{"id":{"repo_id":"cape-town","oai_identifier":"oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/9157"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/cape-town/oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/9157","repository":{"repo_id":"cape-town","name":"University of Cape Town","base_url":"https://open.uct.ac.za/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"An assessment of the suitability of the criminal cartel offence in South African competition law","abstract":"Section 73A of the Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009 which will be inserted into the Competition Act 89 of 1998, will hold directors/executives criminally liable for infringing s4(1)(b) of the Competition Act. Section 4(1)(b) specifically prohibits firms from engaging in price-fixing, collusive tendering, market allocation which are regarded as egregious forms of activity. The underlying justification for the cartel offence is the protection of consumer welfare and on the other hand to address the under-deterrent nature of monetary administrative penalties in the fight against cartels. In its current form, s73A has several weaknesses which will negatively impact competition enforcement; particularly the leniency policy which is the Commission’s most effective weapon against cartelisation. The emergence of follow-on damages litigation as a legal remedy and class actions as a procedural mechanism in the bread class action, have paved the way for private competition enforcement as a more effective deterrent. The lack of a statutory regulatory framework compelled the courts to develop the common law regarding follow-on damages litigation and class actions. Although the exercise has highlighted the challenges associated with the lack of judicial guidance in developing directives, it has indicated that private competition enforcement is a pragmatic solution for cartelisation.","abstract_html":"Section 73A of the Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009 which will be inserted into the Competition Act 89 of 1998, will hold directors/executives criminally liable for infringing s4(1)(b) of the Competition Act. Section 4(1)(b) specifically prohibits firms from engaging in price-fixing, collusive tendering, market allocation which are regarded as egregious forms of activity. The underlying justification for the cartel offence is the protection of consumer welfare and on the other hand to address the under-deterrent nature of monetary administrative penalties in the fight against cartels. In its current form, s73A has several weaknesses which will negatively impact competition enforcement; particularly the leniency policy which is the Commission’s most effective weapon against cartelisation. The emergence of follow-on damages litigation as a legal remedy and class actions as a procedural mechanism in the bread class action, have paved the way for private competition enforcement as a more effective deterrent. The lack of a statutory regulatory framework compelled the courts to develop the common law regarding follow-on damages litigation and class actions. Although the exercise has highlighted the challenges associated with the lack of judicial guidance in developing directives, it has indicated that private competition enforcement is a pragmatic solution for cartelisation.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Ramalohlanye, Zandile"],"institution":"Department of Commercial Law","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Kelly, Luke"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2013,"date_issued":"2013","date_published":"2013","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:22:41Z","subjects":[],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/11427/9157","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Kelly, Luke"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Ramalohlanye, Zandile"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2014-11-05T03:53:49Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2014-11-05T03:53:49Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2013"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.department","label":"Dc Publisher Department","values":["Department of Commercial Law"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Cape Town"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Master Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["Masters"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationname","label":"Dc Type Qualificationname","values":["LLM"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["eng"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/11427/9157"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Includes bibliographical references"]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Section 73A of the Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009 which will be inserted into the Competition Act 89 of 1998, will hold directors/executives criminally liable for infringing s4(1)(b) of the Competition Act. Section 4(1)(b) specifically prohibits firms from engaging in price-fixing, collusive tendering, market allocation which are regarded as egregious forms of activity. The underlying justification for the cartel offence is the protection of consumer welfare and on the other hand to address the under-deterrent nature of monetary administrative penalties in the fight against cartels. In its current form, s73A has several weaknesses which will negatively impact competition enforcement; particularly the leniency policy which is the Commission’s most effective weapon against cartelisation. The emergence of follow-on damages litigation as a legal remedy and class actions as a procedural mechanism in the bread class action, have paved the way for private competition enforcement as a more effective deterrent. The lack of a statutory regulatory framework compelled the courts to develop the common law regarding follow-on damages litigation and class actions. Although the exercise has highlighted the challenges associated with the lack of judicial guidance in developing directives, it has indicated that private competition enforcement is a pragmatic solution for cartelisation."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["An assessment of the suitability of the criminal cartel offence in South African competition law"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Kelly, Luke"],"dc:creator":["Ramalohlanye, Zandile"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2014-11-05T03:53:49Z"],"dc:date.available":["2014-11-05T03:53:49Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2013"],"dc:description":["Includes bibliographical references"],"dc:description.abstract":["Section 73A of the Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009 which will be inserted into the Competition Act 89 of 1998, will hold directors/executives criminally liable for infringing s4(1)(b) of the Competition Act. Section 4(1)(b) specifically prohibits firms from engaging in price-fixing, collusive tendering, market allocation which are regarded as egregious forms of activity. The underlying justification for the cartel offence is the protection of consumer welfare and on the other hand to address the under-deterrent nature of monetary administrative penalties in the fight against cartels. In its current form, s73A has several weaknesses which will negatively impact competition enforcement; particularly the leniency policy which is the Commission’s most effective weapon against cartelisation. The emergence of follow-on damages litigation as a legal remedy and class actions as a procedural mechanism in the bread class action, have paved the way for private competition enforcement as a more effective deterrent. The lack of a statutory regulatory framework compelled the courts to develop the common law regarding follow-on damages litigation and class actions. Although the exercise has highlighted the challenges associated with the lack of judicial guidance in developing directives, it has indicated that private competition enforcement is a pragmatic solution for cartelisation."],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/11427/9157"],"dc:language.iso":["eng"],"dc:publisher.department":["Department of Commercial Law"],"dc:publisher.institution":["University of Cape Town"],"dc:title":["An assessment of the suitability of the criminal cartel offence in South African competition law"],"dc:type":["Master Thesis"],"dc:type.qualificationlevel":["Masters"],"dc:type.qualificationname":["LLM"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:22:41Z"}